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Developing countries are more likely than developed countries to pursue a xed exchange
rate regime, yet this pattern is not directly predicted by conventional theories of optimum
currency area. The rst Chapter proposes a new theory of exchange rate regime choice
di¤erent from the policy makers credibility argument in the "fear of oating" theory that
stresses the roles of both stage of economic development and labor market frictions. In
general, for a typical developing country with low labor productivity and high labor market
frictions, a xed exchange rate regime would yield a higher level of welfare than a oating
regime as the former generates more export revenue. The opposite is true for a country
with high labor productivity or a more exible labor market. We provide empirical evidence
that is consistent with the key predictions of the theory.
The second chapter investigates some new hypothesis of the high savings rates and cur-
rent account surpluses in countries like China. Large savings and current account surpluses
by China and other countries are said to be a contributor to the global current account
imbalances. In this chapter, we propose a theory of excess savings based on a major trans-
formation in many of these societies, namely, a steady increase in the surplus of men relative
to women. We construct an OLG model with two sexes and a desire to marry. We show
conditions under which an intensied competition in the marriage market can induce men
to raise their savings rate, and produce a rise in both the aggregate savings and current
account surplus. This e¤ect is economically signicant if the biological desire to have a
partner of the opposite sex is strong. A calibration of the model suggests that this factor
could generate economically signicant current account responses, or between one third and
a half of the actual current account imbalances observed in the data.
In the third chapter, we analyze how the social structual changethe rise in the sex
ratiosmay a¤ect the real exchange rate. We nd that a rise in the sex ratio, in theory, can
simultaneously generate a decline in the real exchange rate (RER) and a rise in the current
account surplus. We demonstrate this logic through both a savings channel and an e¤ective
labor supply channel. In this model, a low RER is not a cause of the current account
surplus, nor is it a consequence of currency manipulations. Empirically, those economies
with a high sex ratio tend to have a low real exchange rate, beyond what can be explained by
the Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect, nancial underdevelopment, dependence ratio, and exchange
rate regime classications. Once these factors are accounted for, the Chinese real exchange
rate is estimated to be undervalued by only a relatively trivial amount.
The last chapter studies the entrepreneurial activities in countries like China who have
experienced a severe rise in the pre-marriage age cohorts sex ratio. In this chapter, we
present a theoretical model and nd that, when the sex ratio is large, a rise in the sex ratio
will induce men to take the risk and pursue the high returns, which leads to an increase in
the entrepreneurial activities in the economy. In an open economy model with two sectors,
a risky sector and a risk free sector, we show that a country with a very skewed sex ratio
is more likely to have a comparative advantage in the risky sectors. We provide empirical
evidence that is consistent with the theoretical predictions.
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1Introduction
This dissertation consists of four chapters on international economics. The rst chapter
studies the role of the development stage of a country and wage rigidity in the determination
of the optimal exchange rate regime choices. The second and the third chapters analyze
how a major social transformations in countries like China, namely a rise in the surplus of
men relative to women, will a¤ect countriescurrent accounts and real exchange rates. The
last chapter studies how the rise in the sex ratios in those economies will also a¤ect the
entrepreneurial activities and countriescomparative advantages.
While developing countries are more likely than developed countries to pursue a xed
exchange rate regime, this pattern is not directly predicted by conventional theories of
optimal currency area. Calvo and Reinhart (2002), to our knowledge, is the only paper
that interprets this pattern. They nd that, even in the best of times, when countries
retain voluntary access to international capital markets, lack of credibility in developing
countries will give rise to "fear of oating." However, the authors consider no direct role
of a countrys stage of development in choosing the exchange rate regime, and they do not
provide a welfare-based model that can be used to analyze the policy choice.
The aim of the rst chapter is to ll this important void in the literature. Without
assuming any "lack of credibility" problems, we provide a theoretical model to analyze the
role of countriesstage of development in the choice of exchange rate regime. We show that,
in general, for a typical developing country with low labor productivity and high labor-
market frictions, a xed exchange rate regime yields a higher level of welfare than would
a oating regime, as the former generates more export revenue. The opposite is true for a
2country with high labor productivity or a more exible labor market.
The related literature on the choice of exchange rate regime traces back to the "optimum
currency area" theory (OCA thereafter), originally associated with Mundell (1961), McK-
innon (1963) and Kenen (1969). This approach to a xed-versus-exible dilemma weighs
the trade and welfare gains from a stable exchange rate vis-à-vis the rest of the world (or,
more precisely, the countrys main trade partners) against the benets of exchange rate
exibility as a means of adjusting to shocks in the presence of nominal rigidities. The
traditional OCA theory delivers four key criteria for a successful currency union: i) labor
mobility across the region; ii) openness with capital mobility and price and wage exibility
across the region; iii) a risk-sharing system such as an automatic scal transfer mechanism
to redistribute money to areas/sectors that have been adversely a¤ected by the rst two
characteristics; and iv) participant countries with similar business cycles. The theory has
been most frequently applied in recent years to the euro. However, a major shortcoming
of OCA theory is that it is very hard to nd a group of countries in the real world that
meet all the criteria. Even in the case of the Eurozone, member countries do not fulll all
of the requirements: First, while capital is quite mobile in the Eurozone, labor mobility is
relatively low. Second, wages in the Eurozone are quite rigid. In fact, Babecký et al. (2009)
nd that the incidence of downward nominal wage rigidity is substantial in Europe. One
criticism of the OCA theory is that the only area that has optimal conditions for a single
currency is one that already has a single currency.
More recently, Devereux and Engel, in a series of papers, investigate the choice of ex-
change rate regime xed vs. oating in a dynamic intertemporal general equilibrium
framework with price stickiness. In Devereux and Engel (2003), they nd that in the pres-
ence of local currency pricing (LCP), a xed exchange rate regime is preferred. Intuitively,
when the policy maker chooses an optimal monetary rule under LCP, she does not attempt
to use monetary policy to alter the relative price of home to foreign goods because move-
ments in exchange rates do not a¤ect the prices consumers face. The exchange rate is not a
part of the optimal monetary policy. Gertler et al. (2001) study xed and exible exchange
3rates in an economy with a nancial accelerator. They nd that the nancial-accelerator
e¤ects are much stronger under xed rates than under exible rates (with a suitably man-
aged monetary policy). Roughly speaking, an exchange rate peg forces the central bank
to adjust the interest rate in a manner that enhances nancial distress. Bacchetta and
Wincoop (2000) develop a simple general-equilibrium framework to study the e¤ect of the
exchange rate regime on trade and welfare. They nd that, in general, both trade and
welfare can be higher under either exchange rate regime, depending on preferences and
the monetary-policy rules. There is no one-to-one relationship between the levels of trade
and welfare across exchange rate regimes. Using a similar framework as in Bacchetta and
Wincoop (2000), Bergin and Lin (2008) nd that currency unions and direct exchange rate
pegs can raise trade signicantly. They do not analyze the welfare e¤ect of switching from
a exible to a xed exchange rate regime. However, if trade is important to the country,
their work may be interpreted as favoring a xed exchange rate regime.
These papers reach no consensus on which regime xed or exible is better; nor do
they analyze why country income seems to be so tightly linked to exchange rate regime
choice. As mentioned above, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) appears to be the only paper
that draws a link, albeit indirect, between country income and the choice of exchange rate
regime. They argue that developing countriescentral banks usually lack credibility and,
therefore, prefer a xed exchange rate regime since exchange rate stabilization provides the
economy with a clear-cut nominal anchor.
Unlike Calvo and Reinharts (2002) "fear of oating" theory, we stress the roles of
both stage of economic development and labor market frictions under a New Keynesian
framework. Our model expands on Devereux and Engels (2003) framework with some
important features. First, we assume physical capital in production. Capital is used in both
the domestic and export sectors; hence, the capital rental rate (the factor price of capital)
will be a¤ected by both domestic and foreign demand shocks. Under a xed exchange rate
regime, domestic demand always moves in the same direction as foreign demand; under
a exible exchange rate regime, however, domestic demand is independent of changes in
4foreign demand. In response to foreign shocks, a exible exchange rate regime, by adjusting
the nominal exchange rate to stabilize the domestic economy, can generate a less volatile
capital market than can a xed exchange rate regime.
Second, we assume price stickiness and wage rigidity in the model. Monopolistically
competitive rms will set prices one period before sales happen. In the presence of local
currency pricing, rms in the export sector will set optimal prices by taking the future nom-
inal exchange rate and marginal costs into account. Fluctuations in both the marginal cost
and nominal exchange rate will inuence the rmschoices. If labor is the main factor in
production i.e., production in the export sector is labor-intensive under the assumption
of wage rigidity, a part of the marginal cost can be predicted. Firms will be concerned
primarily with the volatility of the nominal exchange rate when pre-setting optimal prices.
However, if capital makes the main contribution to production i.e., production in the
export sector is capital-intensive both future capital market conditions and nominal ex-
change rate movements are important to rmsoptimal decisions. The nominal exchange
rate then plays distinct roles in optimal price setting, depending on the kind of production
technology a country uses: If a country has a capital-intensive export sector, rms may care
more about the capital rental rate risk, and a oating exchange rate may help to reduce such
a risk; if a country has a labor-intensive export sector, rms will be more concerned about
nominal exchange rate uctuations, and a xed exchange rate may reduce that volatility.
Finally, we assume a CES production function with the substitution elasticity between
capital and labor below one, instead of the Cobb-Douglas production function. Antras
(2004) estimates the substitution elasticity between capital and labor in a very similar
CES production and obtains the result that, allowing for labor-augmenting technology, the
elasticity is signicantly below one. The lower-than-one elasticity of substitution means that
capital and labor are gross complements rather than substitutes: when labor-augmenting
productivity is high, rms will input more capital. In developed countries, labor is usually
more e¢ cient than in developing countries, and, hence, production in developed countries
is more capital-intensive. Taking all three assumptions into account, it is not hard to see
5that the choice of exchange rate regime may have di¤erent implications for developed and
developing countries.
Our model can successfully interpret the pattern that developing countries are more
likely than developed countries to pursue a xed exchange rate regime. A xed exchange
rate regime can generate higher exports, as well as higher consumption good prices, for
developing countries than can a exible exchange rate regime. If wages are su¢ ciently
rigid, switching to a xed exchange rate regime will have a positive net e¤ect on welfare.
The result reverses for developed countries. A exible exchange rate regime creates higher
exports and lower consumption good prices than does a xed exchange rate regime and,
therefore, is preferred. Interestingly, our result is opposite to the OCA theory: a country
with a higher degree of wage rigidity tends to choose a xed exchange rate regime, while
OCA theory predicts that wage exibility should be one important criterion for a successful
currency union.
The result also di¤ers from Devereux and Engel (2003). The main reason is that we
assume capital in production while they do not. Intuitively, if rms use capital intensively
in production, under a exible exchange rate regime, the home country can adjust the
nominal exchange rate to reduce the impact of foreign shocks on the capital market and,
thus, stabilize the home capital rental rate. The existence of a capital market in the model
works to provide an advantage to a exible exchange rate regime. As the domestic sector
becomes more important, the desire for a exible exchange rate regime is stronger.
Our model is useful in analyzing the optimal exchange rate regime choices for countries
in di¤erent development stages. For a country with low labor productivity i.e., at an
earlier stage in its development it is optimal to have a xed exchange rate regime if wages
are su¢ ciently rigid. As the country reaches a higher development stage (labor productivity
rises), it would be optimal to switch from a xed to a exible exchange rate regime.
We document empirical evidence supporting the mechanism described in the rst chap-
ter. We rst examine how de facto exchange rate regime choices (Reinhart and Rogo¤,
2004) inuence the export growth in 24 manufacturing sectors. We nd that: i) sectoral
6export growth tends to be higher in more capital-intensive sectors under a exible exchange
rate regime than that under a xed exchange rate regime; and ii) sectoral exports tend to
grow faster under a xed exchange rate regime if wages are more rigid. Both results are
consistent with our theoretical prediction. In a separate regression, we test how countries
income and wage rigidity a¤ect the choice of exchange rate regime. Consistent with the
theory, the result shows that countries with higher initial incomes or lower wage rigidities
are more likely to choose more exible exchange rates. To further examine the validity of
our empirical analysis, we run 2SLS regressions to deal with endogeneity issues and use
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) de facto exchange rate regime classications to do
robustness checks. Those results are similar to our benchmark regressions.
In summary, the main results in the rst chapter show that: for a typical developing
country with low labor productivity and high labor market frictions, a xed exchange rate
regime would yield a higher level of welfare than a oating regime as the former generates
more export revenue. The opposite is true for a country with high labor productivity or a
more exible labor market.
Chapters 2 and 3 are joint works with Professor Shang-Jin Wei of Columbia University
Business School. We focus on the current accounts and real exchange rates in a special
group of countries.
High savings rates in excess of domestic investment rates in many Eastern and South-
eastern Asian countries have produced a massive current account surplus as a share of
GDP, and are said to be a major contributor to the global current account imbalances, to
the unusually low long-term interest rates, and possibly to the onset of the 2008-2009 global
nancial crisis. As to theories of savings behavior, the existing literature has highlighted the
roles of life-cycle considerations (Modigliani, 1970), precautionary savings (Kimball, 1990),
habit formation (Carroll, Overland, and Weil, 2008), culture (Belton and Uwaifo Oyelere,
2008), and nancial under-development (Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas, 2008; Ju and
Wei, 2006, 2008 and 2010; Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull, 2007). The aim of Chapter
2 is to propose an alternative theory that gives prominence to a major, albeit insu¢ ciently
7recognized by macroeconomists, social transformation in many economies, namely an in-
creasing gap in the numbers of men and women in the marriage market. The basic thesis is
that as competition intensies in the marriage market, men or parents with sons raise their
savings rates with the hope of improving their relative standing in the marriage market.
Because the biological desire to have a partner of the opposite sex is strong, this e¤ect
is quantitatively important enough to reveal itself in the aggregate savings rate and the
current account balance.
A direct source of the idea for the theory is an empirical paper by Wei and Zhang (2009),
which studies household savings behavior in China. They provide both cross-regional and
cross-household evidence that is consistent with the notion that a worsening prospect for
men in the marriage market has motivated them and their parents to raise their savings rates
substantially. They call this the "competitive saving motive." Chinese household savings
as a share of disposable income rose from 16% in 1990 to 30% in 2007. Wei and Zhang
suggest that the rise in the sex ratio imbalance could account for half the total increase
in the savings rate. Because their paper does not have a formal theory, there is a need to
construct a model to see if the hypothesis can work in a general equilibrium, and whether a
calibration of the model can produce an e¤ect whose magnitude is economically signicant.
Chapter 2 aims to ll these important voids. The core part of the chapter is to analyze
theoretically whether and how a sex ratio imbalance will inuence the economy-wide savings
rate and the current account. We construct a simple overlapping generations (OLG) model
with two sexes and a desire to marry. To focus on the macroeconomic implications of
sex ratio imbalances, we intentionally shut down channels such as the usual precautionary
savings motive, habit formation, culture, and nancial development. Because it is an OLG
model, there are still life-cycle considerations, which, however, do not lead to current account
imbalances on their own.
Under reasonable conditions, we show that men respond to a rise in the sex ratio by
raising their savings rates. Moreover, the increment in their savings is always enough to
o¤set any decrease in womens savings. As a result, the aggregate savings rises with the sex
8ratio. We also discuss a number of extensions that aim to allow for additional realism: (a)
incorporate parental savings for children, (c) introduce intra-household bargaining, and (c)
consider an OLG structure in which each generation lives for 50 periods and makes savings
decisions in multiple periods. In each case, under reasonably general conditions, both the
aggregate savings rate and current account rise in response to a rise in the sex ratio.
To check if the model can deliver an e¤ect that is economically signicant, we go to
quantitative calibrations. In a more realistic case when allowing intra-household bargaining,
for a small open economy, as the sex ratio rises from 1 to 1.15, the economy-wide savings
rate and the current account will rise by more than 6%. We also consider the case of two
large economies, whose relative sizes and income levels are calibrated to mimic China and
the United States. The synthetic United States is assumed to always have a balanced sex
ratio, while the synthetic China experiences a rise in the sex ratio from 1 (balanced) to
1.5 (very unbalanced). The rise in Chinas sex ratio produces a rise in its current account
surplus, and a corresponding rise in the current account decit for the United States. The
magnitudes of the current account imbalances in the simulations (about 6.1% of GDP for
China and -2.0% of GDP for the United States) are such that they are around one-half of
the actual current account imbalances observed in the data. While the sex ratio imbalance
is not the sole reason for the global current account imbalances in recent years, it could be
one of the signicant, and yet thus far unrecognized, factors.
A desire to enhance ones prospects in the marriage market through a higher level of
wealth could be a motive for savings even in countries with a balanced sex ratio. But such a
motive is not as easy to detect when the competition is modest. When the sex ratio gets out
of balance, obtaining a marriage partner becomes much less assured. A host of behaviors
that are motivated by a desire to succeed in the marriage market may become magnied.
But sex ratio imbalances so far have not been investigated by macroeconomists. This may
be a serious omission. A sex ratio imbalance at birth and in the marriage age cohort is a
common demographic feature in many economies, especially in East, South, and Southeast
Asia, such as Korea, India, Vietnam, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong, in addition to
9China. In many economies, parents have a preference for a son over a daughter. This used
to lead to large families, not necessarily an unbalanced sex ratio. However, in the last three
decades, as the technology to detect the gender of a fetus (Ultrasound B) has become less
expensive and more widely available, many more parents engage in selective abortions in
favor of a son, resulting in an increasing relative surplus of men. The spread of technology
started in the early 1980s and accelerated quickly afterwards. 1985 was the rst year in
which half of the county-level hospitals in China had acquired at least one Ultrasound B
machine. By early 1990s, all county-level hospitals had at least one such machine (Ebenstein,
Li, and Meng, 2010). The strict family planning policy in China, introduced in the early
1980s, has induced Chinese parents to engage in sex-selective abortions more aggressively
than their counterparts in other countries. The sex ratio at birth in China rose from 106
boys per hundred girls in 1980 to 122 boys per hundred girls in 1997 (see Wei and Zhang,
2009, for more detail). It may not be a coincidence that the Chinese current account surplus
started to garner international attention around 2002 just when the rst cohort born after
the implementation of the strict family planning policy was entering the marriage market.
Throughout the model, we assume an exogenous sex ratio. While the sex ratio is en-
dogenous in the long-run as parental preference evolves, the assumption of an exogeous sex
ratio can be defended on two grounds. First, the technology that enables the rapid rise
in the sex ratio has only become inexpensive and widely accessible in developing countries
within the last 25 years or so. As a result, it is reasonable to think that the rising sex ratio
a¤ects only the relatively young cohortssavings decisions, but not those who have passed
half of their working careers. Second, data suggests that if the preference for son has a
mean-reverting property, it must be a very slow-moving process. Almost all countries that
have a skewed sex ratio today have exhibited a gradual climb over the last decade or two.
Korea is the only economy whose sex ratio appears to have started to revert back from a
very skewed level. This suggests that a systematic reversal of the sex ratio is unlikely to
happen in most economies in the short run.
To see if the theoretical predicion has any support in the data, we check if a countrys
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private sector savings rate (dened as current account minus government savings, divided by
GDP) is systematically linked to its sex ratio. After controlling for the e¤ects on the savings
rate from income, the share of working age people in the population (i.e., a proxy for the life
cycle theory), the ratio of private bank credit to GDP (a proxy for nancial development),
and social security expenditure as a share of GDP (a proxy for the precautionary savings
motive), we nd that a rise in the sex ratio from a balanced level to 1.15 (the current sex
ratio for the pre-marital age cohort in China) is associated with a higher current account
(excluding government savings) by over 10% of GDP.
In Chapter 3, we explore neglected implications of the sex ratio imbalance for the real
exchange rate. Real exchange rate undervaluation due to currency manipulation is a fre-
quent topic in international economic policy discussions. Two commonly used criteria by
researchers and international nancial institutions for judging undervaluations are devia-
tions from the purchasing power parity (PPP) and large and persistent current account
surpluses. The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate that a rise in the sex ratio can gen-
erate both phenomena. In other words, a low real exchange rate need not be the cause of
a current account surplus. (Given a current account surplus, foreign exchange reserve ac-
cumulation could be a passive outcome of a countrys capital account controls, rather than
exchange rate interventions. In other words, if a country has no capital controls, e.g., Japan,
a current account surplus shows up as an addition to its private sectors holding of foreign
assets. With capital controls, which typically require compulsory surrender of foreign ex-
change earnings by rms or households, a current account surplus has to be converted into
additional holding of foreign exchange reserves by the o¢ cial sector.)
We highlight two channels through which a sex ratio imbalance could lead to an appear-
ance of currency undervaluation. The rst is a savings channel. If an economy experiences
a shock that raises its savings rate, then the real exchange rate often falls. To see this, we
recognize that a rise in the savings rate implies a reduction in the demand for both tradable
and non-tradable goods. Since the price of the tradable good is tied down by the world
market, this translates into a reduction in the relative price of the nontradable good, and
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hence a decline in the value of the real exchange rate (a departure from the PPP). The
e¤ect can be persistent if there are frictions that impede the reallocation of factors between
the tradable and nontradable sectors.
The second theoretical channel works through e¤ective labor supply. A rise in the sex
ratio can also motivate men to cut down leisure and increase labor supply. This leads to
an increase in the economy-wide e¤ective labor supply. If the nontradable sector is more
labor intensive than the tradable sector, this generates a Rybzinsky-like e¤ect, leading to
an expansion of the nontradable sector at the expense of the tradable sector. The increase
in the supply of nontradable good leads to an additional decline in the relative price of
nontradable and a further decline in the value of the RER. There is evidence from China
that the e¤ective labor supply is indeed larger in regions with a higher sex ratio (Wei and
Zhang, 2010).
Putting the two channels together, a rise in the sex ratio generates a real exchange
rate that appears too low relative to the purchasing power parity. Of course, if there are
structural factors, other than a rise in the sex ratio, that have also triggered an increase in
the aggregate savings rate (e.g., an increase in the government savings rate) or an increase
in the e¤ective labor supply (e.g., peculiar patterns of the rural-urban migration within a
country), they would reinforce the mechanisms discussed in this chapter, causing the real
exchange rate to fall further.
There are four bodies of work that are related to the second and third chapter. First,
the literature on status goods, positional goods, and social norms (e.g., Cole, Mailath and
Postlewaite, 1992, Corneo and Jeanne, 1999, Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004 and 2009) has
o¤ered many useful insights. One key point is that when wealth can improve ones social
status (including improving ones standing in the marriage market), in addition to a¤ording
a greater amount of consumption goods, there is an extra incentive to save. This element
is in our model as well. However, all existing theories on status goods feature a balanced
sex ratio. Yet, an unbalanced sex ratio presents some non-trivial challenges. In particular,
while a rise in the sex ratio is an unfavorable shock to men (or parents with sons), it is a
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favorable shock to women (or parents with daughters). Could the latter group strategically
reduce their savings so as to completely o¤set whatever increments in savings men or parents
with sons may have? In other words, the impact on aggregate savings appears ambiguous.
Our model in Chapter 2 will address this question. In any case, the literature on status
goods has no discernible impact in policy circles. For example, while there are voluminous
documents produced by the International Monetary Fund or speeches by U.S. o¢ cials on
Chinas high savings rate and large current account surplus, no single paper or speech thus
far has pointed to a possible connection with its high sex ratio imbalance.
Second, the theoretical and empirical literature on the real exchange rate is too volu-
minous to summarize comprehensively here. Sarno and Taylor (2002) and Chinn (2011)
provide recent surveys. A third related literature is the economics of family, which is also
too vast to be summarized here comprehensively. One interesting insight from this litera-
ture is that a married couples consumption has a partial public goods feature (Browning,
Bourguignon and Chiappori, 1994; Donni, 2006). We make use of this feature in our model
as well. None of the papers in this literature explores the general equilibrium implications
for exchange rates from a change in the sex ratio. The fourth literature examines empirically
the causes of a rise in the sex ratio. The key insight is that the proximate cause for the
recent rise in the sex ratio imbalance is sex-selective abortions, which have been made in-
creasingly possible by the spread of Ultrasound B machines. There are two deeper causes for
the parental willingness to disproportionately abort female fetuses. The rst is the parental
preference for sons, which in part has to do with the relatively inferior economic status of
women. When the economic status of women improves, sex-selective abortions appear to
decline (Qian, 2008). The second is either something that leads parents to voluntarily have
a lower fertility rate than earlier generations, or a government policy that limits the number
of children a couple can have. In regions of China where the family planning policy is less
strictly enforced, there is also less sex ratio imbalance (Wei and Zhang, 2009). Bhaskar
(2011) examines parental sex selections and their welfare consequences.
In Chapter 4, we study the same social structual change as in Chapters 2 and 3, but we
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focus on the entrepreneurship and comparative advantage. A direct source of idea comes
from Wei and Zhang (2010), which empirically studies the e¤ect of a rise in the sex ratio
on entrepreneurship and economic growth. They nd that the imbalance may stimulate
economic growth by inducing more entrepreneurship. Motivated by their empirical ndings,
we provide a theoretical framework to analyze the consequence of a sex ratio imbalance on
entrepreneurial activities in this chapter. We rst construct an overlapping generations
model with two sexes and desire to marry in a closed economy. At the beginning of the
rst period, men can choose to be entrepreneurs (with a risky return) and workers (with a
certain labor income) while all women are workers. They enter the marriage market at the
start of the second period and marriages occur. When the sex ratio is close to a balanced
level, only entrepreneurs who receive low income failed in the marriage market. As the
sex ratio rises, more men will choose to be workers since being workers will obtain higher
returns in the marriage market. However, when the sex ratio is large such that some male
workers cannot get matched with women, an increase in the sex ratio raises the probability
that a male worker will not get married, while it does not alter the expected utility of being
an entrepreneur (to a rst-order approximation). Then more men will respond to a higher
sex ratio by becoming entrepreneurs.
The results may have important implications in an open economy model. Based on
the same idea, the sex ratio imbalance can be an important sourse of the comparative
advantage1 in the risky sectors. We show in this chapter that, in an open economy with two
sectors in an economy, a risky sector and a risk free sector, a country with a very skewed
sex ratio (above some threshold) may have more entrepreneurs in the risky sector, which in
turn may lead to a comparative advantage in the risky sector.
We also provide some empirical support to the theoretical predictions. In addition to
reviewing the evidence in Wei and Zhang (2010), we run two types of regressions to test our
theoretical predictions in this chapter. First, we nd that, when the sex ratio exceeds some
threshold, a rise in a countrys sex ratio tends to lead to higher exports in more volatile
1We dene the comparative advantage in a sector as the relative sectoral export position in this paper.
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sectors. Second, in a nonlinear least squares test, we nd that above some threshold, which
is close to the biological mean of the cross-country sex ratios, a rise in the sex ratio will
lead to an increase in a countrys export volatility. Both ndings are consistent with our
theoretical predictions. Quantitatively, the e¤ect of a rise in the sex ratio on a countrys
export volatility can be very signicant. For instance, consider a country initially with a sex
ratio around 1.05 (mean of the sex ratios in the world) and an export volatility 0.11 (mean
of the export volatilities across countries), if the sex ratio rises from 1.05 to 1.13 (Chinas
sex ratio in 2006), the export volatility will increase by almost 25%.
In summary, Chapter 4 provides a theoretical framework to analyze the impact of a rise
in the sex ratio on entrepreneurial activities. A very skewed sex ratio may induce more
entrepreneurship. In an open economy model, the sex ratio imbalance may be an important
sourse of comparative advantages in the more risky sectors.
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Chapter 1
To Fix or to Float? The Role of
Development Stage and Wage
Rigidity
While developing countries are more likely than developed countries to pursue a xed ex-
change rate regime, this pattern is not directly predicted by conventional theories of optimal
currency area. Calvo and Reinhart (2002), to our knowledge, is the only paper that inter-
prets this pattern. They nd that, even in the best of times, when countries retain voluntary
access to international capital markets, lack of credibility in developing countries will give
rise to "fear of oating." However, the authors consider no direct role of a countrys stage of
development in choosing the exchange rate regime, and they do not provide a welfare-based
model that can be used to analyze the policy choice.
Our aim in this paper is to ll this important void in the literature. Without assuming
any "lack of credibility" problems, we provide a theoretical model to analyze the role of
countriesstage of development in the choice of exchange rate regime. We show that, in
general, for a typical developing country with low labor productivity and high labor-market
frictions, a xed exchange rate regime yields a higher level of welfare than would a oating
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regime, as the former generates more export revenue. The opposite is true for a country
with high labor productivity or a more exible labor market.
The related literature on the choice of exchange rate regime traces back to the "optimum
currency area" theory (OCA thereafter), originally associated with Mundell (1961), McK-
innon (1963) and Kenen (1969). This approach to a xed-versus-exible dilemma weighs
the trade and welfare gains from a stable exchange rate vis-à-vis the rest of the world (or,
more precisely, the countrys main trade partners) against the benets of exchange rate
exibility as a means of adjusting to shocks in the presence of nominal rigidities. The
traditional OCA theory delivers four key criteria for a successful currency union: i) labor
mobility across the region; ii) openness with capital mobility and price and wage exibility
across the region; iii) a risk-sharing system such as an automatic scal transfer mechanism
to redistribute money to areas/sectors that have been adversely a¤ected by the rst two
characteristics; and iv) participant countries with similar business cycles. The theory has
been most frequently applied in recent years to the euro. However, a major shortcoming
of OCA theory is that it is very hard to nd a group of countries in the real world that
meet all the criteria. Even in the case of the Eurozone, member countries do not fulll all
of the requirements: First, while capital is quite mobile in the Eurozone, labor mobility is
relatively low. Second, wages in the Eurozone are quite rigid. In fact, Babecký et al. (2009)
nd that the incidence of downward nominal wage rigidity is substantial in Europe. One
criticism of the OCA theory is that the only area that has optimal conditions for a single
currency is one that already has a single currency.
More recently, Devereux and Engel, in a series of papers, investigate the choice of ex-
change rate regime xed vs. oating in a dynamic intertemporal general equilibrium
framework with price stickiness. In Devereux and Engel (2003), they nd that in the pres-
ence of local currency pricing (LCP), a xed exchange rate regime is preferred. Intuitively,
when the policy maker chooses an optimal monetary rule under LCP, she does not attempt
to use monetary policy to alter the relative price of home to foreign goods because move-
ments in exchange rates do not a¤ect the prices consumers face. The exchange rate is not a
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part of the optimal monetary policy. Gertler et al. (2001) study xed and exible exchange
rates in an economy with a nancial accelerator. They nd that the nancial-accelerator
e¤ects are much stronger under xed rates than under exible rates (with a suitably man-
aged monetary policy). Roughly speaking, an exchange rate peg forces the central bank
to adjust the interest rate in a manner that enhances nancial distress. Bacchetta and
Wincoop (2000) develop a simple general-equilibrium framework to study the e¤ect of the
exchange rate regime on trade and welfare. They nd that, in general, both trade and
welfare can be higher under either exchange rate regime, depending on preferences and
the monetary-policy rules. There is no one-to-one relationship between the levels of trade
and welfare across exchange rate regimes. Using a similar framework as in Bacchetta and
Wincoop (2000), Bergin and Lin (2008) nd that currency unions and direct exchange rate
pegs can raise trade signicantly. They do not analyze the welfare e¤ect of switching from
a exible to a xed exchange rate regime. However, if trade is important to the country,
their work may be interpreted as favoring a xed exchange rate regime.
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2011) investigates how costly it is to maintain a currency
peg, in terms of unemployment and welfare, for an emerging economy facing large external
shocks. Currency pegs will hinder the e¢ cient adjustment of the economy to negative
external shocks. The reason is that such shocks produce a contraction in aggregate demand
that requires a decrease in the relative price of nontradables, that is, a real depreciation
of the domestic currency. In turn, the required real depreciation may come about via a
nominal devaluation of the domestic currency or via a fall in nominal prices or both. The
currency peg rules out a devaluation. Thus, the only way the necessary real depreciation can
occur is through a decline in the nominal price of nontradables. However, if nominal prices,
especially factor prices, are downwardly rigid, the real depreciation will take place only
slowly, causing recession and unemployment along the way. In a calibrated version of the
model, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe show that a large contraction can lead to a huge welfare
loss (the median welfare cost of a currency peg is about 10 percent of lifetime consumption).
These papers reach no consensus on which regime xed or exible is better; nor do
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they analyze why country income seems to be so tightly linked to exchange rate regime
choice. As mentioned above, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) appears to be the only paper
that draws a link, albeit indirect, between country income and the choice of exchange rate
regime. They argue that developing countriescentral banks usually lack credibility and,
therefore, prefer a xed exchange rate regime since exchange rate stabilization provides the
economy with a clear-cut nominal anchor.
Unlike Calvo and Reinharts (2002) "fear of oating" theory, we stress the roles of
both stage of economic development and labor market frictions under a New Keynesian
framework. Our model expands on Devereux and Engels (2003) framework with some
important features. First, we assume physical capital in production. Capital is used in both
the domestic and export sectors; hence, the capital rental rate (the factor price of capital)
will be a¤ected by both domestic and foreign demand shocks. Under a xed exchange rate
regime, domestic demand always moves in the same direction as foreign demand; under
a exible exchange rate regime, however, domestic demand is independent of changes in
foreign demand. In response to foreign shocks, a exible exchange rate regime, by adjusting
the nominal exchange rate to stabilize the domestic economy, can generate a less volatile
capital market than can a xed exchange rate regime.
Second, we assume price stickiness and wage rigidity in the model. Monopolistically
competitive rms will set prices one period before sales happen. In the presence of local
currency pricing, rms in the export sector will set optimal prices by taking the future nom-
inal exchange rate and marginal costs into account. Fluctuations in both the marginal cost
and nominal exchange rate will inuence the rmschoices. If labor is the main factor in
production i.e., production in the export sector is labor-intensive under the assumption
of wage rigidity, a part of the marginal cost can be predicted. Firms will be concerned
primarily with the volatility of the nominal exchange rate when pre-setting optimal prices.
However, if capital makes the main contribution to production i.e., production in the
export sector is capital-intensive both future capital market conditions and nominal ex-
change rate movements are important to rmsoptimal decisions. The nominal exchange
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rate then plays distinct roles in optimal price setting, depending on the kind of production
technology a country uses: If a country has a capital-intensive export sector, rms may care
more about the capital rental rate risk, and a oating exchange rate may help to reduce such
a risk; if a country has a labor-intensive export sector, rms will be more concerned about
nominal exchange rate uctuations, and a xed exchange rate may reduce that volatility.
Finally, we assume a CES production function with the substitution elasticity between
capital and labor below one, instead of the Cobb-Douglas production function. Antras
(2004) estimates the substitution elasticity between capital and labor in a very similar
CES production and obtains the result that, allowing for labor-augmenting technology, the
elasticity is signicantly below one. The lower-than-one elasticity of substitution means that
capital and labor are gross complements rather than substitutes: when labor-augmenting
productivity is high, rms will input more capital. In developed countries, labor is usually
more e¢ cient than in developing countries, and, hence, production in developed countries
is more capital-intensive. Taking all three assumptions into account, it is not hard to see
that the choice of exchange rate regime may have di¤erent implications for developed and
developing countries.
Our model can successfully interpret the pattern that developing countries are more
likely than developed countries to pursue a xed exchange rate regime. A xed exchange
rate regime can generate higher exports, as well as higher consumption good prices, for
developing countries than can a exible exchange rate regime. If wages are su¢ ciently
rigid, switching to a xed exchange rate regime will have a positive net e¤ect on welfare.
The result reverses for developed countries. A exible exchange rate regime creates higher
exports and lower consumption good prices than does a xed exchange rate regime and,
therefore, is preferred. Interestingly, our result is opposite to the OCA theory: a country
with a higher degree of wage rigidity tends to choose a xed exchange rate regime, while
OCA theory predicts that wage exibility should be one important criterion for a successful
currency union.
The result di¤ers from Devereux and Engel (2003). The main reason is that we assume
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capital in production while they do not. Intuitively, if rms use capital intensively in
production, under a exible exchange rate regime, the home country can adjust the nominal
exchange rate to reduce the impact of foreign shocks on the capital market and, thus,
stabilize the home capital rental rate. The existence of a capital market in the model works
to provide an advantage to a exible exchange rate regime. As the domestic sector becomes
more important, the desire for a exible exchange rate regime is stronger.
Our framework also di¤ers from Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2011). One important de-
parture of this paper from Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2011) is that we focus on the ex ante
optimal policies while they study the ex post exchange rate policy. Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2011) focus on analyzing how a small open economy deviates from the steady state
after a negative external shock. The steady states under the two exchange rate regimes
in their paper are the same and hence both exible and xed exchange rate regimes will
yield the same the welfare before the shock. The ex post best policy will be the optimal
policy. However, our paper focuses on the di¤erence in the ex ante equilibrium under the
two exchange rate regimes. We allow rms choosing their own prices, and since rms have
di¤erent expections about future under two exchange rate regimes, they will set di¤erent
prices which in turn leads to di¤erent ex ante equilibria under the two regimes. The goal of
this paper is to compare the expected social welfare under di¤erent ex ante equilibria and
nd the optimal exchange rate policy.
Our model is useful in analyzing the optimal exchange rate regime choices for countries
in di¤erent development stages. For a country with low labor productivity i.e., at an
earlier stage in its development it is optimal to have a xed exchange rate regime if wages
are su¢ ciently rigid. As the country reaches a higher development stage (labor productivity
rises), it would be optimal to switch from a xed to a exible exchange rate regime.
We document empirical evidence supporting the mechanism described in this paper.
We rst examine how de facto exchange rate regime choices (Reinhart and Rogo¤, 2004)
inuence the export growth in 24 manufacturing sectors. We nd that: i) sectoral export
growth tends to be higher in more capital-intensive sectors under a exible exchange rate
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regime than that under a xed exchange rate regime; and ii) sectoral exports tend to
grow faster under a xed exchange rate regime if wages are more rigid. Both results are
consistent with our theoretical prediction. In a separate regression, we test how countries
income and wage rigidity a¤ect the choice of exchange rate regime. Consistent with the
theory, the result shows that countries with higher initial incomes or lower wage rigidities
are more likely to choose more exible exchange rates. To further examine the validity of
our empirical analysis, we run 2SLS regressions to deal with endogeneity issues and use
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) de facto exchange rate regime classications to do
robustness checks. Those results are similar to our benchmark regressions.
The rest of the paper is organized as following: In section 2, we present the model and
solve it up to the second order. Section 3 provides empirical facts that support our theory.
Section 4 concludes and suggests future research directions.
1.1 Model
1.1.1 Households
We assume that there are two countries in the world: home and foreign. The households
in each country have the same preferences. As in Devereux and Engel (2003) and Corsetti














where Ct and Lt are the consumption of the nal good and supply of labor. Mt=Pt is the real
money balance in period t.  is the discount factor. The intertemporal budget constraint


























where Wt and rt are the nominal wage rate and the real capital rental rate, respectively,
in period t. t is the aggregate prot in period t. Pt and Pinv;t are the prices for the nal
consumption good and the capital good, respectively. Kt is the capital stock held by the
households at the beginning of period t. Bt and Bt are home-currency denominated and
foreign-currency denominated bonds, respectively.
To facilitate an analytical solution, we assume complete capital depreciation. Relaxing
this assumption will not change any of the qualitative results.
Kt+1 = It
The optimal conditions for the representative household in the home country are
(1 + it)
 1 = Et [Qt;t+1] (1.1)



























is the stochastic discount factor.
Households in the foreign country will have similar optimal conditions. If we assume a





as in the standard literature.







where the tradable good bundle can be written as an index over the home produced tradable
















where  is the constant elasticity of substitution between the home produced tradable good
and foreign produced tradable good. We assume  > 1. We assume that both countries
have the same tradable good basket and parameter ! indicates the expenditure share of the
foreign countrys goods in the consumption basket of households in either country. CHt and


























The elasticity of substitution between any two home produced tradable goods is H , and
the elastiticity of substitution between any two foreign produced tradable goods is F . We
assume H and F are both greater than one.








where N is the constant elasticity of subsitution between nontradable goods in the home
country.
We assume that ! is small (close to zero) i.e., the home country is a small open
economy. As in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995), for simplicity, we assume that only tradable
goods can be transformed into capital goods.1
1This assumption greatly simplies the calculation. However, relaxing it will not change the qualitative
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1.1.2 Government
The government alters the money supply with direct transfers. The government budget
constraint (in per capita terms) is
Mt =Mt 1 + Tt
1.1.3 Firms
Firms in each country will produce a tradable good and a non-tradable good. The produc-
















where At is the labor productivity in the home country. H is the constant elasticity of
substitution between capital and labor, which is a central parameter in the economic theory.
Models investigating the sources of economic growth and the determinants of the aggregate
distribution of income have been found to deliver substantially di¤erent implications de-
pending on the value of the elasticity of substitution. Antràs (2004) assumes a very similar
production function as in our model and obtains the result that this elasticity of subsitution
is signicantly below one. Therefore, we assume H < 1 in our paper.
















where N < 1. Since there is no direct evidence to the contrary, we assume H = N = .
As in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995), we also assume that N  H .
All the markets are monopolistically competitive. We assume price stickiness and local
currency pricing i.e., rms set their own prices one period before the sales happen, and
results.
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export prices must be denominated in the foreign currency.
The optimization problem for a representative rm in the non-tradable sector is








is the demand function facing each individual rm.























1.1.4 Tradable good sector
Due to the assumption of a small open economy (! is close to zero), almost all tradable
goods produced by the home country will be exported abroad. Then the optimization
problem for a representative rm in the tradable good sector is approximately as following:
max Et 1 [Qt 1;t (StpHt  MCHt) yHt]
where pHt is the price denominated in foreign currency and MCHt is the marginal cost in












is the demand function facing each individual rm.





































and the total employment is






  (CTt + It )
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Proof. (See Appendix A1.1.).
By Lemma 1, rms in the tradable good sector will set prices taking into account the
future marginal cost and the nominal exchange rate. Using this result, the expected value
of a rms future prot and export revenues are
Et 1 [Qt 1;t (StP Ht  MCHt) yHt] =
















respectively, where d is dened in the proof of Lemma 1. Since  > 1, a lower price will
lead to higher expected export revenues and prot. Obviously, if the future marginal cost is
predictable or does not uctuate much,MCHt is close to a constant. By Jensens inequality,
under a xed exchange rate regime, rms are able to set more competitive (lower) prices and
earn higher export revenues. However, results may di¤er ifMCHt is volatile. For instance, if
capital is the main factor used in production, i.e., the home country uses a capital-intensive
technology, rms should also take the capital market conditions into account when setting
their optimal prices. By (1.8), the capital rental rate will be a¤ected by both home and
foreign shocks. It is also clear from (1.8) that the capital rental rate is not linear in home and
foreign demand, which means volatility in the capital rental rate will inuence the pricing
rule by rms. It is ambiguous as to which regime, xed or oating, can create a competitive
edge for domestic rms in the tradable good sector. It depends on several conditions: i)
the convexity of marginal cost in the shocks, and ii) the ability of each regime to reduce the
volatility in MCHtSt .
1.1.5 Wage rigidity









= mrst = Ct
where mrst is consumer-workers real value of marginal substitution between leisure and
consumption. In equilibrium, the nominal wage is W ot = PtCt.
However, almost all the countries in the world exhibit some degree of wage rigidities in
their labor markets. Therefore, we assume in this paper that wages respond sluggishly to
labor market conditions, as a result of some (unmodeled) imperfection or friction in labor
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where  is the degree of the nominal wage rigidity. We view equation (1.12) as an ad-
mittedly ad-hoc but parsimonious way of modeling the slow adjustment of wages to labor
market conditions, as found in a variety of models of real wage rigidities, without taking a
stand on what the "right" model is.
1.1.6 Money supply
In the benchmark model, we consider only the monetary shocks in the economyi.e., the
labor productivity is non-stochastic. Assume that the foreign countrys money balance
growth rule is





where "t is a white noise following a normal distribution N(0; 2). We assume  >  in
order to make sure that consumption is positive in both countries.
If the home country takes a exible exchange rate regime and chooses the monetary
growth as the monetary policy, we assume that the equilibrium money growth rate would
be similar to that of the foreign country.
lnMt = ln+ lnMt 1 + "t (1.14)
2Blanchard and Gali (2005) similarly assume real wage rigidity. We can also assume the same real wage
rigidity as in their paper: no qualitative results will change.
3Similar to Blanchard and Gali (2005), in principle, one would want to guarantee Wt
Pt
 mrst at all times,
to prevent workers from working more than desired, given the wage (as would be the case for example in
a model where wages set in bargaining vary over time, but always remain above the workers reservation





without altering any of the conclusions below, though at the cost of burdening the notation.
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where "t is a white noise subject to a normal distribution N(0; 2). We may think of the
shock as a money velocity shock. When the policy maker sets the money supply goal, the
nominal money balance in the home country will be the money supply plus the velocity
shock.
If the home country chooses a xed exchange rate regime, St = St 1.
1.1.7 Solving the benchmark model
Given these processes, we have that the domestic and foreign interest rates are both equal
to a constant, which we denote by i.
As the model cannot be solved analytically, we will solve the model up to the second
order (of ). Our strategy is to rst compute the steady state ("t = "t = 0) and then take
approximation around the steady state.
In the steady state, since there is no monetary shock, we have
W =  P C (1.15)
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In period t, all the prices and capital stock are predetermined and the price in the
foreign country will not be a¤ected by the home countrys production. We log approximate
30
equation (1.8) around "t = "t = 0 and obtain






























































































































In the standard literature, capital-intensity is commonly dened as the ratio of capital




is the steady state capital-intensity in the tradable good sector. Given all the assumptions
and equations above, we can show the following Proposition.
Proposition 1. Up to the second order, if the share of nontradable goods in the aggregate





















(i) For At > A0, (P Ht)
flexible < (P Ht)
fixed, as a result, exports in the tradable good
sector are higher under a exible exchange rate regime than that under a xed exchange
rate regime. For At < A0, (P Ht)
flexible > (P Ht)
fixed, as a result, exports in the tradable
good sector are lower under a exible exchange rate regime than that under a xed exchange
rate regime.
(ii) For all At > 0, (PNt)
flexible < (PNt)
fixed.
Proof. (See Appendix A1.2.)
A few remarks are in order. First, the tradable good price is more likely to be lower
(higher) in a labor-intensive (capital-intensive) sector under a xed exchange rate regime.
Here is the intuition. Suppose that only labor is used in production. Due to wage rigidity,
part of the marginal cost is predetermined. Firms will set prices based mainly on the
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expectation of the future nominal exchange rate. By Lemma 1, the expectional term is
a convex function of the nominal exchange rate which means that higher volatility in the
nominal exchange rate will yield a higher premium in the price. Therefore, xing the
exchange rate at a constant may help rms to set more competitive prices and earn higher
revenues. In the opposite case, if capital is the main factor input in production, the result
will reverse. We can consider MCHtSt as the marginal cost in the foreign currency, which
approximately equals rtPtSt . By (1.8), (1.13), (1.14) and Lemma 1, we can show that the
capital rental rate denominated in foreign currency is convex in both home and foreign
demand shocks. A volatile capital rental rate (in foreign currency) will yield a positive
premium in the optimal prices. Suppose that there is an expansion in foreign demand.
Under a xed exchange rate regime, this immediately leads to a double increase in the
demand for capital, from both the tradable and the nontradable good sector. As a result,
the capital rental rate (in terms of foreign currency) rises drastically. However, under a
exible exchange rate regime, the nontradable good sector in the home country will not be
inuenced by the foreign shock, the capital rental rate (in foreign currency) will rise only
moderately. Then, a exible exchange rate can generate a less volatile capital rental rate
(in foreign currency) and rms in the tradable good sector are able to set more competitive
prices. Combining the two cases together, in general, a higher volatility in MCHtSt will yield
higher prices, and by (1.10) and (1.11), will generate both lower prots and lower export
revenues. In fact, we can understand this result from another aspect. We consider a special
case when prices are fully exible, in which rms set prices after the shocks. By (1.7), a






If MCHtSt becomes more volatile, rms are facing higher possibilities that tradable good
prices set by (1.7) may deviate signicantly from a exible prices ex post. However, exible
tradable good prices are virtually the best response functions to the shocks and thus are
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desirable to rms. An increase in the volatility of MCHtSt will then lead to a loss to rms.
Second, the di¤erence between tradable good prices under two exchange rate regimes,
(P Ht)
fixed   (P Ht)flexible, is decreasing in , which means that as wages become more
rigid, rms are more likely to set lower prices under a xed exchange rate regime. Here
is the intuition. Suppose wages become fully rigid i.e., wages in period t are completely
determined by period t 1s information. This will greatly reduce the volatility of marginal
cost in period t. Firms probably will be concerned mainly with nominal exchange rate
movements. If the home country can x the nominal exchange rate, rms do not have to
worry about the loss caused by exchange rate uctuations and hence they set lower prices.
Third, if wages are fully exible, rms will always set lower prices under a exible
exchange rate regime. In this case, nothing can be predetermined and wage is also volatile
in each period. Based on similar reasoning in the rst remark, factor prices (in foreign
currency) are less volatile under a exible exchange rate regime. Therefore, rms under a
exible exchange rate regime are always more competitive.
Fourth, by Proposition 1, for all positive labor productivities, (PNt)
flexible  (PNt)fixed.
Here is why. The nominal exchange rate does not directly inuence the price in the non-
tradable good sector. Firms will be concerned only with the volatility of marginal cost when
setting their prices. Once there is a capital input in nontradable good production, rms
will be a¤ected by foreign shocks. Since a exible exchange rate regime works to reduce
the impact from foreign shocks, the capital rental rate is less volatile, thus rms in the
nontradable good sector are able to set lower prices. However, as we can see from the proof
of Proposition 1, when wages become more rigid, the di¤erence between nontradable good
prices under the two exchange rate regimes becomes smaller.
Finally, the inequality condition in Proposition 1 is easy to be satised under proper



















stands for the investment-to-consumption ratio in the foreign country. We can
nd investment and consumption to GDP data from Penn World Table 6.3 and compute
the investment-to-consumption ratio. If we look at this ratio across countries from 2000 to
2004, the mean and median are both smaller than 0.3. For  and ,  takes a value above
0.98 for quarterly frequency, and  takes a value such that the markup in the tradable good
sector 1 1 is about 15 percent.  is the elasticity of substitution between home produced
tradable good and foreign produced tradable good. As in Corsetti et al. (2007), it takes a
value about 1.5 or above. Then the right hand side of the inequality takes a value of 0.32
with an extremely high F (

F = 1), and a value of 0.40 with 

F = 0:8. In the literature,
the share of nontradable good consumption in the aggregate consumption good basket is
usually assumed to be around or even greater than 70 percent, which means   0:3 in our
model, (Burstein, Neves and Rebelo, 2003). Then, the condition in Proposition 1 is easy to
be satised under proper parameter settings.
1.1.8 Welfare
In this section, we will compare welfare levels under the two exchange rate regimes. As in
Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), we consider the problem faced by a policymaker who seeks to

















We use V fixed and V flexible denote the value functions under a xed exchange rate regime
and a exible exchange rate regime, respectively. Given the information in period t 1, the













































  V flexible  Kt; Bt 1
= Et 1
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The policy maker will consider two components if the country switches from a exible
exchange rate regime to a xed exchange rate regime: i) the welfare gain in period t, and
ii) the future welfare gain after period t.
Proposition 2. Under the assumption in Proposition 1,
(i) If the nominal wage in the home country is rigid enough i.e.,  is su¢ ciently large
there exists a critical value of labor productivity, Aw0 , which is an increasing function of ,
such that the welfare levels are the same under the two regimes. For At > Aw0 , welfare is
higher under a exible exchange rate regime than that under a xed exchange rate regime.
For At < Aw0 , welfare is lower under a exible exchange rate regime than that under a xed
exchange rate regime.
(ii) If the nominal wage in the home country is exible enough i.e.,  is su¢ ciently
smallthe welfare under a exible exchange rate regime is always higher than that under a
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xed exchange rate regime.
Proof. (See Appendix A1.3.)
A few remarks are in order. First, the price of the nal consumption good in the home
country is lower under a exible exchange rate regime than that under a xed exchange
rate regime. Here is the intuition: i) As shown in Proposition 1, the nontradable good price
in the home country is lower under a exible exchange rate regime than that under a xed
exchange rate regime; ii) since the foreign country is relatively large, the home countrys
import price will not be a¤ected by changes in the home country. Therefore, the nal
consumption good price is lower under a exible exchange rate regime.
Second, by Proposition 1, for any positive degree of wage rigidity, if  > 0, there exists
some small Ats, such that the tradable good price is lower under a xed exchange rate
regime than that under a exible exchange rate regime. As a result, switching from a
exible exchange rate regime to a xed exchange rate regime, the home country will obtain
more export revenues. However, this does not mean that welfare is unambiguously higher
under a xed exchange rate regime. The higher CPI in the rst remark may cause a welfare
loss to the representative agent in the home country. One necessary condition for a home
country with low labor productivity to optimally choose a xed exchange rate regime is
that wage is su¢ ciently rigid. As  becomes larger, the gap between a nontradable good
price under a xed versus a exible exchange rate regime becomes smaller. For su¢ ciently
large , the welfare loss resulting from the higher CPI under a xed exchange rate regime
is small. The positive e¤ect from the higher export revenue will dominate, and there is a
welfare gain if the home country switches to a xed exchange rate regime. In short, the
advantage of a exible exchange rate diminishes with .
1.1.9 Other shocks
In this section, we will consider shocks other than monetary shocks. To be more specic,
we consider labor productivity shocks i.e., At and At are stochastic. Assume that lnAt
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and lnAt follow AR(1) processes:
lnAt =  lnAt 1 + (1  ) ln A+ "at
lnAt = 
 lnAt 1 + (1  ) ln A + "at
where A and A are steady state labor productivities in the home and foreign country,
respectively. "at and "at are white noises following normal distributions N (0; a) and
N (0; a), respectively. For simplicity, we assume that a = a.  and  shows the
convergence speed of labor productivity in the home and foreign country, respectively. We
assume that 0 <  < 1 and 0 <  < 1.
Assume that the central bank in the foreign country adjusts money growth as following:










where a(> 0) is the coe¢ cient showing the reaction of money growth to the deviation of
productivity shocks in the foreign country.
If the home country follows a xed exchange rate regime, money growth in the home
country will follow the same process as in the foreign country. If home chooses a exible
exchange rate regime, the home policy maker will set monetary policy rule similar to foreign
country






where a(> 0) is the response coe¢ cient to the labor productivity shock set by the home
country policy maker. We assume that labor productivity shocks and monetary shocks are
independent.
In this extended model, interest rates in both countries are no longer constant. In the





























Notice that  > , and it is bounded in each period. Then the last term on the right hand







































For simplicity, we assume  = , which is not crucial. Let bit denote ln it{, where {
denotes the steady state interest rate in the foreign country, then,

























































We assume that 2 and 2a are small enough, then s

n is increasing in n.
Similarly, if the home country is under a exible exchange rate regime, we have






























































Notice that this interest rate implication is not inconsistent with Taylor rule, which implies
that the policy maker will raise the interest rate if there is an excess ination and excess
output gap. Suppose that labor productivity improves in the home country, there will be
two direct results: rms will be able to set lower prices and expand output. If ination
has a very strong e¤ect on the interest rate, the nominal interest rate will go down, which
is consistent with (1.25) by assuming a > 0. This is also consistent with Corsetti and
Pesenti (2005). In their paper, if there is a positive productivity shock, the home country
will increase its expenditures on consumption goods. In our paper, combining (1.23) and
(1.25), we nd this to be true as well.
Assume that in period t  1, both countries stay at the steady states, then we can show
the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Up to the second order, if a > 0 and under the same assumption as in
Proposition 1, there exists a critical value Aa0 for the steady state labor productivity such
that (P Ht)
flexible = (P Ht)
fixed.
(i) For A > Aa0, (P Ht)
flexible < (P Ht)
fixed, as a result, export in the tradable good
sector is higher under a exible exchange rate regime than that under a xed exchange rate
regime. For A < Aa0, (P Ht)
flexible > (P Ht)
fixed, as a result, export in the tradable good
sector is lower under a exible exchange rate regime than that under a xed exchange rate
regime.
(ii) For all A > 0, (PNt)
flexible < (PNt)
fixed.
Proof. (See Appendix A1.4.)
Proposition 3 and Proposition 1 are almost the same. One remark on the price of the
40
nontradable good is that, as we can nd, (PNt)
flexible is increasing in a, which means that
if the money supply responds more aggressively to the labor productivity shock, the price
of the nontradable good sector will be lower.
As for welfare, we can show the following proposition:
Proposition 4. (i) If the nominal wage in the home country is rigid enough i.e.,  is
su¢ ciently largethere exists a critical value of labor productivity, Awa0, such that welfares
are the same under a exible and a xed exchange rate regime. For A > Awa0, welfare is
higher under a exible exchange rate regime than that under a xed exchange rate regime.
For At < Awa0, welfare is lower under a exible exchange rate regime than that under a xed
exchange rate regime.
(ii) If the nominal wage in the home country is exible enough i.e.,  is su¢ ciently
small welfare under a exible exchange rate regime is always higher than that under a xed
exchange rate regime.
Proof. (See Appendix A1.5.)
Proposition 4 and Proposition 2 are similar. As stated in Proposition 3, when a becomes
larger, rms are more likely to set lower prices in the nontradable good sector which in turn
may potentially reduce the consumption good price. However, the e¤ect on welfare of raising
a is ambiguous. Suppose that there is an adverse labor productivity shock in the home
country. As we analyzed above, higher a can result in a lower nontradable good price;
however, at the same time, this also reduces the aggregate demand greatly, which has a
negative e¤ect on welfare. If the second e¤ect on the aggregate demand dominates the rst
e¤ect, the home country will result in a welfare loss by raising a.
We can also extend the model, as in Devereux and Engel (2003), so that each country
can adjust the money supply by responsing to the foreign productivity shock. Then the
foreign country will follow a monetary policy rule:
















and if the home country chooses a exible exchange rate regime, it will follow a similar
monetary policy rule











where  and  are positive as in Devereux and Engel (2003).
Similar to the analysis above, the interest rate in the foreign country is






cAt + asncAt  n+11  

(1.26)
and the interest rate in the home country is
bit =   1X
n=1

asn bAt + asncAt  n+11  

(1.27)
(1.26) and (1.27) are very similar to (1.25) and (1.24) except for the additional terms
resulted from responding to the external productivity shocks. Those additional terms work
only as constants and will not change any of the theoretical results in Propositions 3 and 4.
1.1.10 Producer pricing in the foreign country
In this section, we consider an extension that rms in the foreign country, a large country,
will set their export prices in the domestic currency (producer currency pricing). This
change will a¤ect only the import price for the home country and, hence, will not a¤ect the
export and nontradable good sector. Proposition 1 still holds.
In the welfare analysis, the import price in the home country now becomes StP Ft where
P Ft is the price for the foreign produced tradable good denominated in foreign currency.
Since the foreign country is much bigger than the home country, P Ft cannot be a¤ected by
the demand shocks in the home country. In other words, the home country takes P Ft as
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Since  < 1, and (PNt)
flexible < (PNt)
fixed, the expectation of the nal consumption good
price index is lower under a exible exchange rate regime than that under a xed exchange
rate regime.
For developed countries, we can obtain the same result: They prefer exible exchange
rate regimes since i) as analyzed in Proposition 1, they obtain higher export revenues under
a exible exchange rate regime; and ii) a exible exchange rate regime can generate a
lower consumption good price level than a xed exchange rate regime. Both e¤ects are
welfare-enhancing.
Developing countries face a tradeo¤ similar to that in the benchmark model. If they
switch from a exible exchange rate regime to a xed exchange rate regime, their exports
increase according to Proposition 1. However, this also leads to a higher consumption good
price, which potentially yields welfare loss. The net e¤ect is ambiguous. Substituting (1.28)
into the proof of Proposition 2, we can obtain a very similar result: If wages are rigid
enough in developing countries, a xed exchange rate regime is preferred since the rst
e¤ect (higher export revenues when switching to a xed exchange rate regime) dominates
the second e¤ect (higher consumption good price).
1.2 Empirics
1.2.1 Benchmark regressions
In this section, we examine whether the data supports our theoretical predictions. Two
separate experiments are done in this section.
We rst estimate how sectoral export growth varies under di¤erent exchange rate regimes.
Our industry-level data can be obtained from the Centre DEtudes Prospectives et DInformations
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Internationales (CEPII) database that covers sectoral data in 42 countries from 1980 to
2004.4 There are 24 sectors in the sample, dened using 3-digit International Standard
Industrial Classication (ISIC system), Revision 2. For the exchange rate regimes, we use
the de facto regime classications by Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) (henceforth RR). As in
Aghion et al. (2006), RR can take values from set f1; 2; 3; 4g, in which 1, 2, 3 and 4 rep-
resent a peg, a crawling peg, a managed oating and a free oating, respectively.5 As the
number becomes larger, the exchange rate is more exible. Macro data such as real GDP
per capita can be found in Penn World Table 6.2.
As in the literature, we construct a panel data set by transforming our time series data
into ve-year averages. There are ve non-overlapping periods in this sample: 1980-1984,
1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999 and 2000-2004.
We test the predictions by Proposition 1 (or Proposition 3). We look at how sectoral
export growth varies in response to the change in the choice of exchange rate regime and
wage rigidities in all the sectors. We use sectoral export revenue growth as the dependent
variable and regress on the de facto exchange rate regime index, the interaction between
exchange rate regime index and sectoral capital-intensity, the interaction between exchange
rate regime index and wage rigidity index, and other control variables including countrys
log initial income, wage rigidity index, capital-intensity and country, time and sectoral
dummies. The regression equation is as following:
yijt = + 1 RRjt + 2  (RRjt  capital-intensityit) (1.29)
+3 
 
RRjt  wage rigidityjt

+   Zt + "ijt
where i stands for sector. If we use the sectoral export growth as the dependent variable,
according to theory, we expect to have positive 2 and negative 3, which means that as the
exchange rate becomes more exible, the marginal e¤ect of exchange rate regime on sectoral
4We drop four large countries in the regressions: United States, Japan, Germany and China.
5We drop the "free falling" from this classication.
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export growth is increasing in the capital-intensity and decreasing in the wage rigidity.
The capital-intensity is computed as one minus labor compensation in value added.
There is no direct measure for the nominal wage rigidities for most countries in the world.
But Babecký et al. (2009) nd that ring cost is positively associated with DNWR; we then
use ring cost as one proxy for the nominal wage rigidity in this paper. We also use the
index of labor union power as another proxy for wage rigidity. Both data can be obtained
from Doing Business Report, World Bank database. We dont think the two indices are
perfect measures for the nominal wage rigidities. In fact, we will use another measure in this
paper to do the sensitivity checks. As in the macroeconomics literature, we can compute
the nominal wage rigidity level by estimating the wage Phillips curve. As in Gali (2010),
the coe¢ cient on the predicted unemployment rate (Column (8) in Table 1, Gali, 2010) is a
linear function of nominal wage rigidity implied by the model. Since we dont assume any
cross-country di¤erences in the utility function, that parameter can be used directly as the
measure for nominal wage rigidity. In this paper, we estimate the wage Phillips curve for 38
countries using the quarterly data of wage income, unemployment rate and ination from
1990 to 2010, which can be obtained from the ILO database. However, the parameter we
will use for the nominal wage rigidity measure is an estimator from the wage Phillips curve
estimation; there will be a measurement error problem in the sectoral regression, which
yields biases to the coe¢ cients. In this paper, we only use the wage rigidity parameter from
the wage Phillips curve in the sensitivity checks to show how di¤erent our result would be
by changing the wage rigidity index. We dont aim to nd any proper instruments to solve
the measurement error problem.
Table 1.3 shows the regression results. We nd that, in all regressions, most coe¢ cients
on the interaction term between exchange rate regime and capital-intensity are signicant
with the right signs, which means in more capital-intensive sectors, sectoral exports tend
to grow faster under a exible exchange rate regime. The opposite results hold in more
labor-intensive sectors. We also nd that most coe¢ cients on the interaction term between
exchange rate regime and wage rigidity are negative and signicant, which means that
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in countries with a higher wage rigidity level, exible exchange rates tend to impede the
sectoral export growth. All these results are consistent with the theoretical predictions.
One concern in (1.29) is that switching from a more xed to a more exible exchange
rate regime might have nonlinear e¤ects on sectoral export growth. To check this, we run
the regression by using exchange rate dummies. In the rst experiment, we broadly classify
the exchange rates into two regimes: xed (a peg or a crawling peg) and exible (a managed
oating or a free oating). The regression equation is
yijt = + 1  flexiblejt + 2  (flexiblejt  capital-intensityit)
+3 
 
flexiblejt  wage rigidityjt

+   Zt + "ijt (1.30)
We then use the four exchange rate regime dummies in Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) (a peg,













RRk;jt  wage rigidityjt

+   Zt + "ijt
Table 1.4 show the regression results. Compared to a xed exchange rate regime, under a
exible exchange rate regime, sectoral exports tend to grow faster i) in more capital-intensive
sectors and ii) in countries with lower wage rigidity levels. Both results are consistent with
our theory.
We also test whether there exists empirical support for Proposition 2 (or Proposition
4). We rst examine the capital-intensities in di¤erent countries. If the model is correct,
then one reason why rich countries are willing to choose a exible exchange rate regime is
that they use more capital-intensive technology in production. Gollin (2002) measures the
labor share in GDP. Using his data, we calculate the capital share by using one minus the
labor share obtained from Gollin (2002)6. Figure 1.1 shows the scatter plot, from which we
6We use the rst labor share measure in Gollin (2002).
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can see a clear positive correlation between capital share in GDP and a countrys income.
There exist some caveats in this test: i) the sample is very small (only 24 countries); and
ii) the labor share obtained in Gollin (2002) may be overstated since he put all operating
surplus into the labor income. Therefore, we dont claim this is the perfect evidence to
support our theory.
Instead of seeking further cross-country evidence on the capital-intensities, we run an
direct ordered Probit using the de facto exchange rate regime index as the dependent
variable, and countrys income and wage rigidity index as the independent variables. The
specication equation is as following:




+   wage rigidityjt +   Zjt + "jt (1.32)
where Zjt is the set of other control variables that may a¤ect the countries exchange
rate regime choices. Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenegger and Reggio (2004) nd that exchange rate
regime choice may depend on several determinants such as OCA theory, nancial openness
and policy crutch. Aghion et al. (2006) nd that nancial development may also be a key
factor in choosing the optimal exchange rate regimes. We will include all such variables
in our regression by adding trade openness, capital openness, nancial development index,
years in o¢ ce and vetopoints to the regressors. Trade openness data can be obtained from
the World Bank dataset. Capital openness index can be obtained from the IFS dataset.
We use private credit to GDP ratio as the measure of nancial development index, which
can be obtained from the World Bank dataset. Years in o¢ ce measures the years the
incumbent administration has been in o¢ ce which can be obtained from the Database of
Political Institutions 2000. Vetopoints refer to the extent of institutionalized constraints on
the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. This
data is from the Polcon 2002 Database.
Tables 1.5 and 1.6 show the regression results when using di¤erent wage rigity measures.
In all columns in Table 1.5, the coe¢ cients on ln(GDP per capita) are positive and signif-
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icant, which means that developed countries (usually with high productivities) are more
likely to choose exible exchange rate regimes, while developing countries (usually with low
productivities) are more likely to choose xed exchange rate regimes. The coe¢ cients on
ring cost are negative and signicant, which means that, for countries with more rigid
wage settings, they may be more likely to choose xed exchange rate regimes. Both results
are consistent with our theoretical predictions. In Table 1.6, we again nd negative and
signicant coe¢ cients on the wage rigidity measure obtained from estimations of the wage
Phillips curves. However, the coe¢ cients on ln(GDP per capita) are no longer signicant
though they are with the correct signs. One possible reason is that the sample shrinks
signicantly when we use the wage Phillips curve parameter to measure the wage rigidity.
1.2.2 Endogeneity issues
Using exchange rate regime as the regressor in the estimation will inevitably lead to dis-
cussions on the endogeneity issues. We will adopt the similar methodology in Levy-Yeyati,
Sturzenegger, and Reggio (2004) to solve this problem. They nd that there are the three
main competing approaches to explaining the choice of exchange rate regimes: i) the op-
timal currency area (OCA) theory pioneered by Mundell (1961), which relates the choice
of regime to the countrys trade links, size, and openness; ii) the nancial view, which
highlights the consequences of international nancial integration; and iii) and the political
view, which regards the use of a peg (or, more generally, an exchange rate anchor) as a
policy crutch for governments lacking (nominal and institutional) credibility. Based on
their work, we will run 2SLS regressions to deal with the endogeneity problems.
In the rst stage, we run a multinomial Probit regression by using the exible dummy
or the four de facto exchange rate regime index as the dependent variable, and the same set
of regressors as in Tables 1.5 and 1.6. We can obtain the predicted values (the likelihoods
of the exchange rate regimes) from the rst-stage regression. Then in the second stage,
we directly use those predicted values obtained from the rst stage regression to replace
the orginal exchange rate regime dummies in (1.30) or (1.31). For instance, in the period
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2000-2004, by the rst stage regression, we obtain the likelihood 0.23 that Brazil takes the
crawling peg regime and likelihood 0.44 that it will take the managed oating regime. Then
we will use the likelihood 0.23 and the likelihood 0.44 to replace the crawling peg dummy
and managed oating dummy respectively for Brazil in the second stage regression.
Table 1.7 show the regression results by running 2SLS regressions to (1.30) and (1.31).
We nd that most results are similar to those in Table 1.3. Exports grow faster under
a exible exchange rate regime than that under a xed exchange rate regime in capital-
intensive sectors or in countries with low wage rigidities. The opposite results hold if
capital-intensity is low or wage rigidity is high.
1.2.3 Alternative exchange rate regime classications
It is useful to examine our results with another exchange rate regime index. In this section,
we redo all the regressions by using the de facto exchange rate regime classication dened
by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003).7 The original LYS index takes values from 1 to
5, which represent exchange rate regimes inconclusive, oat, dirty oat, crawling peg and
xed, respectively. We modify the LYS index by i) using 6 minus the LYS index and ii)
dropping the observations with "inconclusive". The objective is to have a similar de facto
exchange rate regime index to the RR index that, as the number becomes larger in the
new LYS index, the exchange rate regime is more exible. Tables 1.8, 1.9 and 1.10 show
the regression results when we use the LYS index to replace the RR index and redo (1.29),
(1.30), (1.31) and (1.32). In the sectoral export growth regressions, we nd very similar
results to the case when using RR exchange rate regime classications. In the regression
(1.32), some coe¢ cients on the log countrys initial income, and wage rigidity index are not
signicant. However, all the coe¢ cients have the correct signs that are consistent with our
theoretical predictions. We think that the robustness checks still provide empirical support
to our theory.
7We use the 5-way classication in this paper.
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1.3 Conclusion
We investigate how a countrys stage of development and labor market frictions will inuence
its choice of exchange rate regime in this paper. Our conclusion is that whether to x or
to oat the currency depends on the countrys labor productivity and wage rigidity level.
For countries that have high labor productivities (namely developed countries), or exible
wages, a exible exchange rate regime is preferred because under such a regime: i) exporting
rms will earn more revenues, and ii) the domestic consumption good price level is lower.
Both of these e¤ects are welfare-enhancing. For countries that have low labor productivities
(namely developing countries), though domestic consumption good prices are higher under
a xed exchange rate regime, a stable nominal exchange rate will result in more exporting
income. If wages are su¢ ciently rigid, the latter e¤ect (higher exports) will dominate
the former (higher consumption good prices), and there is a welfare improvement when
switching to a xed exchange rate regime.
The choice of either a exible or a xed exchange rate regime may not always remain
the optimal policy. The optimal choice should depend on a countrys development stage.
At a low level of development, the country might deem a xed exchange rate regime as
optimal if wages are rigid enough. However, as the country develops, an eventual switch
from a xed to a exible exchange rate regime will be optimal.
To test the theoretical predictions, we use the de facto exchange rate regime index from
Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) to examine the relationships among sectoral export growth,
capital-intensity, exchange rate regime choice and wage rigidity. We nd that, consistent
with the theory, a exible exchange rate regime will enhance sectoral export growth in
more capital-intensive sectors or in countries with low wage rigidities. Then, we test how
a countrys initial income and wage rigidity a¤ect the choice of the exchange rate regime.
We nd that, as the theory predicts, countries with high incomes or low wage rigidities are
more likely to choose exible exchange rate regimes.
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Figure 1.1: Capital share vs ln(GDP per capita)
Notes: a. Capital share is calculated as one minus the labor share. We use the rst adjustment in
Gollin (2002) to calculate the labor share. b. Since labor shares in Botswana and Congo fall drastically
from 1980 to 1990 (more than 20 percent), we exclude the two countries from the sample.
51
Table 1.1: A countrys exchange rate regime and its income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Obs Fixed Obs Fixed Obs Fixed Obs Fixed
Low income countries 94 0.74 94 0.74 94 0.74 81 0.71
High income countries 34 0.65 23 0.44 22 0.45 14 0.29
t-test 0.09 0.30 0.29 0.45
(0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09)
Notes: a. We report the share of countries that take a xed exchange rate regime in Table 1. A
xed exchange rate regime is dened as a peg or a crawling peg using Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004)
index. A exible exchange rate regime is dened as a managed oating or a free oating. b.
We divide the countries into two groups, low income countries and high income countries, using
20,000 dollars in year 2004 as the cuto¤ value of GDP per capita. High income countries include:
Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong China, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. All other countries
in the sample are low income countries. c. In column (2), we treat countries that use Euro as
the currency as one big country. d. In column (3) and (4), we drop countries that use Euro
as the currency. In column (4), we also drop city economies (Hong Kong and Singapore) and
countries with population smaller than 1,000,000.
Table 1.2: Summary statistics of key variables
Obs Mean Median Std Dev Min Max
RR 487 1.56 2 1.31 1 4
LYS 603 1.95 1.5 1.06 1 4
GDP per capita 617 9059 5384 9886 258 65480
Labor union 67 0.75 1 0.44 0 1
Firing cost 128 0.31 0.30 0.23 0 1
Wage Phillips 38 0.032 0.046 0.018 0.002 0.191
Sectoral export growth 4354 0.23 0.22 0.48 -2.96 3.18
Capital-intensity 6911 0.60 0.61 0.18 0.08 0.91
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Table 1.3: Sectoral export growth vs exchange rate regime index (RR),
capital-intensity and wage rigidity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RR -0.111 0.029 -0.038 -0.096 -0.124
(0.025) (0.029) (0.021) (0.042) (0.048)
RR*K-intensity 0.227 0.228 0.175
(0.034) (0.054) (0.088)
RR*labor union -0.067 -0.070
(0.027) (0.028)
RR*ring cost -0.110 -0.119
(0.063) (0.072)
RR*wage Phillips -1.76 -2.08
(0.764) (0.797)
ln(initial income) -0.474 -0.146 -0.175 -0.127 -0.175
(0.070) (0.018) (0.038) (0.022) (0.044)
K-intensity 0.182 -0.327 -0.207
(0.125) (0.161) (0.239)
Labor union 0.087 0.090
(0.058) (0.059)
Firing cost 0.164 0.168
(0.164) (0.164)
Wage Phillips 5.15 5.71
(2.46) (2.52)
Observations 3,489 867 1,088 867 1,088
R-squared 0.23 0.20 0.24 0.22 0.24
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.4: Sectoral export growth vs exchange rate regime dummy (RR),
capital-intensity and wage rigidity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Flexible -0.074 0.062 -0.104 -0.204 -0.160
(0.065) (0.066) (0.050) (0.104) (0.150)
Flexible*K-intensity 0.403 0.588 0.317
(0.096) (0.170) (0.304)
Flexible*labor union -0.158 -0.201
(0.062) (0.064)
Flexible*ring cost -0.136 -0.290
(0.143) (0.145)
Flexible*wage Phillips -2.48 -2.62
(1.31) (1.51)
ln(initial income) -0.549 -0.137 -0.174 -0.117 -0.162
(0.070) (0.019) (0.038) (0.023) (0.044)
K-intensity 0.556 -0.115 0.045
(0.107) (0.148) (0.219)
Labor union 0.016 0.027
(0.035) (0.035)
Firing cost 0.014 0.064
(0.089) (0.091)
Wage Phillips 1.86 2.03
(1.42) (1.44)
Observations 3,489 867 1,088 867 1,088
R-squared 0.22 0.20 0.24 0.21 0.24
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.5: Exchange rate regimes (RR) vs ln(GDP per capita), wage rigidity
(using labor union index and ring cost)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(initial GDP per capita) 0.374 0.386 0.446 0.384 0.637
(0.223) (0.244) (0.336) (0.233) (0.363)
Labor union -0.269 -0.215 -0.376 -0.256 -0.251
(0.313) (0.336) (0.403) (0.373) (0.429)
Firing cost -1.46 -1.39 -1.44 -1.51 -2.09
(0.68) (0.69) (0.69) (0.727) (0.791)
Size (countrys GDP/US GDP) 7.46 66.9
(4.41) (30.3)
Geographical area 0.129 0.36
(106 square kilometers) (0.130) (0.26)
Island dummy 0.645 0.342
(0.426) (0.495)
Trade openness -0.003 -0.006
(0.002) (0.003)
Financial openness -0.141 -0.126
(0.126) (0.130)
Financial development 0.003 0.001
(0.005) (0.006)
Reserve to money base ratio 1.04 2.22
(0.92) (1.32)
Years in o¢ ce -0.018 -0.016
(0.025) (0.026)
Veto points -0.871 4.22
(1.13) (1.89)
Continent dummies Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 59 59 57 59 57
Pseudo R-squared 0.18 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.24
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.6: Exchange rate regimes (RR) vs ln(GDP per capita), wage rigidity
(using wage Phillips curve index)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(initial GDP per capita) 0.267 0.249 1.79 0.487 1.29
(0.237) (0.272) (0.746) (0.366) (0.759)
Wage Phillips -12.3 -10.86 -15.38 -11.09 -13.49
(5.64) (5.91) (8.09) (5.88) (8.57)
Size (countrys GDP/US GDP) 3.49 6.93
(3.68) (5.35)
Geographical area 0.357 0.346
(106 square kilometers) (0.302) (0.362)
Island dummy 0.240 0.372
(0.654) (0.485)
Trade openness -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.003)
Financial openness -0.209 -0.354
(0.237) (0.330)
Financial development 0.002 0.000
(0.007) (0.006)
Reserve to money base ratio 3.47 3.52
(1.83) (2.32)
Years in o¢ ce -0.018 -0.026
(0.025) (0.029)
Veto points -0.871 3.12
(1.13) (2.19)
Continent dummies Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 38 38 37 36 36
Pseudo R-squared 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.30
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.7: Sectoral export growth vs exchange rate regime dummy (RR),
capital-intensity and wage rigidty, 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IV Flexible -1.28 -0.175 -0.210 -0.202 -1.19
(0.383) (0.791) (0.154) (0.791) (1.40)
IV Flexible*K-intensity 1.69 1.97 2.35
(0.536) (1.12) (1.91)
IV Flexible*labor union -0.154 -0.117
(0.045) (0.045)
IV Flexible*ring cost -1.13 -1.14
(0.453) (0.451)
IV Flexible*wage Phillips -12.4 -2.62
(3.85) (1.51)
ln(initial income) -0.549 -0.163 -0.124 -0.147 -0.172
(0.234) (0.069) (0.078) (0.063) (0.094)
K-intensity 0.456 -0.105 0.049
(0.247) (0.218) (0.359)
Labor union 0.023 0.032
(0.057) (0.043)
Firing cost 0.019 0.084
(0.097) (0.105)
Wage Phillips 2.86 1.56
(4.42) (4.84)
Observations 2,934 742 914 742 914
R-squared 0.21 0.17 0.28 0.22 0.32
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.8: Sectoral export growth vs exchange rate regime index (LYS),
capital-intensity and wage rigidity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LYS -0.148 0.026 -0.007 -0.037 -0.050
(0.024) (0.021) (0.015) (0.032) (0.036)
LYS*K-intensity 0.206 0.111 0.098
(0.032) (0.042) (0.071)
LYS*labor union -0.045 -0.039
(0.020) (0.021)
LYS*ring cost -0.045 -0.079
(0.044) (0.045)
LYS*wage Phillips -0.946 -1.03
(0.523) (0.594)
ln(initial income) -0.356 -0.144 -0.183 -0.138 -0.194
(0.072) (0.018) (0.042) (0.023) (0.047)
K-intensity 0.179 -0.180 -0.163
(0.125) (0.157) (0.235)
Labor union 0.045 0.038
(0.045) (0.046)
Firing cost 0.067 0.081
(0.120) (0.122)
Wage Phillips 3.11 3.13
(2.29) (2.35)
Observations 3,746 804 1,046 804 1,046
R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.22
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.9: Sectoral export growth vs exchange rate regime dummy (LYS),
capital-intensity and wage rigidity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Float -0.458 0.083 -0.017 -0.020 -0.081
(0.081) (0.064) (0.025) (0.107) (0.114)
Float*K-intensity 0.651 0.229 0.133
(0.130) (0.132) (0.216)
Float*labor union -0.134 -0.132
(0.061) (0.063)
Float*ring cost -0.122 -0.191
(0.128) (0.135)
Float*wage Phillips -3.48 -3.75
(1.85) (1.90)
ln(initial income) -0.389 -0.138 -0.182 -0.132 -0.180
(0.072) (0.019) (0.040) (0.023) (0.042)
K-intensity 0.388 -0.007 0.045
(0.114) (0.145) (0.219)
Labor union -0.000 0.001
(0.030) (0.031)
Firing cost 0.020 0.030
(0.081) (0.084)
Wage Phillips 2.83 2.94
(1.89) (1.90)
Observations 3,746 804 1,046 804 1,046
R-squared 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.22
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.10: Exchange rate regimes (LYS) vs ln(GDP per capita), wage rigidity
(using labor union index and ring cost)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(initial GDP per capita) 0.246 0.466 1.08 0.279 1.70
(0.237) (0.264) (0.481) (0.262) (0.73)
Labor union -0.319 -0.310 -0.050 -0.298 0.052
(0.427) (0.441) (0.483) (0.161) (0.502)
Firing cost -0.860 -1.05 -0.881 -0.569 -1.68
(0.715) (0.610) (0.742) (0.784) (0.791)
Size (countrys GDP/US GDP) 2.69 16.7
(4.48) (40.3)
Geographical area 0.756 1.41
(106 square kilometers) (0.329) (0.94)
Island dummy 0.594 -0.934
(0.497) (1.01)
Trade openness -0.004 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Financial openness -0.279 -0.292
(0.172) (0.223)
Financial development -0.012 -0.025
(0.007) (0.011)
Reserve to money base ratio 5.34 7.32
(1.69) (2.65)
Years in o¢ ce -0.018 0.065
(0.025) (0.035)
Veto points -0.871 -2.58
(1.13) (2.18)
Continent dummies Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 56 56 53 56 53
Pseudo R-squared 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.18
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.11: Exchange rate regimes (LYS) vs ln(GDP per capita), wage rigid-
ity (using wage Phillips curve index)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(initial GDP per capita) 0.400 0.336 0.351 0.085 0.702
(0.321) (0.362) (0.489) (0.407) (0.722)
Wage Phillips -2.45 -0.457 -2.21 -0.074 -1.67
(6.46) (6.71) (7.17) (6.53) (7.86)
Size (countrys GDP/US GDP) 9.23 14.2
(8.24) (10.35)
Geographical area 0.254 0.346
(106 square kilometers) (0.267) (0.662)
Island dummy 0.620 0.472
(0.824) (0.985)
Trade openness -0.008 -0.004
(0.008) (0.009)
Financial openness -0.827 -0.354
(0.656) (0.730)
Financial development 0.037 0.004
(0.025) (0.036)
Reserve to money base ratio 56.7 43.5
(22.1) (25.3)
Years in o¢ ce -0.013 -0.017
(0.027) (0.031)
Veto points -0.732 -0.982
(1.23) (2.19)
Continent dummies Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 37 37 36 36 36
Pseudo R-squared 0.23 0.28 0.22 0.29 0.36









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Sex Ratios, Savings Rates and
Current Account Imbalances
with Shang-Jin Wei
High savings rates in excess of domestic investment rates in many countries in East and
Southeast Asia have produced a massive current account surplus as a share of GDP, and are
said to be a major contributor to the global current account imbalances, to the unusually
low long-term interest rates, and possibly to the onset of the 2008-2009 global nancial
crisis. As to theories of savings behavior, the existing literature has highlighted the roles
of life-cycle considerations (Modigliani, 1970), precautionary savings (Kimball, 1990), habit
formation (Carroll, Overland, and Weil, 2008), culture (Belton and Uwaifo Oyelere, 2008),
and nancial under-development (Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas, 2008; Ju and Wei,
2006, 2008 and 2010; Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull, 2007). The aim of the current
paper is to propose an alternative theory that gives prominence to a major, albeit insu¢ -
ciently recognized by macroeconomists, social transformation in many economies, namely
an increasing gap in the numbers of men and women in the marriage market. The basic
thesis is that as competition intensies in the marriage market, men or parents with sons
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raise their savings rates with the hope of improving their relative standing in the marriage
market. Because the biological desire to have a partner of the opposite sex is strong, this
e¤ect is quantitatively important enough to reveal itself in the aggregate savings rate and
the current account balance.
A direct source of the idea for the theory is an empirical paper by Wei and Zhang (2009),
which studies household savings behavior in China. They provide both cross-regional and
cross-household evidence that is consistent with the notion that a worsening prospect for
men in the marriage market has motivated them and their parents to raise their savings rates
substantially. They call this the "competitive saving motive." Chinese household savings
as a share of disposable income rose from 16% in 1990 to 30% in 2007. Wei and Zhang
suggest that the rise in the sex ratio imbalance could account for half the total increase
in the savings rate. Because their paper does not have a formal theory, there is a need to
construct a model to see if the hypothesis can work in a general equilibrium, and whether a
calibration of the model can produce an e¤ect whose magnitude is economically signicant.
In this paper, we aim to ll these important voids. The core part of the paper is to
analyze theoretically whether and how a sex ratio imbalance will inuence the economy-wide
savings rate and the current account. We construct a simple overlapping generations (OLG)
model with two sexes and a desire to marry. To focus on the macroeconomic implications of
sex ratio imbalances, we intentionally shut down channels such as the usual precautionary
savings motive, habit formation, culture, and nancial development. Because it is an OLG
model, there are still life-cycle considerations, which, however, do not lead to current account
imbalances on their own.
Under reasonable conditions, we show that men respond to a rise in the sex ratio by
raising their savings rates. Moreover, the increment in their savings is always enough to
o¤set any decrease in womens savings. As a result, the aggregate savings rises with the sex
ratio. We also discuss a number of extensions that aim to allow for additional realism: (a)
incorporate parental savings for children, (c) introduce intra-household bargaining, and (c)
consider an OLG structure in which each generation lives for 50 periods and makes savings
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decisions in multiple periods. In each case, under reasonably general conditions, both the
aggregate savings rate and current account rise in response to a rise in the sex ratio.
To check if the model can deliver an e¤ect that is economically signicant, we go to
quantitative calibrations. In the benchmark case, for a small open economy, as the sex ratio
rises from 1 to 1.15, the economy-wide savings rate and the current account will rise by
more than 10%. We also consider the case of two large economies, whose relative sizes and
income levels are calibrated to mimic China and the United States. The synthetic United
States is assumed to always have a balanced sex ratio, while the synthetic China experiences
a rise in the sex ratio from 1 (balanced) to 1.5 (very unbalanced). The rise in Chinas sex
ratio produces a rise in its current account surplus, and a corresponding rise in the current
account decit for the United States. The magnitudes of the current account imbalances in
the simulations (about 7.7% of GDP for China and -2.6% of GDP for the United States) are
such that they are more than one-half of the actual current account imbalances observed in
the data. While the sex ratio imbalance is not the sole reason for the global current account
imbalances in recent years, it could be one of the signicant, and yet thus far unrecognized,
factors.
A desire to enhance ones prospects in the marriage market through a higher level of
wealth could be a motive for savings even in countries with a balanced sex ratio. But such a
motive is not as easy to detect when the competition is modest. When the sex ratio gets out
of balance, obtaining a marriage partner becomes much less assured. A host of behaviors
that are motivated by a desire to succeed in the marriage market may become magnied.
But sex ratio imbalances so far have not been investigated by macroeconomists. This may
be a serious omission. A sex ratio imbalance at birth and in the marriage age cohort is a
common demographic feature in many economies, especially in East, South, and Southeast
Asia, such as Korea, India, Vietnam, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong, in addition to
China. In many economies, parents have a preference for a son over a daughter. This used
to lead to large families, not necessarily an unbalanced sex ratio. However, in the last three
decades, as the technology to detect the gender of a fetus (Ultrasound B) has become less
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expensive and more widely available, many more parents engage in selective abortions in
favor of a son, resulting in an increasing relative surplus of men. The spread of technology
started in the early 1980s and accelerated quickly afterwards. 1985 was the rst year in
which half of the county-level hospitals in China had acquired at least one Ultrasound B
machine. By early 1990s, all county-level hospitals had at least one such machine (Ebenstein,
Li, and Meng, 2010). The strict family planning policy in China, introduced in the early
1980s, has induced Chinese parents to engage in sex-selective abortions more aggressively
than their counterparts in other countries. The sex ratio at birth in China rose from 106
boys per hundred girls in 1980 to 122 boys per hundred girls in 1997 (see Wei and Zhang,
2009, for more detail). It may not be a coincidence that the Chinese current account surplus
started to garner international attention around 2002 just when the rst cohort born after
the implementation of the strict family planning policy was entering the marriage market.
Throughout the model, we assume an exogenous sex ratio. While the sex ratio is en-
dogenous in the long-run as parental preference evolves, the assumption of an exogeous sex
ratio can be defended on two grounds. First, the technology that enables the rapid rise
in the sex ratio has only become inexpensive and widely accessible in developing countries
within the last 25 years or so. As a result, it is reasonable to think that the rising sex ratio
a¤ects only the relatively young cohortssavings decisions, but not those who have passed
half of their working careers. Second, data suggests that if the preference for son has a
mean-reverting property, it must be a very slow-moving process. Almost all countries that
have a skewed sex ratio today have exhibited a gradual climb over the last decade or two.
Korea is the only economy whose sex ratio appears to have started to revert back from a
very skewed level. This suggests that a systematic reversal of the sex ratio is unlikely to
happen in most economies in the short run.
To see if the theoretical predicion has any support in the data, we check if a countrys
private sector savings rate (dened as current account minus government savings, divided by
GDP) is systematically linked to its sex ratio. After controlling for the e¤ects on the savings
rate from income, the share of working age people in the population (i.e., a proxy for the life
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cycle theory), the ratio of private bank credit to GDP (a proxy for nancial development),
and social security expenditure as a share of GDP (a proxy for the precautionary savings
motive), we nd that a rise in the sex ratio from a balanced level to 1.15 (the current sex
ratio for the pre-marital age cohort in China) is associated with a higher current account
(excluding government savings) by over 10% of GDP.
There are three bodies of work that are related to the current paper. First, the literature
on status goods, positional goods, and social norms (e.g., Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite,
1992, Corneo and Jeanne, 1999, Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004 and 2009) has o¤ered many
useful insights. One key point is that when wealth can improve ones social status (including
improving ones standing in the marriage market), in addition to a¤ording a greater amount
of consumption goods, there is an extra incentive to save. This element is in our model
as well. However, all existing theories on status goods feature a balanced sex ratio. Yet,
an unbalanced sex ratio presents some non-trivial challenges. In particular, while a rise in
the sex ratio is an unfavorable shock to men (or parents with sons), it is a favorable shock
to women (or parents with daughters). Could the latter group strategically reduce their
savings so as to completely o¤set whatever increments in savings men or parents with sons
may have? In other words, the impact on aggregate savings appears ambiguous. Our model
will address this question. In any case, the literature on status goods has no discernible
impact in policy circles. For example, while there are voluminous documents produced
by the International Monetary Fund or speeches by U.S. o¢ cials on Chinas high savings
rate and large current account surplus, no single paper or speech thus far has pointed to a
possible connection with its high sex ratio imbalance.
A second related literature is the economics of family, which is too vast to be summarized
here comprehensively. One interesting insight of this literature is that a married couples
consumption has a partial public goods feature (Browning, Bourguignon and Chiappori,
1994; Donni, 2006). We make use of this feature in our model as well. None of the papers
in this literature explores the general equilibrium implications for aggregate savings from a
change in the sex ratio.
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The third literature examines empirically the causes of a rise in the sex ratio. The key
insight is that the proximate cause responsible for a majority of the recent rise in the sex
ratio imbalance is sex-selective abortions, which have been made increasingly possible by
the spread of Ultrasound B machines. There are two deeper causes for parental willingness
to disproportionately abort female fetuses. The rst is the parental preference for sons,
which in part has to do with the relatively inferior economic status of women. When
the economic status of women improves, sex-selective abortions appear to decline (Qian,
2008). The second is either something that leads parents to voluntarily choose to have
fewer children than the earlier generations, or a government policy that limits the number
of children a couple can have. In regions of China where the family planning policy is less
strictly enforced, there is also less sex ratio imbalance (Wei and Zhang, 2009). Bhaskar
(2011) examines parental sex selections and their welfare consequences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we present a benchmark
model with no intra-household bargaining. In Section 3, we consider a number of exten-
sions. One such extension allows for intra-household bargaining, and shows that the key
propositions still hold. In Section 4, we calibrate the model to see if the sex ratio imbalance
can produce changes in the aggregate savings rate and current account whose magnitudes
are economically signicant. In Section 5, we provide some empirical evidence that the sex
ratio may have a signicant impact on a countrys current account. Finally, in section 6,
we o¤er concluding remarks and discuss possible future research.
2.1 The Benchmark Model
We construct an overlapping generations model with two sexes. Both men and women live
two periods: young and old. An individual (of either sex) receives an exogenous endowment
in the rst period and nothing in the second period. She or he consumes a part of the
endowment in the rst period and saves the rest for the second period.
A marriage can only take place between a man and a women in the same generation
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and at the beginning of their second period. Once married, the husband and the wife pool
their rst-period savings together and consume an identical amount in the second period.
The second period consumption within a marriage has a partial public good feature. In
other words, the husband and the wife can each consume more than half of their combined
second period income - the exact proportion is an exogenous parameter to be explained
below. Everyone is endowed with an ability to give his/her spouse some emotional utility
(or "love" or "happiness"). This emotional utility is a random variable in the rst period
with a common and known distribution across all members of the same sex, and its value is
realized and becomes public information when the individual enters the marriage market.
Each generation is characterized by an exogenous ratio of men to women (>= 1).
All men are identical ex ante, and all women are identical ex ante. Men and women are
symmetric in all aspects except that the sex ratio may be unbalanced.
We describe the equilibrium in this economy in six steps. First, we start with a repre-
sentative womans optimization, followed by a representative mans optimization problem.
Second, we describe how the marriage market works. Third, we perform comparative sta-
tics, in particular, on how the savings rates change in response to a rise in the sex ratio.
Fourth, we consider a small open economy with production and discuss the current account
response to a change in the sex ratio. Fifth, we solve for a two-country model in which the
global interest rate is endogenous. Sixth, we use numerical calibrations to see if the model
can deliver current account responses that are economically signicant.
2.1.1 A Representative Womans Optimization Problem
A representative woman makes her consumption/saving decisions in her rst period, taking





where R, yw and sw are the gross interest rate, her endowment, and savings rate, respec-
tively.
If she is married (at the beginning of the second period), her second-period consumption
is
c2w =  (Rs
wyw +Rsmym)
where ym and sm are her husbands endowment and savings rate, respectively.  (12 =<
 =< 1) represents the notion that consumption within a marriage is a public good with
congestion. As an example, if a couple buys a car, both spouses can use it. When  = 12 ;
the husband and the wife only consume private goods. In contrast, when  = 1, all the
consumption is a public good with no congestion1.
She chooses her savings rate to maximize the following objective function:
V w = max
sw
u(c1w) + E [u(c2w) + 
m]
subject to the budget constraints that
c1w = (1  sw)yw (2.1)
c2w =
8><>:  (Rs
wyw +Rsmym) if married
Rswyw otherwise
(2.2)
where V w is her value function, and E is the expectation operator. m is the emotional
utility (or "love") she obtains from her husband, which is a random variable with a dis-
tribution function Fm. Utility function u() satises the standard properties that u0 > 0,
and u00 < 0. The exact value of emotional utility is revealed at the beginning of the second
period and becomes a common knowledge at that time. Bhaskar (2009) also introduces a
1By assuming the same  for the wife and the husband, we abstract from a discussion of bargaining within
a household. In an extension later in the paper, we allow  to be gender specifc, and to be a function of
the sex ratio and the relative wealth levels of the two spouses, along the lines of Chiappori (1988 and 1992)
and Browning and Chiappori (1998). This tends to make the response of the aggregate savings stronger to
a given rise in the sex ratio.
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similar "love" variable.
2.1.2 A Representative Mans Optimization Problem
A representative man has a similar optimization problem as the representative woman. In
particular, if he is not married, his second-period consumption is
c2m;n = Rs
mym
If he is married, his second-period consumption is
c2m =  (Rs
wyw +Rsmym)
He chooses his savings rate to maximize the following value function:
V m = max
sm
u(c1m) + E [u(c2m) + 
w]
subject to the budget constraints that
c1m = (1  sm)ym (2.3)
c2m =
8><>:  (Rs
wyw +Rsmym) if married
Rsmym otherwise
(2.4)
where V m is his value function. w is the emotional utility he obtains from his wife, which
is drawn from a distribution function Fw. We assume w and m are independent.
2.1.3 The Marriage Market
In the marriage market, every woman (or man) ranks all members of the opposite sex by
a combination of two criteria: (1) the level of wealth (which is determined solely by the
rst-period savings), and (2) the size of "love" he/she can obtain from his/her spouse.
The weights on the two criteria are implied by the utility functions specied earlier. More
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precisely, woman i prefers a higher ranked man to a lower ranked one, where the rank on
man j is given by u(c2w;i;j) + mj . Symmetrically, man j assigns a rank to woman i based
on the utility he can obtain from her u(c2m;j;i)+wi . (To ensure that the preference is strict
for men and women, when there is a tie in terms of the above criteria, we break the tie by
assuming that a woman prefers j if j < j0 and a man does the same.) Note that "love" is
not in the eyes of the beholder in the sense that every woman (man) has the same ranking
over men (women).
The marriage market is assumed to follow the Gale-Shapley algorithm, which produces
a unique and stable equilibrium of matching (Gale and Shapley, 1962; and Roth and So-
tomayor, 1990). The algorithm species the following: (1) Each man proposes in the rst
round to his most preferred choice of woman. Each woman holds the proposal from her most
preferred suitor and rejects the rest. (2) Any man who is rejected in round k-1 makes a new
proposal in round k to his most preferred woman among those who have not yet rejected
him. Each available women in round k "holds" the proposal from her most preferred man
and rejects the rest. (3) The procedure repeats itself until no further proposals are made.2
With many women and men in the marriage market, all women (and all men) approx-
imately form a continuum and each individual has a measure close to zero. Let Iw and
Im denote the continuum formed by women and men, respectively. We normalize Iw and
let Iw = (0; 1). Since the sex ratio is , the set of men Im = (0; ). Men and women
are ordered in such a way that a higher value means a higher ranking by members of the
opposite sex.
In equilibrium, there exists a unique mapping (w) for women in the marriage market.
w : Iw ! Im
That is, woman i (i 2 Iw) is mapped to man j (j 2 Im), given all the initial wealth and
2 If only women can propose and men respond with deferred acceptance, the same matching outcomes
will emerge. What we have to rule out is that both men and women can propose, in which case, one cannot
prove that the matching is unique.
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emotional utility draws. This implies a mapping from a combination (swi , 
w
i ) to another
combination (smj , 
m





mens (sm, m), the type of husband j she can marry depends on her (swi , 
w
i ). Before she
enters the marriage market, she knows only the distribution of her own type but not the
exact value. As a result, the type of her future husband (smj , 
m
j ) is also a random variable.




u (c2w;i;j) + 
m
w( ijswi ;wi ;sw i;w i;sm;m)









u (c2w;i;j) + 
m
w( ijswi ;wi ;sw i;w i;sm;m)
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where wi is her threshold ranking on men such that she is indi¤erent between marriage or
not. Any lower-ranked man, or any man with wi < 
w
i , wont be chosen by her.
Since we assume there are (weakly) fewer women than men, we expand the set Iw to eIw
so that eIw = (0; ). In the expanded set, women in the marriage market start from value
   1 to . The measure for women in the marriage market remains one. In equilibrium,
there exists an unique mapping for men in the marriage market:
m : Im ! eIw
where m maps man j (j 2 Im) to woman i (i 2 Iw). Those men who are matched
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where mj is his threshold ranking on all women. Any woman with a poorer rank, 
m
j <
mj , will not be chosen by him.
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We assume that the density functions of m and w are continuously di¤erentiable.
Since all men (women) in the marriage market have identical problems, they make the
same savings decisions. In equilibrium, a positive assortative matching emerges for those
men and women who are matched. In other words, there exists a mapping M from w to
m such that










For simplicity, we assume that w and m are drawn from the same distribution, Fw =
Fm = F . The lowest possible value of emotional utility min is assumed to be su¢ ciently
small (and can be negative) such that any person with a low realized value of emotional
utility may not succeed in getting married. Dene w and m as the threshold values of
emotional utility for women and men, respectively, such that only those with emotional
utilities higher than the threshold value will get married. In other words,
w = max

u2m;n   u2m;M 1 (m)
	
and m = max fu2w;n   u2w;M(w)g (2.5)











where ~wi = u( (Rs
w
i y
w +Rsmym))   u( (Rswyw +Rsmym)) + wi . wi is the probability
that she will get married,
wi = Pr (u( (Rs
w
i y
w +Rsmym))  u( (Rswyw +Rsmym)) + wi  wjRswyw; Rsmym)
= 1  F (w   u( (Rswi yw +Rsmym)) + u( (Rswyw +Rsmym))) (2.6)
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Due to symmetry (i.e., all women are identical ex ante), we drop sub-index i for women
in subsequent discussion. Given mens savings decisions, the rst order condition for her
optimization problem is
  u01wyw + 







@sw (u2w   u2w;n)



















































  u( (Rswyw +Rsmym) + mj  mRswyw; Rsmym
= 1  F  m   u    Rswyw +Rsmj ym) + u( (Rswyw +Rsmym) (2.8)
The rst order condition for his optimization problem is
  u01mym + 




@sm + (1  m)u02m;nRym
+@
m
@sm (u2m   u2m;n)




















In the rest of the paper, we assume that the average value of emotional utility E is
su¢ ciently high such that a representative man, ex ante, always prefers marriage to being
single. For simplicity, we also assume R = 1 througout the paper.
2.1.4 Equilibrium Savings Rates
In the benchmark, we assume that all women and men automatically enter the marriage
market (We will later consider an extension in which agents decide whether or not to enter
the marriage market). An equilibrium is dened as a collecton of savings rates by men
and women that solve their respective optimalization problems, taking all other men and
womens decisions as given.










 sw; sm j ; yw; ym; Fw; Fm
where i and j stand for a representative woman and man, respectively, and  i and  j













are the sets of womens and mens savings rates respectively.
To simplify the discussion, we assume that the population growth rate is zero, and
women and men receive the same rst period income (yw = ym = y). Before period t, the
economy has a balanced sex ratio. In this case, sw = sm = s, and s can be obtained from
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solving the set of rst order conditions (3.14) or (3.16):
  u01w + 2 (1  F ())u02 + F ()u02n = 0 (2.10)
and
 = u2   u2n
where we use the fact that at  = 1, M() = .
The rst key proposition concerns the e¤ect of a rise in the sex ratio on the aggregate
savings rate. The thought experiment assumes that people in the old cohort have made their
savings decision when the sex ratio is balanced. When the sex ratio rises, any change in the
aggregate savings is driven by a change in the savings by the young cohort. This simplifying
assumption is motivated by the reality: A rise in the sex ratio in almost all economies is
a recent phenomenon, since large-scale sex-selective abortions are a recent phenomenon.
More precisely, while the diagnostic sonography used for prenatal checkups was available in
the 1960s, the procedure became gradually more a¤ordable to people in countries that have
a high sex ratio only since the 1980s. (The strict version of the Chinese family planning
policy, another contributor to the spread of sex-selective abortions, was also put in place
in the early 1980s.) For this reason, the savings pattern for the currently old was largely
decided when there was no severe sex ratio imbalance.
In what follows, whenever we say a man (or woman), we mean a young man (or woman),
unless otherwise specied. We rst state the proposition formally, and then explain the
intuition behind the key parts of the proposition. A detailed proof is provided in Appendix
A.
Proposition 5. Assume emotional utility w and m are drawn from an independent and





vuutmax0; u02 u02w;n + u02m;n  u02w;nu02m;n
u001mu001w
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Then, as the sex ratio rises, (1) the savings rate of the representative man goes up, but
the change in the savings rate by the representative woman is ambiguous; (2) however, the
economy-wide savings rate increases unambiguously.
Proof. See Appendix A2.1.





vuutmax0; u02 u02w;n + u02m;n  u02w;nu02m;n
u001mu001w
basically states that the expected value of the emotioinal utility one gets from his/her
spouse is not too small (so marriage is valuable). This is not a demanding condition. If
the period utility function takes the log form, u (c) = ln c, then the right-hand-side of the


















This means that the condition becomes E  0.
Second, it is perhaps not surprising that the representative man raises his savings rate
in response to a rise in the sex ratio since the need to compete in the marriage market
becomes greater. Why is the impact of a higher sex ratio on a representative womans
savings rate ambiguous? The answer is that a higher sex ratio produces two o¤setting
e¤ects for her. On the one hand, as she anticipates more savings from her future husband,
she can free-ride and does not need to sacrice her rst-period consumption as much as she
otherwise would have to. On the other hand, precisely because men have increased their
savings rate in the rst period in response to a higher sex ratio, they will be more reluctant
to share their wealth with a woman with both a low savings rate and a low emotional
utility. The last point raises the probability that low-savings women may not get married.
Since the representative women also prefers marriage than spinsterhood, she may raise her
savings rate to improve her chance in the marriage market. Because the two e¤ects go in
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the opposite directions, the net e¤ect of a higher sex ratio on a representative womans
savings is ambiguous.
Third, why does the aggregate savings rate rise in response to a higher sex ratio even
if women reduce their savings? Put it di¤erently, why is the increment in mens savings
greater than the decline in womens savings? To see this intuitively, one has to recognize
two separate motivations for a representative man to raise his savings rate. In addition to
improving his relative standing in the marriage market, he has to raise his savings rate to
make up for the lower savings rate by his future wife. The more his future wife is expected
to cut down her savings, the more he would have to raise his own savings to compensate.
Heuristically, this ensures that his incremental savings is more than enough to o¤set any
reduction in his future wifes savings. In addition, since men save more, the rising share
of men in the population as a result of a higher sex ratio would also raise the aggregate
savings rate. While both channels contribute to a rise in the aggregate savings rate, it is
easy to verify that the rst channel (the incremental competitive savings by any given man)
is more important than the second e¤ect (a change in the composition of the population
with di¤erent savings propensities).
2.1.5 Mixed-strategy equilibrium
In this section, we extend our benchmark model by allowing men and women to choose
to enter and exit the marriage market. Formally, this is a mixed-strategy game in which
the representative woman chooses the probability of entering the marriage market w, a
savings rate if she decides to enter, and a separate savings rate if decides to abstain from
the marriage market.
Conditioning on deciding to enter the marriage market, she has the same optimiza-
tion problem as in the previous section. However, she can also choose to be single, and
conditional on such a choice, her life-time utility is
V wn = maxswn
u(c1w;n) + u(c2w;n)
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where V wn denotes the value function of a representative woman who is single throughout
her life.
Her overall optimization problem when she is young is
max
w;sw;swn
wV w + (1  w)V wn
Obviously, she would choose w = 1 if and only if V w > V wn .
Similarly, a representative man chooses the probability of entering the marriage market
m as well as two potentially separate savings rates. His overall optimization problem is
max
m;sm;smn
mV m + (1  m)V mn
where V mn denotes the value function of a representative man who is single throughout his
life. Obviously, the representative man decides to enter the marriage market with probability
one if and only if the expected utility of doing so is greater than otherwise, or V m > V mn :
Now we can re-dene the equilibrium as following:
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j + (1  mj )V mn;j
 sw; sm j ; swn ; smn; j ; w; m j ; yw; ym; Fw; Fm
where i and j stand for a representative woman and man, respectively, and  i and  j repre-

































are the sets of womens and mens probabilities of
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entering the marriage market respectively.
Now we can show a more general proposition:





with the mean E  0, and u(c) = ln c, then
there exists a threshold value 1 > 1 that satises V
m = V mn .
(i) For  < 1, both women and men choose to enter the marriage market with probabil-
ity one. In addition, as the sex ratio rises, a representative man increases his savings rate
while the change in the savings rate of a representative woman is ambiguous. However, the
economy-wide savings rate increases unambiguously.
(ii) For   1, as the sex ratio rises, a representative man chooses a positive probability
of being single while a representative woman still chooses to enter the marriage market with
probability one. The e¤ect on the aggregate savings rate is ambiguous.
Proof. See Appendix A2.2.
Three remarks are in order. First, for  < 1, as the sex ratio rises, men endure a welfare
loss while the e¤ect on womens welfare is ambiguous. Men lose because (i) they face a lower
probability of marriage, and (ii) the reductions in their rst-period consumption do not in
the end alter their probability of marriage. In comparison, women face two opposing e¤ects.
On the one hand, they may gain both from an ability to free ride on their future husbands
higher savings rates and from an improved chance to marry a man with a higher level of
emotional utility. On the other hand, precisely because men have raised their savings, they
become more choosy in their choice of a mate as sharing their higher savings rate with a
low-type woman may be worse than being single. As a result, women ex ante may face a
rising risk of not getting married. The net e¤ect of a higher sex ratio on womens welfare
is ambiguous.
Second, after reaching the threshold 1, with an savings rate already very high, some
men would nd it better to skip the marriage market (or equivalently, the representative
man would assign a positive probability for not entering the marriage market). Otherwise,
81
they would have to share their high savings rate with a low-type woman, resulting in a
lower level of welfare than being single. From womens point of view, however, as long the
mean level of emotional utility is high enough, they always achieve a higher level of welfare
by choosing to enter the marriage market. In this case, the sex ratio in the marriage market
is always equal to 1. Both men and women who choose to enter the marriage market will
keep their savings rates constant. The rest of men choose another constant savings rate to
maximize their utilities, but it is ambiguous whether the life-time bachelorssavings rate is
lower than womenssavings rate or not. Therefore, the e¤ect of a rise in the sex ratio on
the aggregate savings rate is ambiguous.
Third, the log utility assumption greatly simplies the proof. More general utility
function forms may also yield the same results if the mean of the emotional utility is





vuutmax0; u02 u02w;n + u02m;n  u02w;nu02m;n
u001mu001w
and (ii), at the balanced sex ratio, all women and men enter the marriage market.
2.1.6 A Production Economy
To analyze how the sex ratio imbalance a¤ects a countrys current account imbalance, we
need to compare economy-wide savings with investments. In this subsection, we introduce
a production sector. We assume that both the nal good market and the factor markets






where Kt is the capital stock and Lt is the labor input.  is the share of capital input
to total output and  is the total factor productivity (TFP). Everyone in the economy
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inelastically supplies one unit of labor and earns the same income3.

















= (1  ) Kt (2.13)
where we normalize the aggregate labor supply in the economy to be 1, i.e., Lt = 1.
For simplicity, we assume no tax or government expenditure; then yt = Wt where yt
is the corresponding rst period disposable income in the endowment economy. We also
assume complete depreciation in each period. The aggregate capital supply in period t+ 1








2.1.7 Current Account in a Small Open Economy
In a small open economy, we assume that capital can ow freely among countries and the
gross interest rate R is exogenously determined by the rest of the world. By (4.2) and (4.3),




3Allowing men and women to earn di¤erent wages (with a xed proportional gap) would not change our
results.
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The current account in period t equals the increase in net foreign assets,
NFAt = Qt + (R  1) NFAt 1   C1t   C2t  Kdt+1
where (R   1)  NFAt 1 is the factor income from abroad. C1t and C2t represent the







swt Wt  NFAt 1  Kdt+1
We dene the economy-wide savings rate as the aggregate private savings to GDP ratio;
then
sPt =
Qt + (R  1) NFAt 1   C1t   C2t
Qt
(2.16)
We assume that the country has a balanced sex ratio in period t  1, and the sex ratio
in the young cohort in period t, rises from one to (> 1). Then the ratio of the current
account to GDP is
cat =












where the second equality holds because4
NFAt 1 = st 1Wt 1  Kdt
4 In overlapping generations models, net foreign asset is equal to the di¤erence between the savings by
the young cohort and the domestic investment demand.
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where st 1 is the savings rate by the cohort born in period t   1: Since the sex ratio is
balanced at that time, both the women and the men will have the same savings rate.
Since the wage rate is constant in the small open economy, we can show that a countrys
current account rises as its sex ratio rises (up to a point).
Proposition 7. In a small open economy with production, both the economy-wide savings
rate and the current account would rise in response to a rise in the sex ratio.
Proof. See Appendix A2.3.
The assumption of an exogenous interest rate holds only for a small open economy. But
some of the countries that motivate this study are large. An increase in the savings rate in
such economies could lower the world interest rate, which could alter investment and savings
decisions in all countries. We examine the large country case in the next subsection.
2.1.8 Two Large Countries
Consider a world consisting of only two countries. The two countries are identical in every
respect except for their sex ratios in period t (they both have balanced sex ratios in period
t 1). Country 1s sex ratio 1 is smaller than Country 2s sex ratio 2. There are no barriers
to either goods trade or capital ows (although labor is not mobile internationally). We
can show the following result:
Proposition 8. Country 1 (with a more balanced sex ratio) runs a current account decit
while Country 2 runs a current account surplus.
Proof. See Appendix A2.4.
To see the intuition, let us x 1 = 1 (i.e., Country 1 has a balanced sex ratio). If
Country 2 were to have a balanced sex ratio, the current account must be zero for both
countries since they are identical in every respect. In other words, within each country, the
investment must be equal to the aggregate savings. However, the sex ratio imbalance in
Country 2 causes it to have a higher aggregate savings for a given world interest rate. This
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depresses the world interest rate. The lower interest rate raises the investment level in both
economies (and reduces the savings rate a little bit). This must imply that the desired
investment level in Country 1 is now greater than its desired savings rate. As a result,
capital ows from Country 2 to Country 1. That is, Country 1 runs a current account
decit, and Country 2 a surplus.
2.2 Calibrations and extensions
Are the actual sex ratios observed in the data capable of generating a current account
response whose magnitude is economically signicant? We answer this question in this
section by quantitative calibrations of the model. We start with a small open economy and
allow endogenous entry/exit to the marriage market. Then we move on to two cases of a
large economy. We also consider two extensions that would add some more realism to the
model. First, we discuss potential intra-family bargaining between husband and wife, with
their relative bargaining power depending in part on their relative savings rate. Second, we
extend the benchmark two-period model to a multi-period model.
2.2.1 The Small Open Economy
Assume that the utility function is of the log form
u(c) = ln(c)
In the calibrations for a small open economy, we x R =  1. (In the large country case,
the interest rate is endogenously determined.)
The emotional utility  needs to follow a continuously di¤erential distribution. In the
benchmark calibration, we assume a normal distribution which might be more realistic than
the uniform distribution used in the analytical model (although the uniform distribution
assumption is more convenient in the analytical proof). We choose the mean and the
standard deviation of emotional utility/love by matching with some empirical patterns
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reported in Blachower and Oswald (2004). To be precise, here is what we do to calibrate
the mean value. Within the model, holding all other factors constant, we compute the
income compensation to a life-time bachelor that makes him indi¤erent between being














where m y is the compensation paid to a life-time bachelor for being single and 11+ (1+m)y
is his second period consumption. Regressing a measure of subjective well-being on income
and marital status (and other determinants of happiness) in the United States during 1972-
1998, Blanchower and Oswald (2004) estimate that, on average, a lasting marriage is
equivalent to augmenting ones income by $100,000 (in 1990 dollars) per year every year.
Since the average income per working person was about $48,000 during that period, a
sustained marriage is worth twice the average income. We therefore choose m = 2 as the
benchmark. This implies that the mean value of emotional utility/love is:










We will vary the value of m in the robustness checks.
Since the t-statistic for the marriage status dummy in the happiness regression reported
in Blanchower and Osward (2004) is around 20, we pin down the standard deviation of
emotional utility, , by
E ()
















As a robustness check, we also consider  = 0:1.
For other parameters, whenever possible, we assign values that are consistent with the
standard literature.
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Choice of Parameter Values
Parameters Benchmark Source and robustness checks
Discount factor  = 0:45 Prescott (1986) suggests that the discount
factor takes a value of 0.96 on annual
frequency. As we take 20 years as one
period, we set  = 0:9620 ' 0:45
Share of capital input  = 1=3 Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2001)
Congestion index  = 0:8  = 0:7; 0:9 in the robustness checks.
Love, standard deviation  = 0:05  = 0:1 in the robustness checks
Love, mean m = 2 m = 0:5 in the robustness checks
Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 report the calibration results (when the sex ratio changes from
1 to 1.5). Figure 2.1 plots the aggregate savings rate as a function of the sex ratio (which
changes from 1 to 1.5). In our benchmark case, we assume that the share that each spouse
can consume out of the combined second-period income is  = 0:8, the mean of emotional
utility m = 2, and its dispersion is  = 0:05. In this case, when the sex ratio goes up
from 1 to 1.15, the savings rate would go up by 5.8 percentage points. As the sex ratio
continues rising, the savings rate may decrease. This is because the sex ratio has exceeded
the threshold 1 in Proposition 6, some men quit the marriage market and choose a lower
savings rate, which drives down the economy-wide savings rate.
For sensitivity analyses, we consider di¤erent combinations involving  = 0:7; 0:8 and
0:9, m = 2 and 0:5, and  = 0:05, and 0:1. There are a few noteworthy patterns. First,
the economy-wide savings rate always rises in response to a rise in the sex ratio. Second,
as  becomes larger, the economy-wide savings rate and the current account respond more
strongly to a given rise in the sex ratio. Intuitively, as  becomes larger, consumption within
a marriage acquires more public goods features. Consequently, the desire to marry (and
the need to compete in the marriage market) also increases. However, the response of the
aggregate savings is not very sensitive to small perturbations of this parameter.
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Third, when the mean value of emotional utility becomes higher (e.g., comparing m = 2
to m = 0:5), both the economy-wide savings rate and the current account respond more
strongly to a given rise in the sex ratio. This is intuitive since men have a stronger desire
to compete for a marriage partner.
Fourth, as the dispersion for emotional utility becomes smaller, the economy-wide sav-
ings rate and the current account respond more strongly to a rise in the sex ratio. This is
because, since all men are more similar in terms of the amount of "love" they can o¤er to
women, the need to compete on the basis of wealth also rises.
2.2.2 Two Large Countries
We now consider a two-country model. The interest rate R and the wage rate W are now
endogenously determined. All other parameter values are the same as in the small open
economy case. We discuss two cases.
In the rst case, we assume that the two countries are identical in every respect except
for their sex ratios. While Country 1 always has a balanced sex ratio (1 = 1), we vary the
sex ratio in Country 2 from 1 to 1.5. Table 2.4 reports the calibration results. Figure 2.2
traces out the current account responses in both countries as Country 2s sex ratio increases.
The most important result is that a rise in Country 2s sex ratio rst triggers a rise in its
current account surplus and a rise in Country 1s current account decit. After Country 2s
sex ratio exceeds threshold 1, a further rise in Country 2s sex ratio induces a decline in
its current account surplus and a rise in Country 1s decit.
We have also done robustness checks by varying the values of ;m, and . Based on the
same reasoning as in the small open economy case, for larger , m, or smaller , a given
increase in Country 2s sex ratio results in a greater current account imbalance in the two
countries.
In the second case, we attempt to let Countries 1 and 2 mimic the United States and
China, respectively. In particular, we assume that L1 = 1=5 L2 to match the fact that the
U.S. population is around 1=5 that of China. In addition, we choose the TFP parameter
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in Country 1, 1; to match the fact that the U.S. per capita GDP was about 15 times the
Chinese level around 2000 when the sex ratio in China for the marriage age cohort was not
yet seriously out of balance. The remaining parameters are set to be the same as before.
We let the sex ratio in the United States be always balanced, and vary the Chinese sex ratio
from 1 to 1.5.
Tables 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 report the benchmark result and robustness checks. Figure
2.3 plots the calibration results. Qualitatively, they look similar to the rst large-country
experiment. Quantitatively, Country 2s (China) current account response (as a share of
GDP) becomes stronger. With Chinas sex ratio at 1.15 (and  = 0:8), it runs a current
account surplus on the order of 4.5% of its GDP, and at the same time, the United States
runs a current account decit of 1.5% of GDP. This resembles one third to a half of the real
world pattern in which the U.S. decit is about 4-6% of GDP, whereas the Chinese surplus
is on the order of 7-10% of GDP in recent years. In other words, a rise in the Chinese sex
ratio does not provide a complete explanation for the observed current account patterns,
but could be a potentially signicant contributor to the current account imbalances. If the
sex ratio rises to threshold 1, the Chinese surplus may begin to decline.
To summarize, the calibrations suggest that a rise in the sex ratio (when the sex ratio
takes some reasonable values) could produce an economically signicant increase in the
aggregate savings rate that results in a current account surplus. If the country is large
enough, this could induce other countries to run a current account decit even if they have
a balanced sex ratio.
2.2.3 Welfare
There are two sources of market failure in the model economy. On one hand, a part of the
savings in the competitive equilibrium is motivated by a desire to out-save ones competitors
in the marriage market. The increment in the savings, while individually rational, is not
useful in the aggregate, since when everyone raises the savings rate by the same amount,
the ultimate marriage market outcome is not a¤ected by the increase in the savings. In
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this sense, the competitive equilibrium produces too much savings. On the other hand,
because the savings contribute to a pubic good in a marriage (an individuals savings raises
the utility of his/her partner), but an individual in the rst period does not take this into
account, he/she may under-save relative to the social optimum. Note that these sources of
market failure exist even with a balanced sex ratio. They also have opposite e¤ects on the
aggregate savings rate. (In the calibrations that will be reported later, these two e¤ects
cancel each other out when the sex ratio is balanced.) As the sex ratio rises, the importance
of the over-saving e¤ect also increases, which gives rise to our rst proposition.
We now consider what a welfare-maximizing central planner would do. The central
planner gives equal weight to each man and women. He assigns the marriage matching









The rst order conditions are
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 (1  F (M (w)))]u02w + F (w)u02w;n = 0 (2.18)
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w)u02m;n = 0 (2.19)
Comparing (2.18), (2.19) to (4.40) and (4.41), in general, it is not obvious whether women
or men will save at a higher rate in a decentralized equilibrium than that under central
planning due to the two opposing sources of market failure. However, when  = 1, since
women and men have the same optimal conditions, by (2.10), women and men will save the
same in the competitive equilibrium as in the central planner economy.
As a thought experiment, one may also consider what the central planner would do if
she can choose the sex ratio (in addition to the savings rates) to maximize the social welfare.





The only sex ratio that satises condition above is  = 1. In other words, the central
planner would have chosen a balanced sex ratio. Deviations from a balanced sex ratio
represent welfare losses.
In calibrations with a log utility function, we show that mens welfare under a decentral-
ized equilibrium relative to the central planners economy declines as the sex ratio increases.
In comparision, womens relative welfare increases as the sex ratio goes up. The social wel-
fare (the sum of all mens and womens welfare) goes down as the sex ratio rises.5 Figures
2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 trace out the savings rates for men (the upper left panel), women (the upper
right panel), the economy as a whole (the lower left panel) and the welfare (the lower right
panel). With a log-utility function, the optimal savings rates chosen for men and women
by the planner do not depend on the sex ratio and intra-household bargaining powers.6
When the sex ratio is balanced, the savings rates by women, men and the economy as a
whole are the same as those under the planners economy. With unbalanced sex ratios,
mens (decentralized) savings rates overshoot the socially optimally level, and the extent of
excessive savings rises with the sex ratio. Womens savings rates follow an opposite pattern.
The economy-wide savings rate follows a pattern that is qualitatively similar to the mens
savings rate. In particular, the economy in a decentralized equilibrium tends to save too
much relative to the social optimum, and the excess savings rises with the sex ratio. In the
lower right panel, we can see that welfare levels for both men and the economy as a whole
decline as the sex ratio increases, while the welfare for women rises with the sex ratio.
2.2.4 Endogenous Intra-household Bargaining
One problem in the benchmark calibration is that, as the sex ratio rises, womens savings
rates decline very quickly. In this extension, we incorporate intra-household bargaining
between wives and husbands into the model. To goal is to show that, when allowing intra-
household bargaining, womens savings rate declines much more slowly.
5The results are similar if we change the utility function to a CRRA form.
6This feature does not hold when we use the CRRA utility function.
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We assume that everyone consumes two goods in the second period, a public good (e.g.,
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where zw and zm are private goods consumption by women and men, respectively, and h
is the public good consumption.  is the share of private expenditure in the second period
consumption index.
A representative household maximizes the weighted sum of the utilities of the husband
and the wife. Let  denote the weight on the wifes utility, which represents her bargaining
power in the family. Then the households optimization problem is
max
h;zw;zm
u(c2w) + (1  )u(c2m)
with the resource constraint
zw + zm + h = Rs
wyw +Rsmym (2.20)
If we assume u(c) = ln c, solving the households maximization problem, we have
c2w = 
 (Rswyw +Rsmym)
c2m = (1  ) (Rswyw +Rsmym)
If  = 12 , this is the case in our benchmark model and
1
2 <  = 2
  < 1.
More generally, similar to Browning et al. (1994),  is a function of the sex ratio ,
the relative wealth and other characteristics of the household member. For simplicity, we
assume that the intra-household bargaining power depends only on the relative wealth of






and the husbands bargaining power is 1 . " is the parameter that governs the sensitivity
of bargaining power to relative wealth. A larger " means that household bargaining power
will respond to the relative wealth more strongly.
We take the same values for other parameters as in the benchmark. Table 2.8 reports
the calibration results, and Figures ?? and 2.8 plot the saving rates. Relative to the case
of no intra-household bargaining, women now reduce their savings rates more slowly as the
sex ratio rises. Since there is no big change in mens response to the rise in the sex ratio,
the economy-wide savings rate responds more strongly to a rise in the sex ratio than the
benchmark case. For  = 0:05, " = 0 and  = 0:5, as the sex ratio rises from 1 to 1.15, the
current account to GDP ratio rises by 5.3%. For  = 0:05, " = 0:5 and  = 0:5, as the sex
ratio rises from 1 to 1.15, the current account to GDP ratio rises by 8.1%. As the sex ratio
keeps rising (and exceeds the threshold 1, which is around 1.25 in this case), some men
quit the marriage market and aggregate savings rate declines.
We re-calibrate the case of two otherwise identical countries except for the sex ratio.
Figures 2.9 and 2.10 plot the current account responses and the welfare changes in the
corresponding cases. The results are similar to our benchmark calibrations. In both cases,
the only di¤erence relative to the benchmark model is the allowance for the endogenous
bargaining power with a family. The qualitative results on the aggregate savings and the
current account are similar to before. However, the savings response by women becomes
more realistic. For  = 0:05, " = 0 and  = 0:5, we can nd in that as the sex ratio in
China rises from 1 to 1.15, this can generate an 2.7% current account suplus in China and
a 0.9% decit in the U.S. For  = 0:05, " = 0:5 and  = 0:5, as the sex ratio in China
rises from 1 to 1.15, this can generate an 6.1% current account suplus in China and a 2.0%
decit in the U.S, which resembles more than a half of the real word pattern. As the sex
ratio in China becomes very large, the Chinese current account surplus will decline.
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In the right panel in both Figures 2.9 and 2.10, we trace out the economy-wide welfare
in a decentralized equilibrium for a given sex ratio relative to the welfare in a decentralized
equilibrium but with a balanced sex ratio. The country that experiences a rise in the
sex ratio (e.g., China) clearly su¤ers from an ever-deteriorating welfare. Interestingly, the
country with a balanced sex ratio (e.g., the United States) could enjoy a small welfare gain
as Chinas sex ratio starts to become imbalanced. Intuitively, a rise in the Chinese sex ratio
depresses the global interest rate, but this produces two e¤ects of opposite signs on the
United States. On one hand, the lower cost of capital boosts the real wage in the United
States, which is positive for the Americans. On the other hand, the lower interest rate
also implies a lower interest income for a given amount of savings, which is negative for
the Americans. For a moderately unbalanced sex ratio in China, the positive e¤ect for the
United States dominates. As the Chinese sex ratio becomes seriously out of balance, the
welfare levels in both countries could both go down.
We note, however, that the quantitative e¤ect of a rise in the Chinese sex ratio on
the U.S. welfare is small. The Chinese lose the most from a rise in the sex ratio. As an
illustration, based on the right panel of Figure 2.10, if the Chinese sex ratio reaches 1.15, the
Americans have a utility gain that is equivalent to an increment in consumption by 0.7%.
In contrast, the Chinese su¤er a welfare loss that is equivalent to a decline in consumption
by 18.7%.
2.2.5 Multi-period model calibrations
We now extend our benchmark model to a setting in which every cohort lives for 50 periods.
Everyone works in the rst 30 periods, and retires in the remaining 20 periods. If one gets
married, the marriage take place in the th period. We have not been able to solve the
problem that allows for parental savings for their child in the 50-period setup. Instead,
we study a case in which men and women save for themselves. However, as we recognize
the quantitative importance of parental savings in the data, we choose  = 10 as our
benchmark case so the timing of the marriage is somewhere between the typical number of
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working years by parents when their child gets married and the typical number of working
years by children themselves when they get married. Generally speaking, the greater the
value of  , the stronger is the aggregate savings response to a given rise in the sex ratio.
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For t <  , when the woman is still single, the intertemporal budget constraint is
At+1 = R (At + y
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where At is the her wealth level at the beginning of period t. After marriage (t >= ), her













if t > 30
where AHt is the level of family wealth (held by wife and husband) at the beginning of period
t. ct is the public good consumption by wife and husband, which takes the same form as in
the two period OLG model. The optimization problem for a represenative man is similar.
We adjust some parameters in the 50-period OLG calibrations. As in the standard
literature, we will take R = 1:04 as the annual gross interest rate. The subjective discount
factor now takes the value of  = 1=R. We also assume an annual capital depreciation
rate equal to 0.1 as in the standard literature. Besides the base case of  = 10, we also
examine the case of  = 20 as a sensitivity check. All other parameters are the same as in
the benchmark 2-period OLG model.
The calibration results are shown in Figures 2.11 and 2.12. In the benchmark calibration,
when  = 0:05, if the marriage takes place in the 10th period, as sex ratio rises from 1 to
1.1, the economy-wide savings rate and current account rise by about 4.1% of GDP (Figure
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2.11). As a robustness check, if the marriage takes place in the 20th period, then as the
sex ratio rises from 1 to 1.1, the economy-wide savings rate and current account can rise
by about 5.2% of GDP (Figure 2.12). On the other hand, if the marriage takes place in the
5th period, as the sex ratio rises from 1 to 1.1, the economy-wide savings rate and current
account can rise by around 3% of GDP (the gure not reported to save space).
We also calibrate the multi-period model by incorporating the endogenous intra-household
bargaining. The responses of the savings rate and current account to the rise in the sex
ratio are stronger. When " =  = 0:5, and  = 0:05, if the marriage takes place in the 10th
period, as sex ratio rises from 1 to 1.1, the economy-wide savings rate and current account
rise by almost 5% of GDP (Figure 2.13). As a robustness check, if the marriage takes place
in the 20th period, then as the sex ratio rises from 1 to 1.1, the economy-wide savings rate
and current account can rise by about 6.3% of GDP (Figure 2.14).
2.3 Some Empirical Evidence
We discuss two types of empirical approaches that allow us to check for plausibility and
empirical importance of the theory. First we provide some cross-country evidence on
the relationship between a countrys sex ratio and its non-government part of the current
account. Second, we review household-level evidence from China on the association between
sex ratios and savings rates.
2.3.1 Cross country data patterns
We dene a countrys non-governmental part of the current account as its current account
balance minus its government savings (or government revenue minus expenditure), divided
by its GDP. We exclude government savings because our theory is about private sector
savings.
We run a multivariate regression of the ratio of non-governmental current account to
GDP on sex ratio and other control variables. To be precise, the specication equation is
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the following:
cagdpi = 0 + 1  sex ratioi + 2Zi + "i
where cagdpi is the ratio of current account minus government savings to country is GDP.
Sex ratio is dened as the male to female ratio for the age group 0-15. Our choice of
the control variables is guided by the life-cycle theory, precautionary saving theory, and
nancial development theory. We therefore include variables in Zi log per capita GDP, the
share of working age people in the population (a proxy for life-cycle theory), social security
expenditure as a share of GDP (a proxy for the precautionary saving theory), private credit
to GDP ratio (a proxy for nancial development), and continental dummies (a proxy for
possible cultural factors). (We only conduct a cross-sectional regression as we are not able
to obtain a panel data set on the sex ratios.)
Current account, GDP, the share of working age in the population and private credit to
GDP ratio can be obtained from the World Banks WDI database. The sex ratio data is
obtained from the World Factbook. Social security expenditure as a share of GDP data is
obtained from the International Labor Organization (ILO) database. A series of regression
results are reported in Table 2.9, where the set of control variables is progressively enlarged.
In each regression, we have a positive and statistically signicant coe¢ cient on the sex ratio:
as the sex ratio becomes more unbalanced, the current account balance tends to go up.
This result still holds after we exclude Kuwait, which is a potential outlier with a very large
current account surplus in 2006. From Table 2.9, as the sex ratio rises from 1.05 (normal
biological level without sex selection) to 1.15 (Chinas sex ratio), based on the last column,
current account will rise by around 12.5 percent.
In Table 2.9, we can nd that the nancial development index has signicant negative
signs as the theory predicts. This means that a country with a well developed nancial
market tends to have a current account decit. The age prole of populations and the
social security expenditure index produce some puzzling patterns. In contrast to the life-
cycle theory and precautionary saving theory, the share of working age population has
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a negative coe¢ cient and social security expenditure as a share of GDP has a positive
coe¢ cient. The coe¢ cients mean that old-age households and households with children
save more than do households in between, and people save more even though they may
get more social security benets. However, those coe¢ cients are not signicant in several
regressions which means that life-cycle theory and precautionary saving theory are not
capable of explaining the global current account imbalances.
The intertemporal theory predicts that a countrys current account should be sensitive
to temporary shocks. To minimize the inuence of year-to-year uctuations in the current
account due to temporary shocks, we also conduct a robustness check whereby the dependent
variable is the average ratio of non-governmental current account to GDP over a ve-year
period (2004-2008). We report the results in Table 2.10. Again, the positive relationship
between the local sex ratio and the local non-governmental current account is robustly
positively.
We also study the relationship between a countrys sex ratio and its savings rate (% of
GDP). Table 2.11 and 2.12 provide the regression results. The coe¢ cients on the sex ratio
in all the regressions are positive and signicant which means that as a countrys sex ratio
rises, the aggregate savings rate will increase.
There are many caveats with the empirical patterns. First, in spite of our best e¤orts,
there may still be potential control variables that are missing from our list. Second, because
the sex ratio data is not available for most countries in the earlier years, we are not able
to conduct a panel regression. In any case, the sex ratio data are likely to be strongly
serially correlated, which would have required a long time series to successfully identify the
parameters. Third, the sex ratio can be endogenous and/or measured with errors. This
would normally call for an instrumental variable approach. At this point, we are not able
to come up with convincing instrumental variables in a cross-country context. For these
reasons, it is important to review some micro-evidence from within China.
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2.3.2 Cross-household and cross-region evidence from China
The sex ratio at birth in China increased from being slightly unbalanced in 1990 to about
120 boys per 100 girls in 2007. Its household savings rate (out of disposable income) almost
doubled from 16% to 30% during the same period. While China is not the only economy
with a high sex ratio (and a high savings rate), it is the one with the most extreme sex ratio
imbalance at the moment, and, because of its size, its savings rate and current account
attract the most international attention. For this reason, it is useful to highlight a few
empirical patterns documented in Wei and Zhang (2009) that are most relevant for the
current paper.
First, let us look at Chinese householdsself-reported reasons for savings. A survey of
rural households (Chinese household income project in 2002) asked households why they
save. There were seven possible categories for savings in the questionnaire: (1) childrens
wedding, (2) childrens education, (3) bequest to children, (4) building a house, (5) (own)
retirement, (6) medical expenses, and (7) others. The rst three reaons could be grouped
under the heading of "savings directly for children." If we just focus on families with an
unmarried child, one sees a stunning di¤erence between families with a son versus those
with a daughter. 29.8% of families with a son list savings for their childs wedding as either
the most or the second most important reason for savings, versus 18.3% of families with a
daughter who do the same. Overall, 92.2% of son-families list one of the top three reasons
as their primary reasons for savings, which is 5.8 percentage points higher than the percent
of the daughter families who say the same. In comparison, 45.5% of daugher families and
37.3% of son-families say their most or the second most important reason for savings is
their own retirement. (Note that the sum of the percentage of households that list various
reasons as the most or the second most important reason for savings can be more than 100%
since a given household could list one category as the most important reason for savings,
and another category as the second most important reason for savings.)
Second, we now look at the relationship between household savings rates (out of dis-
posable income) and local sex ratios (at the county or city level), holding constant other
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determinants of savings rate (household income, household heads age, gender, ethnicity,
and educational level, and childrens age, and whether there is a family member that has a
major illness). What is most revealing for our theory is not just a direct comparison in the
savings rates between son-families and daughter families, but the e¤ect of an interaction
term between having a son and living in a region with a high local sex ratio. This exercise
is interesting in China because the migration rate for the purpose of marriage is low (about
92% of marriages take place between a man and a woman from the same county). When
focusing on families with a son in rural areas, Wei and Zhang report that these families
savings rate tends to be higher in regions with a more skewed sex ratio. In comparison, the
savings rate by families with a daughter appears to be uncorrelated with the local sex ratio.
Across Chinese cities, the savings rates by both son-families and daughter families tend
to rise with the local sex ratio. These patterns are consistent with our model that allows
for intra-family bargaining. When women (or their parents) are concerned with erosion of
bargaining power within a family, they may not reduce their savings rate in response to a
higher sex ratio. When the e¤ect of intra-family bargaining dominates, the savings rate by
daughter-families could rise in response to a rise in the sex ratio.
Third, across Chinese provinces, Wei and Zhang report a strong positive correlation
between local savings rates and local sex ratios (for the age cohort of 7-21 years old), con-
trolling for the age structure of local population, per capita income, the share of employment
in state-owned rms in the local labor force, and the share of local labor force enrolled in
social security). To go from correlation to causality, Wei and Zhang employ variations in
the local enforcement of family planning policy (including monetary penalties for violating
birth quotas) as instruments for the sex ratio. The 2SLS estimation conrms the basic
nding: regions with a higher sex ratio are also likely to have a higher household savings
rate. Based on the 2SLS estimates, 40-60% of the rise in the household savings rate from
1990 to 2007 can be attributed to the observed rise in the sex ratio for the pre-marital age
cohort during the period.
Overall, the evidence from within China is consistent with the theoretical predictions.
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2.4 Concluding Remarks and Future Research
This paper builds a theoretical model to analyze whether and how a rise in the sex ratio may
trigger a competitive race in the savings rate by men (or households with sons). Generally
speaking, men raise their savings rate in order to improve their relative standing in the
marriage market. If we dont consider intra-household bargaining, women may respond by
reducing their savings rate because they may free ride on the increased savings from their
husbands. If we consider intra-household bargaining, then the womens response becomes
ambiguous because they also have an incentive to raise their savings rate in order to protect
their bargaining power within a family. In any case, the aggregate savings always rises
unambiguously in response to a rise in the sex ratio, as long as the sex ratio is below
some threshold. We argue conceptually and through calibrations that the sex ratios in real
economies are unlikely to exceed the threshold.
When the country with an unbalanced sex ratio is large, this could have global ram-
ications. In particular, when the sex ratio rises, the world interest rate becomes lower.
Other countries with a balanced sex ratio could be induced to run a current account decit.
Calibration results suggest that the sex ratio e¤ect could potentially explain more than half
of Chinas current account surplus and the U.S. current account decit. In other words, the
e¤ect is economically signicant.
The theory can be extended in a number of directions. First, the sex ratio could endoge-
nously respond to the economic burden of raising a son (as in Bhaskar, 2009). As a result,
there may be forces that will eventually induce a correction in the trajectory of a countrys
sex ratio. It will be a useful extension to endogenize the sex ratio in the model. This
will help us understand better the future trajectories of global current account imbalances.
Second, while the model focuses on the responses of savings and current account to a rise in
the sex ratio, one may extend it to study entrepreneurship and growth e¤ects. These will
be useful topics for future research.
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Figure 2.1: Economy-wide savings rate vs sex ratio
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Figure 2.2: Two large countries, di¤ering only in the sex ratios, sigma=0.05
Figure 2.3: Two large countries, (GDP per capita)1=15*(GDP per capita)2, sigma=0.05
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Figure 2.4: The planners economy vs the decentralized economy, kappa=0.8, sigma=0.05
Figure 2.5: The planners economy vs the decentralized economy, kappa=0.7, sigma=0.05
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Figure 2.6: The planners economy vs the decentralized economy, kappa=0.9, sigma=0.05
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Figure 2.7: Savings rates vs sex ratios, endogenous intra-household bargaining,
sigma=0.05
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Figure 2.8: Savings rates vs sex ratios, endogenous intra-household bargaining,
sigma=0.05
Figure 2.9: Two large countries, di¤ering in the sex ratios, endogenous bargaining power,
welfare loss in units of consumption goods relative to the case of phi=1
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Figure 2.10: Two large countries, endogenous bargaining power, welfare loss in units
of consumption goods relative to the case of phi=1, (GDP per capita)1=15*(GDP per
capita)2
Figure 2.11: 50-period calibrations, tao=10
109
Figure 2.12: 50-period calibrations, tao=20
Figure 2.13: 50-period calibrations, tao=10, endogenous intra-household bargaining
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Table 2.8: Savings rates vs sex ratios, endogenous intra-household bargaining,
small country, sigma=0.05
=0.5 "=0 "=0.5 " =1
(sm , sw , st, ca) (sm , sw , st, ca) (sm , sw , st, ca)
1 .00 0.31 0.31 0.149 0 0.336 0.336 0.149 0 0.36 0.36 0.149 0
1.05 0.504 0.194 0.177 0.028 0.553 0.224 0.187 0.038 0.591 0.295 0.207 0.058
1.10 0.586 0.142 0.192 0.043 0.638 0.206 0.213 0.065 0.68 0.286 0.237 0.089
1.15 0.629 0.113 0.201 0.053 0.684 0.197 0.23 0.081 0.725 0.28 0.255 0.106
1.20 0.645 0.088 0.201 0.053 0.712 0.191 0.242 0.093 0.73 0.279 0.257 0.108
1.25 0.645 0.088 0.2 0.052 0.732 0.186 0.251 0.102 0.73 0.279 0.254 0.105
1.30 0.645 0.088 0.199 0.05 0.732 0.186 0.249 0.1 0.73 0.279 0.252 0.103
1.35 0.645 0.088 0.198 0.049 0.732 0.186 0.239 0.09 0.73 0.279 0.25 0.101
1.40 0.645 0.088 0.197 0.048 0.732 0.186 0.237 0.088 0.73 0.279 0.248 0.099
1.45 0.645 0.088 0.196 0.047 0.732 0.186 0.235 0.086 0.73 0.279 0.246 0.097
1.50 0.645 0.088 0.195 0.046 0.732 0.186 0.233 0.084 0.73 0.279 0.244 0.095
=0.3 "=0 "=0.5 " =1
1.00 0.31 0.31 0.149 0 0.326 0.326 0.149 0 0.341 0.341 0.149 0
1.05 0.525 0.183 0.181 0.032 0.571 0.186 0.187 0.038 0.597 0.246 0.205 0.057
1.10 0.611 0.13 0.196 0.048 0.656 0.166 0.213 0.065 0.686 0.233 0.235 0.086
1.15 0.656 0.101 0.207 0.059 0.701 0.155 0.23 0.081 0.731 0.225 0.252 0.104
1.20 0.667 0.077 0.205 0.056 0.729 0.148 0.242 0.093 0.735 0.224 0.254 0.105
1.25 0.667 0.077 0.204 0.055 0.747 0.144 0.251 0.102 0.735 0.224 0.252 0.103
1.30 0.667 0.077 0.202 0.054 0.747 0.144 0.249 0.1 0.735 0.224 0.25 0.101
1.35 0.667 0.077 0.201 0.053 0.747 0.144 0.238 0.089 0.735 0.224 0.248 0.099
1.40 0.667 0.077 0.2 0.052 0.747 0.144 0.236 0.087 0.735 0.224 0.246 0.097
1.45 0.667 0.077 0.199 0.051 0.747 0.144 0.235 0.086 0.735 0.224 0.244 0.095
1.50 0.667 0.077 0.198 0.05 0.747 0.144 0.233 0.084 0.735 0.224 0.242 0.093
=0.7 "=0 "=0.5 " =1
1.00 0.31 0.31 0.149 0 0.346 0.346 0.149 0 0.378 0.378 0.149 0
1.05 0.482 0.205 0.173 0.024 0.53 0.255 0.182 0.033 0.579 0.333 0.203 0.054
1.10 0.559 0.155 0.186 0.038 0.611 0.239 0.207 0.059 0.666 0.326 0.233 0.084
1.15 0.6 0.127 0.195 0.047 0.657 0.23 0.224 0.075 0.713 0.321 0.251 0.102
1.20 0.621 0.099 0.197 0.049 0.686 0.224 0.236 0.087 0.719 0.323 0.254 0.105
1.25 0.621 0.099 0.196 0.048 0.706 0.22 0.245 0.096 0.719 0.323 0.252 0.103
1.30 0.621 0.099 0.195 0.047 0.706 0.22 0.243 0.094 0.719 0.323 0.25 0.101
1.35 0.621 0.099 0.194 0.046 0.706 0.22 0.234 0.085 0.719 0.323 0.248 0.099
1.40 0.621 0.099 0.193 0.045 0.706 0.22 0.232 0.083 0.719 0.323 0.246 0.097
1.45 0.621 0.099 0.192 0.044 0.706 0.22 0.23 0.081 0.719 0.323 0.244 0.095
1.50 0.621 0.099 0.191 0.043 0.706 0.22 0.229 0.08 0.719 0.323 0.242 0.093
Notes: sm-mens savings rate, sw-womens savings rate, st-economy-wide savings rate, ca-




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Sex Ratios and Exchange Rates
with Shang-Jin Wei
The Chinese real exchange rate (RER) is widely believed to be substantially undervalued.
This in turn has created enormous tension in the global monetary system. The standard
narrative goes as follows. The Chinese exchange rate is undervalued largely through deliber-
ate and massive government interventions in the currency market. The rapid accumulation
of the countrys foreign exchange reserve is the prima facie evidence that the Chinese author-
ities have engaged in a massive currency market intervention. The undervalued currency
has in turn created both a growing currency account surplus and an increasing departure
from the purchasing power parity.
However, this narrative is not an inevitable way to piece together the value of the
real exchange rate, the current account and the foreign exchange reserve. In this paper, we
explore an alternative narrative. It starts from some technology and policy shocks, unrelated
to currency market interventions, that cause simultaneously a rise in the countrys savings
rate and an expansion in the countrys e¤ective labor supply. These developments in turn
lead to a simultaneous decline in the value of the real exchange rate and a rise in the
current account balance (even though the exchange rate decline is not the cause of the
current account surplus). Once the current account is put into a surplus gear, the foreign
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exchange reserve accumulation can happen passively as a result of the countrys capital
control regime - put in place long before the exchange rate became an issue - which, as
capital control regimes in many other countries, requires mandatory surrender of foreign
exchange earnings by rms and households.
The initial technology shock in the new narrative was the spread of ultrasound B machine
in China in the 1980s that allowed expectant parents to easily detect the gender of the fetus.
1985 was the rst year in which half of the county level hospitables acquired at least one
such machine (Li and Zheng, 2009). The initial policy shock was the implementation of a
strict version of the family planning policy (popularly known as the "one-child policy") that
severely restricts many coupleslegally permissable number of children to a level below their
desire. By interacting with a long-existing parental preference for sons, the combination of
the two shocks started to produce an unnaturally high ratio of boys to girls at birth from
early 1980s, and the sex ratio at birth became worse progressively as the use of ultrasound
machines became more widespread, and the enforcement of the family planning policy
tightened over time. Around 2003, the rst cohort born with an excess number of males
was entering the marriage market. The competition for marriage partner by young men
becomes progressively more erce. In 2007, the sex ratio for the pre-marital age cohort
(5-20) is about 115 young men per 100 young women. This implies that about one out
every nine young men cannot get married mathematically speaking.
How would a rise in the sex ratio imbalance trigger a signicant increase in the savings
rate? The key is that family wealth is a key status variable in the marriage market (other
things equal). As the competition for brides intensies, young men and their parents raise
their savings rate in order to improve their relative standing in the marriage market. If
the biological desire to have a female partner is strong, the response of the savings rate to
a rise in the sex ratio can also be quantitatively large. Of course, any complete story has
to investigate why the behavior by women or their parents does not undo the competitive
savings story.
The empirical motivation for the savings channel comes from Wei and Zhang (2011).
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They provide evidence from China at both the household level and regional level. First,
across rural households with a son, they document that the savings rate tends to be higher in
regions with a higher sex ratio imbalance (holding constant family income, age, gender, and
educational level of the household head and other household characteristics). In comparison,
for rural households with a daughter, their savings rate appears to be uncorrelated with the
local sex ratio. Across cities, both households with a son and households with a daughter
tend to have a higher savings rate in regions with a more skewed sex ratio, although the
elasticity of the savings rate with respect to the sex ratio tends to be bigger for son families.
Second, across Chinese provinces, they nd a strong positive correlation between the local
savings rate and the local sex ratio, after controlling for the age structure of the local
population, income level, inequality, recent growth rate, local enrollment rate in the social
safety net, and other factors. Third, to go from correlation to causality, they explore
regional variations in the enforcement of the family planning policy as instruments for the
local sex ratio, and conrm the ndings in the OLS regressions. The sex ratio e¤ect is
both economically and statistically signicant. While the Chinese household savings rate
approximately doubled from 16% (of disposable income) in 1990 to 31% in 2007, Wei and
Zhang (2011a) estimate that the rise in the sex ratio could explain about half of the increase
in the household savings rate.
When the economy-wide savings rate rises, the real exchange rate often falls. To see
this, we recognize that a rise in the savings rate implies a reduction in the demand for both
tradable and non-tradable goods. Since the price of the tradable good is tied down by the
world market, this translates into a reduction in the relative price of the nontradable good,
and hence a decline in the value of the real exchange rate (a departure from the PPP).
The e¤ect would be persistent if there are frictions that impede the reallocation of factors
between the tradable and nontradable sectors.
The second channel for the sex ratio imbalance to a¤ect the real exchange rate works
through e¤ective labor supply. A rise in the sex ratio can also motivate men to cut down
leisure and increase labor supply. This leads to an increase in the economy-wide e¤ective
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labor supply. If the nontradable sector is more labor intensive than the tradable sector, this
generates a Rybzinsky-like e¤ect, leading to an expansion of the nontradable sector at the
expense of the tradable sector. The increase in the supply of nontradable good leads to an
additional decline in the relative price of nontradable and a further decline in the value of
the RER.
Putting the two channels together, a rise in the sex ratio generates a real exchange rate
that appears too low relative to the purchasing power parity (or relative to the standard
approaches used by the IMF to assess equilibrium exchange rate that include additional
terms beyond a departure from PPP but do not include the sex ratio, savings rate, and
e¤ective labor supply). Because the e¤ect of a skewed sex ratio on the real exchange rate
comes from competition for sex partners, this is fundamentally a Darwinian perspective on
the exchange rate.
Of course, other structural factors may also have contributed to an increase in the
aggregate savings rate (e.g., an increase in the government savings or an increase in the
private-sector precautionary savings) or an increase in the e¤ective labor supply (e.g., grad-
ual relaxation of restrictions on rural-urban migration). These other factors would reinforce
the Darwinian mechanism discussed in this paper, causing the real exchange rate to fall fur-
ther.
A desire to enhance ones prospect in the marriage market through a higher level of
wealth could be a motive for savings even in countries with a balanced sex ratio. But
such a motive is not as easy to detect when the competition is modest. When the sex ratio
gets out of balance, obtaining a marriage partner becomes much less assured. A host of
behaviors that are motivated by a desire to succeed in the marriage market may become
magnied. But sex ratio imbalances so far have not been investigated by macroeconomists.
This may be a serious omission.
A sex ratio imbalance is a common demographic feature in many economies, especially
in East, South, and Southeast Asia, such as Korea, India, Vietnam, Singapore, Taiwan and
Hong Kong, in addition to China. It is quite possible that the sex ratio e¤ect plays an
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important in the real exchange rate of these economies. To be clear, most countries in the
world do not have a severe sex ratio imbalance. Correspondingly, it cannot be a signicant
determinant of the real exchange rate for them. However, if one only considers the standard
determinants of the real exchange rate and ignore the sex ratio e¤ect, one could mistakenly
conclude that countries with a severe sex ratio imbalance to have a severely undervalued
currency. This set of countries happens to include China - the worlds second largest
economy and the largest exporter. Given the enormous e¤ort by international nancial
institutions and many national governments to pass judgment on its exchange rate, getting
it right has global importance.
There are four bodies of work that are related to the current paper. First, the theoretical
and empirical literature on the real exchange rate is too voluminous to summarize compre-
hensively here. Sarno and Taylor (2002) and Chinn (2011) provide recent surveys. Second,
the literature on status goods, positional goods, and social norms (e.g., Cole, Mailath and
Postlewaite, 1992, Corneo and Jeanne, 1999, Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004 and 2009) has
o¤ered many useful insights. One key point is that when wealth can improve ones social
status (including improving ones standing in the marriage market), in addition to a¤ording
a greater amount of consumption goods, there is an extra incentive to save. This element
is in our model as well. However, all existing theories on status goods feature a balanced
sex ratio. Yet, an unbalanced sex ratio presents some non-trivial challenges. In particu-
lar, while a rise in the sex ratio is an unfavorable shock to men, it is a favorable shock to
women. Could the women strategically reduce their savings so as to completely o¤set what-
ever increments in savings men may have? In other words, the impact on aggregate savings
from a rise in the sex ratio appears ambiguous. Our model will address this question. In
any case, the literature on status goods has no discernible impact in macroeconomic policy
circles. For example, while there are voluminous documents produced by the International
Monetary Fund or speeches by US o¢ cials on Chinas high savings rate and large current
account surplus, no single paper or speech thus far has pointed to a possible connection
with its high sex ratio imbalance.
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A third related literature is the economics of family, which is also too vast to be sum-
marized here comprehensively. One interesting insight from this literature is that a married
couples consumption has a partial public goods feature (Browning, Bourguignon and Chi-
appori, 1994; Donni, 2006). We make use of this feature in our model as well. None of the
papers in this literature explores the general equilibrium implications for exchange rates
from a change in the sex ratio. The fourth literature examines empirically the causes of a
rise in the sex ratio. The key insight is that the proximate cause for the recent rise in the
sex ratio imbalance is sex-selective abortions, which have been made increasingly possible
by the spread of Ultrasound B machines. There are two deeper causes for the parental
willingness to disproportionately abort female fetuses. The rst is the parental preference
for sons, which in part has to do with the relatively inferior economic status of women.
When the economic status of women improves, sex-selective abortions appear to decline
(Qian, 2008). The second is either something that leads parents to voluntarily have a lower
fertility rate than earlier generations, or a government policy that limits the number of
children a couple can have. In regions of China where the family planning policy is less
strictly enforced, there is also less sex ratio imbalance (Wei and Zhang, 2011). Bhaskar
(2011) examines parental sex selections and their welfare consequences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we construct a simple overlap-
ping generations (OLG) model with only one gender, and show that structural shocks, by
raising the savings rate, can simultaneously produce a real exchange rate depreciation and
a current account surplus. In Section 3, we present an OLG model with two genders, and
demonstrate that a rise in the sex ratio could lead to a rise in both the aggregate savings
rate and the current account, and a fall in the value of the real exchange rate. In Section 4,
we calibrate the model to see if the sex ratio imbalance can produce changes in the real ex-
change rate and current account whose magnitudes are economically signicant. In section
5, we provide some empirical evidence on the connection between the sex ratio and the real
exchange rate. Section 6 o¤ers concluding remarks and discusses possible future research.
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3.1 A benchmark model with one gender
We start with a simple benchmark model with one gender. This allows us to see the savings
channel in a transparent way. The setup is standard, and the discussion will pave the way
for a model in the next section that features two genders and an unbalanced sex ratio.
There are two types of agents: consumers and producers. Consumers consume and make
the saving decisions to maximize their intertemporal utilities. Producers choose capital and
labor input to maximize the prots.
3.1.1 Consumers
Consumers live for two periods: young and old. They receive labor income in the rst period
and nothing in the second period after retiring. In the rst period, consumers consume a
part of the labor income in the rst period and save the rest for the second period.
The nal good Ct consumed by consumers consists of two parts: a tradable good CTt






We normalize the price of the tradable good to be one, and let PNt denote the relative
price of the nontradable good. The consumer price index is Pt = P

Nt.
Consumers earn labor income when they are young and retire when they are old. The
optimization problem for a representative consumer is
max u(C1t) + u(C2;t+1)
with the intertemporal budget constraint
PtC1t = (1  st)yt and Pt+1C2;t+1 = Rstyt
where yt is the disposable income and st is the savings rate of the young cohort. R is the
gross interest rate in terms of the tradable good.
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We start with the case of a small open economy, and assume that the law of one price
for the tradable good holds. The price of the tradable good is determined by the world
market, and is set to be one in each period. The interest rate R in units of the tradable
good is also a constant.
3.1.2 Producers
There are two sectors in the economy: a tradable good sector and a non-tradable good sector.
Both markets are perfectly competitive. For simplicity, we make the same assumption as
in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996) that only the tradable good can be transformed into capital
used in production.1
Tradable good producers





(R)  [QT;t+   wt+LT;t+  KT;t++1]







TT (1  T )1 T
1Relaxing this assumption will not change any of our results qualitatively.
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Without any unanticipated shocks, the factor demand functions are, respectively,
R =
1
















It is useful to note that when there is an unanticipated shock in period t, (3.2) does not
hold since KTt is a predetermined variable.
Nontradable good producers




(R)  [PN;t+QN;t+   wt+LN;t+  KN;t++1]







NN (1  N )1 N
Without unanticipated shocks, we have
R =
1
















If there is an unanticipated shock in period t, (3.4) does not hold.
In equilibrium, the market clearing condition for the nontradable good pins down the
price of the nontradable good,
QNt =




The labor market clearing condition is given by
LTt + LNt = 1 (3.7)
Assuming no labor income tax (for simplicity), yt = wt.
Denition 3. An equilibrium in the small open economy is a set
fst;KT;t+1;KN;t+1; LTt; LNt; PNtg
that satises the following conditions:
(i) The householdssavings rates, st = fsit; s i;tg, maximize the households welfare
st = argmax fVtj s i;t;KTt+1;KNt+t; LTt; LNt; PNtg
(ii) The allocation of capital stock and labor, and the output of the non-tradable good
clear the factor and the output markets, and maximize the rms prot. In other words,
fKT;t+1;KN;t+1; LTt; LNt; PNtg solves (3.2), (3.3), (3.4), (3.5), (3.6) and (3.7).
3.1.3 A shock to the savings rate and the e¤ect on the exchange rate
To illustrate the idea that a shock that raises the savings rate could lower the value of the
real exchange rate, we now consider an unanticipated increase in the discount factor  that
makes the young cohort more patient. In period t, (3.3) and (3.5) hold, but (3.2) and (3.4)
fail.






NN (1  N )1 N
= 
 
Rsyoungt 1 wt 1 + (1  syoungt )wt

We can solve (3.1), (3.6), (3.3) and (3.5) to obtain the equilibrium in period t. Let
R = RPtPt+1 denote the real interest rate. We assume that the utility function is of the CRRA
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form, i.e., u(C) = C
1  1
1  . Following Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996) and assuming that the
nontradable good sector is relatively more labor-intensive, i.e., N < T , we can obtain the
following proposition.
Proposition 9. With an increase in the discount factor  of the young cohort, the aggregate
savings rate rises, and the price of the nontradable good falls. As a result, the real exchange
rate depreciates and the current account increases.
Proof. See Appendix A3.1.
In the period in which the shock occurs, as a representative consumer becomes more
patient, he would save more and consume less. The reduction in aggregate consumption
leads to a decrease in the relative price of nontradable good (and a depreciation of the
real exchange rate). As the rise in savings is not accompanied by a corresponding rise
in investment, the countrys current account increases. In summary, without currency
manipulations, real factors that lead to a rise in a countrys savings rate can simultaneously
produce a fall in the real exchange rate and a rise in the current account. The low value of
the real exchange rate is not the cause of the current account surplus.
Note that the e¤ect on the RER and the current account last for one period. In period
t + 1, since the shock has been observed and taken into account by consumers and rms,
(3.2) and (3.4) hold in equilibrium. By solving (3.2), (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5), we have
PNt = R
N T
1 T and Pt+1 = R
(N T )
1 T
In other words, the price of the nontradable good and the consumer price index go back
to their initial levels. Later in the paper, we will demonstrate how frictions in the factor
market can produce longer-lasting e¤ects on the real exchange rate and the current account.
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3.2 Unbalanced sex ratios and real exchange rates
In this section, we extend our benchmark model to a two-sex overlapping generations model.
Within each cohort, there are women and men. A marriage can take place at the beginning
of a cohorts second period, but only between a man and a women in the same cohort. Once
married, the husband and the wife pool their rst-period savings together and consume an
identical amount in the second period. The second period consumption within a marriage
has a partial public good feature. In other words, the husband and the wife can each con-
sume more than half of their combined second period income. Everyone is endowed with an
ability to give his/her spouse some additional emotional utility (or "love"). This emotional
utility is a random variable in the rst period with a common and known distribution across
all members of the same sex, and its value is realized and becomes public information when
an individual enters the marriage market. There are no divorces.
Each generation is characterized by an exogenous ratio of men to women ( 1). All men
are identical ex ante, and all women are identical ex ante. Men and women are symmetric
in all aspects - in particularly, men do not have an intrinsic tendency to save more - except
that the sex ratio may be unbalanced.
Throughout the model, we maintain the assumption of an exogenous sex ratio. While it
is surely endogenous in the long-run as parental preference should evolve, the assumption
of an exogenous sex ratio can be defended on two grounds. First, the technology that
enables the rapid rise in the sex ratio has only become inexpensive and widely accessible
in developing countries within the last 25 years or so. As a result, it is reasonable to think
that the rising sex ratio a¤ects only the relatively young cohorts savings decisions, but
not those who have passed half of their working careers. Second, in terms of cross country
experience, most countries with a skewed sex ratio have not shown a sign of reversal. This
suggests that, if the sex ratio follows a mean reversion process, the speed of reversion is
very low.
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3.2.1 A small open economy
We start from a small open economy. As in the benchmark model, the price of the tradable
good is always one and the interest rate in units of the tradable good is a constant R. As
in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995), we assume that only tradable goods can be converted into
capital used in production.
A Representative Womans Optimization Problem
A representative woman makes her consumption/saving decisions in her rst period, tak-
ing into account the choices by men and all other women, and the likelihood that she will be







where R, ywt and s
w
t are the gross interest rate of an international bond, her endowment,
and her savings rate, respectively, all in units of the tradable good. If she is married, her













husbands rst period endowment and savings rate, respectively.  (12    1) represents
the notion that consumption within a marriage is a public good with congestion. As an
example, if two spouses buy a car, both can use it. In contrast, were they single, they would
have to buy two cars. When  = 12 ; the husband and the wife only consume private goods.
When  = 1, then all the consumption is a public good with no congestion2.
The optimal savings rate is chosen to maximize the following objective function:







2By assuming the same  for the wife and the husband, we abstract from a discussion of bargaining
within a household. In an extension later in the paper, we allow  to be gender specifc, and to be a function
of both the sex ratio and the relative wealth levels of the two spouses, along the lines of Chiappori (1988
and 1992) and Browning and Chiappori (1998). This tends to make the response of the aggregate savings
stronger to a given rise in the sex ratio.
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subject to the budget constraints that
PtC
w

















where Et is the conditional expectation operator. m is the emotional utility (or "love")
she obtains from her husband, which is a random variable with a distribution function Fm.
Bhaskar (2011) also introduces a similar "love" variable.
A Representative Mans Optimization Problem
A representative mans problem is symmetric to a womens problem. In particular, if














t ). He will
choose his savings rate to maximize the following value function
V mt = max
smt





subject to the budget constraints that
PtC
m

















where V m is his value function. w is the emotional utility he obtains from his wife, which
is drawn from a distribution function Fw.
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The Marriage Market3
In the marriage market, every woman (or man) ranks all members of the opposite sex
by a combination of two criteria: (1) the level of wealth (which is determined solely by
the rst-period savings), and (2) the size of "love" she/he can obtain from her/his spouse.
The weights on the two criteria are implied by the utility functions specied earlier. More
precisely, woman i prefers a higher ranked man to a lower ranked one, where the rank on
man j is given by u(c2w;i;j) + mj . Symmetrically, man j assigns a rank to woman i based
on the utility he can obtain from her u(c2m;j;i) + wi . To ensure that the preference is strict
for both men and women, whenever there is a tie in terms of the above criteria, we break
the tie by assuming that a woman prefers j if j < j0 and a man does the same. Note that
"love" is not in the eyes of a beholder in the sense that every woman (man) has the same
ranking over men (women).
The marriage market is assumed to follow the Gale-Shapley algorithm, which produces
a unique and stable equilibrium of matching (Gale and Shapley, 1962; and Roth and So-
tomayor, 1990). The algorithm species the following: (1) Each man proposes in the rst
round to his most preferred choice of woman. Each woman holds the proposal from her
most preferred suitor and rejects the rest. (2) Any man who is rejected in round k-1 makes
a new proposal in round k to his most preferred woman among those who have not have
rejected him. Each available women in round k holds the proposal from her most preferred
man and rejects the rest. (3) The procedure repeats itself until no further proposals are
made, and the women accept the most attractive proposals.4
With many women and men in the marriage market, all women (and all men) approx-
imately form a continuum and each individual has a measure close to zero. Let Iw and
Im denote the continuum formed by women and men respectively. We normalize Iw and
3We use the word "market" informally here. The pairing of husbands and wives is not done through
prices.
4 If only women can propose and men respond with deferred acceptance, the same matching outcomes
will emerge. What we have to rule out is that both men and women can propose, in which case, one cannot
prove that the matching is unique.
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let Iw = (0; 1). Since the sex ratio is , the set of men Im = (0; ). Men and women are
ordered in such a way that a higher value in the set means a higher ranking by members of
the opposite sex.
In equilibrium, there exists a unique mapping (w) for women in the marriage market,
w : Iw ! Im. That is, woman i (i 2 Iw) is mapped to man j (j 2 Im), given all the
savings rates and emotional utility draws. This implies a mapping from a combination (swi ,




j ). Before she enters the marriage market, she knows
only the distribution of her own type but not the exact value. As a result, the type of
her future husband (smj , 
m
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w( ijswi ;wi ;sw i;w i;sm;m)









u (c2w;i;j) + 
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w( ijswi ;wi ;sw i;w i;sm;m)
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where wi is her threshold ranking on men such that she is indi¤erent between marriage or
not. Any lower-ranked man, or any man with wi < 
w
i , wont be chosen by her.
Since we assume there are (weakly) fewer women than men, we expand the set Iw to eIw
so that eIw = (0; ). In the expanded set, women in the marriage market start from value
   1 to . The measure for women in the marriage market remains one. In equilibrium,
there exists an unique mapping for men in the marriage market: m : Im ! eIw, where m
maps man j (j 2 Im) to woman i (i 2 Iw). Those men with a low value i <    1 in seteIw will not be married. In that case, wm(j) = 0 and c2m;j;i = Rsmj ymj . In general, man js
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mj , will not be chosen by him.
We assume that the density functions of m and w are continuously di¤erentiable.
Since all men (women) in the marriage market have identical problems, they make the
same savings decisions. In equilibrium, a positive assortative matching emerges for those
men and women who are married. In other words, there exists a mapping M from w to
m such that










For simplicity, we assume that w and m are drawn from the same distribution, Fw =
Fm = F . The lowest possible value of emotional utility min is su¢ ciently small (which can
be negative) so that some women and so men may not get married. Let w and m denote
the threshold values for womens and mens emotional utilities in equilibrium, respectively.
Only women (men) with emotional utilities higher than the threshold value w (m) will
get married. In other words,
w = max

u2m;n   u2m;M 1 (m)
	
and m = max fu2w;n   u2w;M(w)g (3.12)
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i is the probability that
140































Due to symmetry, we drop the sub-index i for women. Given mens savings decisions,
the rst order condition for her optimization problem is
  u01wyw + 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Pt+1
1A(3.15)
The rst order condition for a representative mans optimization problem is
  u01mym + 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For simplicity, we assume that women and men will earn the same rst period labor income
and that there is no tax, i.e., ywt = y
m
t = wt. We now dene an equilibrium in this economy.
Denition 4. An equilibrium is a set of savings rates, capital and labor allocation by
sector, and the relative price of nontradable good fswt ; smt ;KT;t+1;KN;t+1; LTt; LNt; PNtg
that satises the following conditions:
(i) The savings rates by the representative woman and the representative man, condi-













maximize their respective utilities
swit = argmax





V mt j swt ; sm j;t;KT;t+1;KN;t+1; LTt; LNt; PNt
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(ii) The markets for capital, labor, and tradable and nontradable goods clear, and rms
maximize their prots. In other words, fKT;t+1;KN;t+1; LTt; LNt; PNtg solves (3.2), (3.3),
(3.4), (3.5), (3.6) and (3.7).
Shocks to the sex ratio We now consider an unanticipated shock to the young cohorts
sex ratio, i.e., the sex ratio rises from one to (> 1) from period t onwards. The nature of
the shock is motivated by the facts about the sex ratio imbalance in China. Since a severe
sex ratio imbalance for the pre-marital age cohort is a relatively recent phenomenon, the
older generationssavings decisions were largely made when there was no severe sex ratio
imbalance. As the shock is unanticipated, (3.2) and (3.4) do not hold in period t.
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t is the aggregate savings rate by the young cohort in period t.
By (3.3) and (3.5), we have
wt =
(1  T )ATt













We can solve (3.14), (3.16), (3.17) and (3.18) to obtain the equilibrium in period t. With
some restrictions on the utility function and the distribution of emotional utility, we have
the following proposition.
Proposition 10. Assume that the utility function is of log form, u(C) = lnC; for all men
and women, and that  is drawn from a uniform distribution, then, as the sex ratio in
the young cohort rises, a representative man in the cohort increases his savings rate while
the savings response by a representative woman is ambiguous. However, the economy-wide
savings rate increases unambiguously. The real exchange rate depreciates and the current
account rises.
Proof. See Appendix A3.2.
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A few remarks are in order. First, it is perhaps not surprising that the representative
man raises his savings rate in response to a rise in the sex ratio because the need to compete
in the marriage market becomes greater. Why does the representative woman reduce her
savings rate? Because she anticipates a higher savings rate from her future husband, she
does not need to sacrice her rst-period consumption as much as she otherwise would have
to.
Second, why does the aggregate savings rate rise in response to a rise in the sex ratio?
In other words, why is the increment in mens savings greater than the decline in womens
savings? Intuitively, a representative man raises his savings rate for two reasons: in addition
to improving his relative standing in the marriage market, he raises his savings rate to make
up for the lower savings rate by his future wife. The more his future wife is expected to
cut down her savings, the more he would have to raise his own savings to compensate.
This ensures that his incremental savings is more than enough to o¤set any reduction in
his future wifes savings. In addition, since men save more, the rising share of men in the
population would also raise the aggregate savings rate. While both channels contribute to a
rise in the aggregate savings rate, it is easy to verify that the rst channel (the incremental
competitive savings by any given man) is more important than the second e¤ect (a change
in the composition of the population with di¤erent saving propensities).
Third, once we obtain an increase in the aggregate savings rate, the logic from the
previous one-gender benchmark model applies. In particular, the relative price of the non-
tradable good declines (and hence the real exchange rate depreciates), and the current
account rises.
Similar to the benchmark model with a single gender, once the shock is observed and
taken into account in period t + 1, (3.2) and (3.4) hold in equilibrium. By solving (3.2),
(3.3), (3.4) and (3.5), we have
PNt = R
N T




This means that the real exchange rate and the current account will return to the previous
values after one period.
3.2.2 Mixed-strategy equilibrium
In this section, we extend our benchmark model by considering an endogenous choice of
entering/exiting the marriage market. Formally, we consider a mixed-strategy game in
which (a) a representative woman will choose the probability of entering the marriage
market w, a savings rate if she decides to enter, and a separate savings rate if decides to
abstain from the marriage market; and (b) a representative man has similar choices.
The representative woman will have the same optimization problem as in the previous
section if she enters the marriage market. She can also choose to be single, and if she does
so, her life-time utility is
V wn = maxswn
u(c1w;n) + u(c2w;n)
where V wn denotes the value function of a woman who is single throughout her life.
Her overall optimization problem in the mixed-strategy game is
max
w;sw;swn
wV w + (1  w)V wn
Obviously, she will choose w = 1 if and only if V w > V wn .
Similarly, a representative mans overall optimization problem is
max
m;sm;smn
mV m + (1  m)V mn
where V mn denotes the value function of a representative man who is single throughout his
life, and m is hi probability of entering the marriage market. He would decide to enter
the marriage market with probability one if and only if the expected utility of doing so is
greater than otherwise, or V m > V mn :
Now we can show a more general proposition in the following:
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Proposition 11. Assume that the utility function is of log form and that emotional utility is
drawn from an independent and identical uniform distribution, then there exists a threshold
value 1 > 1 that satises V
m = V mn .
(i) For  < 1, both women and men choose to enter the marriage market with probabil-
ity one. In addition, as the sex ratio rises, the savings rate of a representative man increases
while the change in the savings rate of a representative woman is ambiguous. However, the
economy-wide savings rate increases unambiguously, and the real exchange rate declines.
(ii) For   1, as the sex ratio rises, a representative man chooses a positive probability
of being single while a representative woman still chooses to enter the marriage market with
probability one. The changes in the aggregate savings rate and the real exchange rate are
ambiguous.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.3.
Two remarks are in order. First, the proposition states that as the sex ratio rises, up
to a threshold 1; a representative man always chooses to enter the marriage market and
raises his savings rate in response to a higher sex ratio. A representative woman also always
chooses to enter the marriage market but reduces her savings rate in response to a higher
sex ratio. This part is similar to Proposition 6. However, once the sex ratio exceeds the
threshold 1, the representative man would respond to an additional increase in the sex
ratio by choosing a progressively greater probability of not entering the marriage market.
He does so because his savings rate is already high enough such that sharing his savings with
a low-type spouse could yield him a lower utility. For the representative woman, entering
the marriage market is still a dominant strategy even after the threshold.
Second, as the sex ratio rises, the representative man su¤ers a welfare loss from two
sources. A higher sex ratio reduces his chance of marriage. In addition, while he has to
increase his savings in order not to lose out to his competitors in the marriage market,
the increased savings in the end does not alter his probability of marriage. Interestingly,
the e¤ect of a higher sex ratio on a presentative woman is ambiguous. On the one hand,
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she could gain both from her future husbands higher savings rates and from the improved
probability to be matched with a man with a higher level of emotiional utility. On the
other hand, precisely because men have rasied their savings rate, they become more reluc-
tant to share their high savings rate with a low-type woman. As a result, a representative
womans chance of getting married declines. These two opposing forces produce an ambigu-
ous net e¤ect on the representative woman. It is useful to note that, while a representative
woman could lose from a higher sex ratio, her utility level is always higher than that of the
representative man.
3.2.3 Capital adjustment costs
Without additional frictions, a shock to the sex ratio can only a¤ect the real exchange rate
for one period. If there are capital adjustment costs in each sector, the e¤ect on the real
exchange rate can be prolonged. We assume that the capital accumulation in each sector
is as following:














Kt represents the adjust-
ment cost as in Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002).
Then (3.2) and (3.4) become, respectively,
R = 1   + 1
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Without capital adjustment cost, i.e., b = 0, the price of the nontradable good will go
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PNt is now a function of
ITt+1
KTt+1
and INt+1KNt+1 . If
ITt+1
KTt+1
6= INt+1KNt+1 , PNt is not a constant. This
means that, with capital adjustment costs, the price of the nontradable good does not return
immediately to its long-run equilibrium level. As a result, a rise in the sex ratio can have
a long-lasting and depressing e¤ect on the real exchange rate.
3.2.4 Two large countries
We now turn to a world with two large countries: Home and Foreign. Assume that they
are identical in every respect except for their sex ratios. Specically, in period t, the sex
ratio of the young cohort in Home rises from one to  ( > 1), while Foreign always has a













where Ct and Ct represent home and foreign consumption indexes, respectively. Since we
choose the tradable good as the numeraire, the consumer price index is Pt = P

Nt, where
PNt is the price of the home produced nontradable good. Similarly, the consumer price
index in Foreign is P t = (P Nt)
 .
The rise in Homes sex ratio in period t is assumed to be unanticipated. As a result,
(3.2) and (3.4) fail in both Home and Foreign. By the same reasoning, Home experiences a
real exchange rate depreciation in period t, but a real appreciation in period t+ 1. We can
write the current account in Home and Foreign as follows:
CAt = stwt   st 1wt 1 +Kt  Kt+1 and CAt = stwt   st 1wt 1 +Kt  Kt+1
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Before the shock, we had
st 1 = st 1, wt 1 = w

t 1 and Kt = K

t
In period t+ 1, we have
PNt = PNt, wt+1 = wt+1, and Pt+1 = P

t+1
and the demand for the nontradable good is
QN;t+1 =
wt+1 ((R  1) st + 1)
PNt
and QN;t+1 =
wt+1 ((R  1) st + 1)
PNt




We assume that the nontradable sector is more labor-intensive, i.e., N < T . Given




In period t, since nothing changes in Foreign, it must be the case that stwt = st 1wt 1.
Following the same steps as in the case of a small open economy, we can show that stwt >
st 1wt 1 = stwt . Then it is easy to show that CAt > 0 > CAt . In other words, Home
exhibits a current account surplus while Foreign experiences a current account decit.
3.2.5 Endogenous labor supply
We turn to the case of endogenous labor supply. Just as a male raises his savings rate to
gain a competitive advantage in the marriage market, he may choose to increase his supply
of labor for the same reason in response to a rise in the sex ratio. This can translate into an
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increase in the e¤ective aggregate labor supply if women do not decrease their labor supply
too much. If the production of the nontradable good is more labor-intensive, the increase
in the e¤ective labor supply can reduce the relative price of the non-tradable good (and
the value of the real exchange rate). Therefore, endogenous labor supply could reinforce
the savings channel from the sex ratio shock, leading to an additional reduction in the real
exchange rate.
We allow each person to endogenously choose the rst period labor supply and the utility
function of the rst period is u(C)+v(1 L), where L is the labor supply and v(1 L) is the
utility function of leisure. As in the standard literature, we assume that v0 > 0 and v00 < 0.
Again, for simplicity, we assume no tax on the labor income. The utility function governing
the leisure-labor choice is the same for men and women. In other words, by assumption,
men and women are intrinsically symmetric except for their ratio in the society.
We can rewrite the optimization problem for a representative woman as following:





with the budget constraint
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The optimization problem for a representative man is similar:





with the budget constraint
PtC
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On the supply side, all equilibrium conditions remain the same except for the labor
market clearing condition, which now becomes







We now dene an equilibrium for such an economy.
Denition 5. An equilibrium is a set f(swt ; Lwt ) ; (smt ; Lmt ) ;KT;t+1;KN;t+1; LTt; LNt; PNtg
that satises the following conditions:
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(ii) The markets for both goods and factors clear, and rms prots are maximized.
In other words, fKT;t+1;KN;t+1; LTt; LNt; PNtg solves (3.2), (3.3), (3.4), (3.5), (3.6) and
(3.23).
As before, we assume that u(C) = lnC. We let Lt denote the aggregate labor supply in
period t, and assume that v
00L
v0 is non-decreasing in L.
Proposition 12. Under the same assumptions as in Proposition 10, as the sex ratio (in the
young cohort) rises, a representative man increases both his labor supply and his savings rate,
while the responses in a representative womans savings rate and labor supply are ambiguous.
However, the economy-wide labor supply and savings rate both increase unambiguously. The
real exchange rate depreciates, and the current account rises.
Proof. See Appendix A3.4.
In response to a rise in the sex ratio, for the same reason that men may cut their
consumption and increase their savings rate, they may cut down their leisure and increase
their labor supply. Similarly, for women, for the same reason that induce them to reduce
their savings, they may reduce their labor supply (and increase leisure). In the aggregate,
for the same reason that the increase in savings by men is more than enough to o¤set the
decrease in savings by women, the increase in labor supply by men is also larger than the
decrease in labor supply by women. Therefore, the aggregate labor supply rises in response
to a rise in the sex ratio.
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With a xed labor supply, it is worth remembering that the nontradable sector shrinks
after a rise in the sex ratio. The reason is that a decline in the relative price of the
nontradable goods (due to the savings channel) makes it less attractive for labor and capital
to stay in the nontradable sector. Now, with an endogenous labor supply, the total e¤ective
labor supply increases after a rise in the sex ratio according to Proposition 11. By a logic
similar to the Rybzinksy theorem, this by itself has a tendency to induce an expansion of
the nontradable sector if the production of the nontradable good is more labor intensive.
Relative to the case of a xed labor supply, adding the e¤ect of endogenous labor supply
leads to either an expansion of the nontradable sector, or at least a smaller reduction
in the size of the nontradable sector. The exact scenario depends on parameter values.
However, regardless of what happens to the size of the nontradable sector, the price of the
nontradable good (and the value of the real exchange rate) must fall by a greater amount
when the endogenous labor supply e¤ect is added to the savings e¤ect.
3.3 Numerical Examples
We start from a simple OLG model allowing mixed strategies in which every cohort lives
two periods and there are no capital adjustment costs. We then add some more realisms
by (1) assuming a 50-period life and (2) introducing capital adjustment costs.
3.3.1 Parameters
In the benchmark, the nontradable sector has a lower capital intensity N = 0:3. We take
all other parameters the same as in Chapter 2.
Choice of Parameter Values
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Parameters Benchmark Source and robustness checks
Discount factor  = 0:45 Prescott (1986) suggests that the discount
factor takes a value of 0.96 on annual
frequency. As we take 20 years as one
period, we set  = 0:9620 ' 0:45
Share of capital input  = 1=3 Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2001)
Congestion index  = 0:8  = 0:7; 0:9 in the robustness checks.
Love, standard deviation  = 0:05  = 0:1 in the robustness checks
Love, mean m = 2 m = 0:5 in the robustness checks
3.3.2 Results for the 2-period OLG model
In Figure 3.1, we set parameter  equal to 0.8. We set m = 2 and  = 0:05 as a benchmark
case. With an unbalanced sex ratio (  > 1), the real exchange rate depreciates. As the
sex ratio rises from 1 to 1.15, the real exchange rate depreciates by 6.4%, while aggregate
savings rate and current account both rise by around 2.9%. As the sex ratio continues to
rise, the real exchange rate begins to appreciate. The turning point for the real exchange
rate corresponds to when the sex ratio crosses the threshold 1 in Proposition 10.
As a rst set of robustness checks, we experiment with di¤erent combinations of m and
 by setting m = 0:5 or 2,  = 0:05 or 0.1. The results are also reported in Figure 3.1, and
generally do not deviate from the benchmark by much.
We also set  to be 0.7 or 0.9, respectively, and experiment with di¤erent combinations
of other parameters. The results are reported in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. Generally speaking,
the real exchange rate always depreciates more with a higher sex ratio. Both the savings
rate and the current account (as a share of GDP) rise in response to a rise in the sex ratio.
We now consider endogenous labor supply in Figure 3.4. With  = 0:8, m = 2 and
 = 0:05, we obtain a much stronger exchange rate depreciation. As the sex ratio rises
from 1 to 1.15, the extent of the real exchange rate depreciation also rises from 0% to about
25%. The aggregate savings rate rises from 17% to 25%, while the current account surplus
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rises from 0% rst to close to 9% of GDP. As the sex ratio continues to rise, it would
cross the threshold value 1, at which point, the real exchange rate begins to appreciate.
Correspondingly, the aggregate savings rate and current account both decline.
Robustness checks with other combinations of the parameters are reported in Figures
3.5 and 3.6. The results are broadly in line with the benchmark calibration. In particular,
with an endogenous labor supply, a given rise in the sex ratio leads to a greater response in
both the real exchange rate and the current account.
3.3.3 An OLG model in which a cohort lives 50 periods
We now extend our benchmark model by assuming that every cohort lives 50 periods.
Everyone works in the rst 30 periods, and retires in the remaining 20 periods. If one gets
married, the marriage take place in the th period. While di¤erences in the savings rates
by parents with a son versus parents with a daughter are an important feature of the data
(Wei and Zhang, 2009), we are not able to solve the problem that features simultaneously
parental savings for children and a nontradable sector. Instead, we study a case in which
men and women save for themselves. However, as we recognize the quantitative importance
of parental savings in the data, we choose  = 20 as our benchmark case so the timing of
the marriage is somewhere between the typical number of working years by parents when
their child gets married and the typical number of working years by a young person when
he/she gets married. Generally speaking, the greater the value of  , the stronger is the
aggregate savings response to a given rise in the sex ratio.








t 1 (u(cwt ) + 
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For t <  , when the woman is still single, the intertemporal budget constraint is
At+1 = R (At + y
w
t   Ptcwt )
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where At is the wealth held by the woman at the beginning of period t. ywt = wtL
w
t is her













if t > 30
where AHt is the level of family wealth (held by wife and husband) at the beginning of period
t. ct is the public good consumption by wife and husband, which takes the same form as in
the two period OLG model. The optimization problem for a representative man is similar.
To simplify the calculation and generate interesting results, we assume that there is a lower
bound of labor supply L, Lit  L (i = w;m).
As before, we take R = 1:04 as the annual gross interest rate. The subjective discount
factor now takes the value of  = 1=R. We assume capital accumulation evolves in the
following way:














Kt represents the quadratic capital adjustment cost. Following Chari,
Kehoe and McGrattan (2002), we assume  = 0:1 and b = 3.
To think of the sex ratio shock, we use demographic changes in China over the last two
decades as a guide. As the data exhibits a steady increase in the sex ratio in the pre-marital
age cohort, we let the sex ratio at birth in the model rise continuously and smoothly until
it reaches 1.2 in period 20. The sex ratio then stays at that level in all subsequent periods.
For technical reason, we set  = 0:1. Under such a standard deviation, 1 does not appear
in this experiment.
The simulation results are shown in Figures 3.7. As the sex ratio rises from 1 in period
0 to 1.2 in period 20, the real exchange rate depreciates by around 9 percent. The economy-
wide savings rate and the current account rise by around 3.5 percent of GDP. As a robustness
check, if capital adjusts more slowly, i.e., with a higher cost of capital adjustment, the real




Since the sex ratio e¤ect is novel, it is useful to present and discuss some empirical evidence.
We recall rst the evidence in Wei and Zhang (2009) that a higher sex ratio has led to a rise
in the household savings rate in China. Chinese households with a son in both rural and
urban areas tend to save more in regions with a more skewed sex ratio. The savings rate
by urban households with a daughter also tend to rise with the local sex ratio, although
the savings rate by rural households with a daughter appears to be insensitive to the local
sex ratio. The savings behavior by daughter-households is consistent with the notion that
intra-household bargaining is su¢ ciently important that they do not cut down savings rate
in response to a higher sex ratio (The model of Du and Wei2010, formalizes this intuition).
Using regional variations in the eneforcement of the famility planning policy as instruments
for the local sex ratio, Wei and Zhang (2009) suggest that the positive correlation reects a
causal e¤ect from a higher sex ratio to a higher savings rate. Based on the IV regressions,
they estimate that the rise in the sex ratio may explain about half of the observed rise in
the household savings rate in the last two decades.
Some evidence that a higher sex ratio has increased e¤ective labor supply is provided in
Wei and Zhang (2011). In particular, the number of days a rural migrant worker chooses to
work away from home tends to rise with the local sex ratio, especially if the migrant worker
has a son at home. Similarly, migrant workers with a son from a region with a more skewed
sex ratio are also more willing to work in a job that are more dangerous and less pleasant,
such as in minining or construction, or with exposure to extreme heat, cold or hazardous
material, presumably for a better wage.
We now provide some suggestive cross-country evidence on how the sex ratio imbal-
ance may a¤ect the real exchange rate. We rst run regressions based on the following
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specication:
lnRERi = +   sex ratio+   Z + "i
where RERi is the real exchange rate for country i. Z is the set of control variables. We
consider a sequentially expanding list of control variables including log GDP per capita,
nancial development index, government scal decit, dependence ratio, and de facto ex-
change rate regime classications.
The data for the real exchange rate and real GDP per capita are obtained from Penn
World Table 6.3. The price level of GDP in the Penn World Table is equivalent to the
inverse of the real exchange rate in the model: A higher value of the price level of GDP
means a lower value of the real exchange rate. The sex ratio data is obtained from the
World Factbook. As we are not able to nd the sex ratio for the age cohort 10-25 for a large
number of countries, we use age group 0-15 instead to maximize the country coverage.
We use two proxies for nancial development. The rst is the ratio of private credit
to GDP, from the World Banks WDI dataset. This is perhaps the most commonly used
proxy in the standard literature. There is a clear outlier with this proxy: China has a very
high level of bank credit, exceeding 100% of GDP. However, 80% of the bank loans go to
state-owned rms, which are potentially less e¢ cient than private rms (see Allen, Qian,
and Qian, 2004). To deal with this problem, we modify the index by multiplying the credit
to GDP ratio for China by 0.2. Because this measure is far from being perfect, we also use
a second measure, which is the level of nancial system sophistication as perceived by a
survey of business executives reported in the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR).
For exchange rate regimes, we use two de facto classications. The rst comes from
Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004), who classify all regimes into four groups: peg, crawling peg,
managed oating and free oating. The second classication comes from Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger (2005), who use three groups: x, intermediate and free oat.
For the dependent variable, logRER, and most regressors where appropriate, we use
their average values over the period 2004-2008. The averaging process is meant to smooth
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out business cycle uctuations and other noises. The period 2004-2008 is chosen because
it is relatively recent, and the data are available for a large number of countries. (We have
also examined a single year, 2006, and obtained similar results).
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics for the key variables. The log RER ranges from
-2.22 to 0.41 in the sample, with a mean of -0.74 and a standard deviation of 0.59. The
value of log RER for China indicates a substantial undervaluation on the order of 45% when
compared to the simple criterion of purchasing power parity.
For the sex ratio for the age cohort 0-15, both the mean and the median across countries
are 1.04, and the standard deviation is 0.02. For this age cohort, all countries in the sample
have a sex ratio that is at least 1. The sex ratio for most of the countries is between 1 and
1.07. The following economies have a sex ratio that is 1.07 or higher: China (1.13), Macao
(1.11), Korea (1.11), Singapore (1.09), Switzerland (1.08), Hong Kong (1.08), Vietnam
(1.08), Jordan (1.07), Portugal (1.07) and India (1.07). They represent the most skewed
sex ratios in the sample. China, by far, has the most unbalanced sex ratio in the world. If the
same sex ratio persists into the marriage market, then at least one out of every eight young
men cannot get married. As wives are typically a few years younger than their husbands, the
actual probability of not being able to marry is likely to be modestly better in a country with
a growing population (for which later cohorts are slightly larger). Nonetheless, the relative
tightness of the marriage market for men across countries should still be highly correlated
with this sex ratio measure. In addition, unlike most other countries, China exhibits a
progressively smaller age cohort over time as a result of its strict family planning policy. As
a result, the relative tightness of the marriage market for Chinese men when compared to
their counterparts in other countries is likely to be worse than what is represented by this
sex ratio. Furthermore, the Chinese sex ratios at birth in 1990 and 2005 are estimated to
be 1.15 and 1.20, respectively (see Wei and Zhang, 2009). This implies that the sex ratio
for the pre-marital age cohort will likely worsen in the foreseeable future.
We present a series of regressions in Table 3.2. The rst column shows that the real
exchange rate tends to be lower in poorer countries. This is commonly interpreted as
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conrmation of the Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect. In Column 2, we add a proxy for nancial
development by the ratio of private sector credit to GDP. The positive coe¢ cient on the
new regressor indicates that countries with a poorer nancial system tend to have a lower
RER. In Column 3, we add the sex ratio. The coe¢ cient on the sex ratio is negative and
statistically signicant, indicating that countries with a higher sex ratio tend to have a lower
RER. Since oil exporting countries have a current income that is likely to be substantially
higher than their permanent income (until they run out of the oil reserve), their current
account and RER patterns may be di¤erent from other economies. In Column 4, we exclude
major oil exporters and re-do the regression. This turns out to have little e¤ect on the reult.
In particuar, countries with a higher sex ratio continue to exhibit a lower RER.
In Column 5 of Table 3.2, we add several additional control variables: government
scal decit, terms of trade, capital account openness, and dependency ratio. Due to
missing values for some of these variables, the sample size is dramatically smaller (a decline
from 123 in Column 4 to 75 Column 5). Of these variables, the dependence ratio is the
only signicant variable. The positive coe¢ cient on the dependence ratio (0.0093) means
that countries with a low dependency ratio (fewer children and retirees as a share of the
population) tend to have a low RER. By the logic of the life-cycle hypothesis, a lower
dependency ratio produces a higher savings rate. By the model in Section 2, this could lead
to a reduction in the value of the real exchange rate. It is noteworthy, however, even with
these additional controls and in a smaller sample, the sex ratio e¤ect is still statistically
signicant, although its point estimate is slightly smaller.
In Column 6 of Table 3.2, we take into account exchange rate regimes using the Reinhart-
Rogo¤ (2004) de facto regime classications. Relative to the countries on a xed exchange
rate regime (the left out group), those on a crawling peg appear to have a lower RER.
Countries on other currency regimes do not appear to have a systematically di¤erent RER.
With these controls, the negative e¤ect of the sex ratio on the RER is still robust. In
Column 7, we measure exchange rate regimes by the de facto classications proposed by
Levy Yeyati and Sturzenneger (2003). It turns out this does not a¤ect the relationship
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between the sex ratio and the real exchange rate.
In Table 3.3, we re-do the regressions in Table 3.2 except that we now measure a countrys
nancial development by the nancial system system sophistication index from the Global
Competitiveness Report. The results are broadly similar to Table 3.2. In particular, the
coe¢ cients on the sex ratio are negative in all ve cases, and are signicant in four of the
ve cases. The sex ratio coe¢ cient is (marginally) not signicant in Column 6 of Table
3.3, where the Reinhart-Rogo¤ exchange rate classications are used as controls. We note,
however, that this regression also has far fewer observations (35 only), which also reduces
the power of the test. In any case, when the LYS exchange rate classications are used
instead (reported in Column 7), the sex ratio coe¢ cient becomes signicant again.
In Tables 3.4 and 3.5, we examine the relationship between the sex ratio and the (private-
sector) current account. Because our theory does not discuss government savings behavior,
we choose to dene the dependent variable as a countrys current account account (as a
share of GDP) minus the government savings (as a share of GDP). Otherwise, the regression
specications are similar to those in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. The sex ratio has a positive
coe¢ cient which is statistically signicant in almost all cases except when the sample size
becomes very small.
In sum, we nd that the sex ratio has a signicant impact on the real exchange rate and
current account in a way consistent with our theory: as the sex ratio rises, a country tends
to have a real exchange rate depreciation and a current account surplus. (An important
caveat is that we do not have a clever idea to instrument for the sex ratio in the cross
country context; future research will have to investigate the causality more thoroughly.)
To be clear, as the sex ratio imbalance is a severe problem only in a subset of countries,
it is not a key fundamental for the real exchange rate in most countries. Nonetheless, for
those countries with a severe sex ratio imbalance, including China, one might not have
an accurate view on the equilibrium exchange rate unless one takes it into account. To
illustrate the quantitative signicance of the empirical relations, we compute the extent of
the Chinese real exchange rate undervaluation (or the value of the RER relative to what
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can be predicted based on the fundamentals) by taking the point estimates in Columns
1-2 and 5 of Tables 3.2-3.5, respectively, at their face value. The results are tabulated
in Table 3.6. As noted earlier, relative to the simple-minded PPP, the Chinese exchange
rate is undervalued by about 45%. Once we adjust for the Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect, the
extent of the undervaluation becomes 55% (column 1 of Table 3.6) - apparently the Chinese
RER is even lower than other countries at the comparable income level. If we additionally
consider nancial underdevelopment (proxied by the ratio of private sector loans to GDP),
the Chinese RER undervaluation is reduced to 43% (column 2, row 1 of Table 3.6), which is
still economically signicant. If we also take into account government decit, terms of trade,
and capital account openness, the extent of the RER undervaluation is 35% (column 3, row
1). If we further take into account the dependency ratio, the extent of undervaluation
drops to 18% (column 4, row 1). Finally, if we add the sex ratio e¤ect, the extent of
undervaluation becomes 8% (column 5, row 1 of Table 3.6). The last number represents a
relatively trivial amount of undervaluation since major exchange rates (e.g., the euro/dollar
rate or the yen/dollar rate) could easily uctuate by more than 8% in a year. If we proxy
nancial development by the rating of nancial system sophistication, and also take into
account the sex ratio e¤ect and other structural variables, the extent of the Chinese RER
undervaluation becomes 2% (column 5, row 2 of Table 3.6), an even smaller amount.
We can do similar calculations for the Chinese (private sector) current account (as a
share of GDP) in excess of the fundamentals. If we only take into the regularity that
poorer countries tend to have a lower current account balance, the Chinese excess CA
is on the order of 14%. If we take into account the sex ratio e¤ect as well as nancial
underdevelopment, the dependency ratio and other variables in the regressions, the excess
amount of current account becomes somewhere between 0.3% and 2.0%, depending on which
proxy for nancial development is used. These numbers illustrate that the sex ratio is a
quantitatively important structural factor, though it is not the only one. In particular, the
dependency ratio is also a very important factor. In any case, if these structural factors are
not taken into account, one might mistakenly exaggerate the role of currency manipulation
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in a¤ecting both the RER and the current account.
3.5 Conclusion
A low value of the real exchange rate (i.e., deviations from the PPP from below), a large
current account surplus, and accumulation of foreign exchange reserve are the commonly
used criteria for judging currency undervaluation or manipulation. We argue that none
of them is a logically sound criterion. Instead, a dramatic rise in the sex ratio for the
premarital age cohort in China since 2003, could generate both a depreciation of the real
exchange rate and a rise in the current account surplus. With capital controls (including
mandatory surrender of foreign exchange earnings), a persistent current account surplus
can mechanically be converted into a rise in a countrys foreign exchange reserve.
The usual narrative about the Chinese external economy connects the three variables in
the following way: The authorities intervene aggressively in the currency market in order
to generate an articial undervaluation of its currency. This generates a rise in the foreign
exchange reserve holdings and a fall in the real exchange rate. As a result of the currency
undervaluation, the country manages to produce a current account surplus. The model and
the evidence in this paper encourage the reader to consider an alternative way to connect the
three variables: structural factors, such as a rise in the sex ratio, simultaneously generate
a rise in the current account (through a rise in the savings rate) and a fall in the real
value of the exchange rate. The low real exchange rate is not the cause of the current
account surplus. With mandatory surrender of foreign exchange earnings required of by the
countrys capital control regime, the current account surplus is converted passively into an
increase in the central banks foreign exchange reserve holdings.
If other factors, in addition to a rise in the sex ratio, have also contributed to a rise in the
Chinese savings rate, such as a reduction in the dependency ratio, or a rise in the corporate
and government savings rates, they can complement the sex ratio e¤ect and reinforce an
appearance of an undervalued currency even when there is no manipulation. To be clear,
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this paper is not saying that no manipulations have occured. Instead, it illustrates potential
pitfalls in assessing the equilibrium exchange rate when important structural factors are not
accounted for.
Empirically, countries with a high sex ratio do appear to have a low value of the real
exchange rate and a current account surplus. If we take the econometric point estimates
at face value, it appears that the Chinese real exchange rate has only a relatively small
amount of undervaluation (2-8%) once we take into account the sex ratio e¤ect and other
structural factors.
In future research, the model could be extended to allow for endogenous adjustment of
the sex ratio. This will help us to assess the speed of the reversal of the sex ratio and the
unwinding of the current account surplus and currency "undervaluation."
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Figure 3.1: RER, aggregate savings rate, CA/GDP vs sex ratio, no labor supply e¤ect,
kappa=0.8
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Figure 3.2: RER, aggregate savings rate, CA/GDP vs sex ratio, no labor supply e¤ect,
kappa=0.7
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Figure 3.3: RER, aggregate savings rate, CA/GDP vs sex ratio, no labor supply e¤ect,
kappa=0.9
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Figure 3.4: RER, aggregate savings rate, CA/GDP vs sex ratio, with labor supply e¤ect,
kappa=0.8
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Figure 3.5: RER, aggregate savings rate, CA/GDP vs sex ratio, with labor supply e¤ect,
kappa=0.7
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Figure 3.6: RER, aggregate savings rate, CA/GDP vs sex ratio, with labor supply e¤ect,
kappa=0.9
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Figure 3.7: Impulse responses of RER, aggregate savings rate and CA/GDP, tao=20
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Sex Ratios, Entrepreneurship and
Comparative Advantage
Many Asian countries, including China, Korea, India, Vietnam, Singapore, Taiwan, and
Hong Kong, have experienced a rise in the sex ratio in the pre-marriage age cohort. In
many of such economies, parents have a strong preference for a son over a daughter. This
used to lead to large families, not necessarily an unbalanced sex ratio. However, in the last
three decades, as the technology to detect the gender of a fetus (Ultrasound B) has become
less expensive and more widely available, more parents engage in selective abortions in
favor of a son, resulting in an increasing relative surplus of men. The strict family planning
policy in China, introduced in the early 1980s, has induced Chinese parents to engage in
sex-selective abortions more aggressively than their counterparts in other countries. The
sex ratio at birth in China used to be 106 boys per hundred girls in 1980, and it rose to 122
boys per hundred girls in 1997 (see Wei and Zhang, 2009, for more detail).
The existing literature has identied several consequences on the economy of a serious
sex ratio imbalance. First, the sex ratio imbalance may cause crimes. Edlund, Li, Yi, and
Zhang (2007) use Chinese data to estimate the e¤ect of a rise in the sex ratio in crimes.
They nd that every one basis point increase in the sex ratio (e.g., from 1.10 to 1.11 boys per
girl) raises violent and property crime rates by 3%, and the rise in the sex ratio imbalance
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may account for up to one-seventh of the overall rise in crime in China. Second, the
imbalance may also trigger competitive savings among 2 households men and households
with sons forego current consumption to accumulate wealth in order to improve a young
mans standing in the marriage market relative to other men. This increase in the savings
rate is ine¢ cient since it does not alter the number of unmarried men in the aggregate. Wei
and Zhang (2009) estimate that about half the increase in the household savings rate in
China during 1990-2005 can be attributed to the rise in the sex ratio. Du and Wei (2010)
provide a theoretical framework to show this e¤ect. In Du and Wei (2010), they also nd
that, as the sex ratio rises, social welfare will decline. Third, the sex ratio imbalance can
generate a decline in the real exchange rate. They highlight two channels through which
a sex ratio imbalance could lead to an appearance of currency undervaluation. The rst is
a savings channel. A rise in the savings rate implies a reduction in the demand for both
tradable and non-tradable goods. Since the price of the tradable good is tied down by the
world market, this translates into a reduction in the relative price of the nontradable good,
and hence a decline in the value of the real exchange rate. The second theoretical channel
works through e¤ective labor supply. A rise in the sex ratio can also motivate men to
cut down leisure and increase labor supply. This leads to an increase in the economy-wide
e¤ective labor supply. If the nontradable sector is more labor intensive than the tradable
sector, this generates a Rybzinsky-like e¤ect, leading to an expansion of the nontradable
sector at the expense of the tradable sector. The increase in the supply of nontradable good
leads to an additional decline in the relative price of nontradable and a further decline in
the value of the RER.
However, not many papers have focused on the consequence of a sex ratio imbalance on
economic growth and entrepreneurship. To our knowledge, Wei and Zhang (2010) is the rst
paper that empirically studies the e¤ect of a rise in the sex ratio on entrepreneurship and
economic growth. They nd that the imbalance may stimulate economic growth by inducing
more entrepreneurship. Motivated by their empirical ndings, we provide a theoretical
framework to analyze the consequence of a sex ratio imbalance on entrepreneurial activities
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in this paper. We rst construct an overlapping generations model with two sexes and
desire to marry in a closed economy. At the beginning of the rst period, men can choose
to be entrepreneurs (with a risky return) and workers (with a certain labor income) while
all women are workers. They enter the marriage market at the start of the second period
and marriages occur. When the sex ratio is close to a balanced level, only entrepreneurs
who receive low income failed in the marriage market. As the sex ratio rises, more men will
choose to be workers since being workers will obtain higher returns in the marriage market.
However, when the sex ratio is large such that some male workers cannot get matched
with women, an increase in the sex ratio raises the probability that a male worker will
not get married, while it does not alter the expected utility of being an entrepreneur (to a
rst-order approximation). Then more men will respond to a higher sex ratio by becoming
entrepreneurs.
The results may have important implications in an open economy model. Based on
the same idea, the sex ratio imbalance can be an important sourse of the comparative
advantage1 in the risky sectors. We show in this paper that, in an open economy with two
sectors in an economy, a risky sector and a risk free sector, a country with a very skewed
sex ratio (above some threshold) may have more entrepreneurs in the risky sector, which in
turn may lead to a comparative advantage in the risky sector.
We also provide some empirical support to the theoretical predictions. In addition to
reviewing the evidence in Wei and Zhang (2010), we run two types of regressions to test our
theoretical predictions in this paper. First, we nd that, when the sex ratio exceeds some
threshold, a rise in a countrys sex ratio tends to lead to higher exports in more volatile
sectors. Second, in a nonlinear least squares test, we nd that above some threshold, which
is close to the biological mean of the cross-country sex ratios, a rise in the sex ratio will
lead to an increase in a countrys export volatility. Both ndings are consistent with our
theoretical predictions. Quantitatively, the e¤ect of a rise in the sex ratio on a countrys
export volatility can be very signicant. For instance, consider a country initially with a sex
1We dene the comparative advantage in a sector as the relative sectoral export position in this paper.
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ratio around 1.05 (mean of the sex ratios in the world) and an export volatility 0.11 (mean
of the export volatilities across countries), if the sex ratio rises from 1.05 to 1.13 (Chinas
sex ratio in 2006), the export volatility will increase by almost 25%.
The rest of the paper is organized as following. In Section 2, we present a model and
derive the main results of the paper. Section 3 is the empirical part in which we provide
some empirical support to the theoretical predictions. In Section 4, we conclude and discuss
about the future research.
4.1 Model
We construct an overlapping generations model with two sexes. Both men and women live
two periods: young and old. At the beginning of the rst period, men decide whether
to become an entrepreneur or a worker while all women are workers. Every entrepreneur
will run a rm by renting capitals and hiring workers. The return on the entrepreneurial
activity is uncertain. All workers earn the same wage income. After receiving the rst
period income, men and women will consume part of the income and save the rest for the
second period.
A marriage can only take place between a man and a women in the same generation
and at the beginning of their second period. Once married, the husband and the wife pool
their rst-period savings together and consume an identical amount in the second period.
The second period consumption within a marriage has a partial public good feature. In
other words, the husband and the wife can each consume more than half of their combined
second period income - the exact proportion is an exogenous parameter to be explained
below. Everyone is endowed with an ability to give his/her spouse some emotional utility
(or "love" or "happiness"). This emotional utility is a random variable in the rst period
with a common and known distribution across all members of the same sex, and its value is
realized and becomes public information when the individual enters the marriage market.
We describe the equilibrium in three steps: rst, we introduce the optimization problems
182
for men and women. Second, we discuss the matching in the marriage market. Finally we
derive the equilibrium in this economy.
4.1.1 Optimization problems for men and women
We denote the wage income byWt and let  and nmt denote the sex ratio in the young cohort
and the fraction of young men who choose to be entrepreneurs. Then the total number of
entrepreneurs in the economy is 1+n
m
t if we normalize the measure of young people to be
one.









where Kit and Lit are the capital and labor input, respectively. zit is the productivity shock.
For simplicity, we assume that the productivity z is drawn from a binomial distribution:
z = zH with probability  and z = zL with probability 1  .














As in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), parameter  denotes the elasticity of intratemproal substi-
tution between di¤erent varieties, with  > 1.






















For simplicity, we assume complete capital depreciation in this paper. Then for an




the optimal price chosen by the entrepreneur is
pit =

   1MCit (4.1)

















where MCit is the marginal cost which equals RtW
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Given the equilibrium interest rate and wage rate, each rm will have the same capital
to labor ratio which should be equal to the economy-wide capital to labor endownment in
period t.
For a representative entrepreneur with zH and a reprensentative entrepreneur with zL,































where LHt and L
L
t are the labor hired by the representative entrepreneur with z
H and the











































In this model, PtYt is the aggregate sales revenue by all the rms. Given the demand
structure in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), each individual rm has the same markup which
equals  1 , which means that the total revenue equals the product of the total cost and
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Using this result, the prot of entrepreneur i is



























Since the total labor supply is
Lt =
(1  nmt ) + 1
1 + 




















 (zH) 1 + (1  ) (zL) 1
(4.5)
By (4.5), one key factor that determines the prot is the productivity. A larger pro-
ductivity will yield a higher prot. In the rest of the paper, we call entrepreneurs with zH
"successful entrepreneurs", and entrepreneurs with zL "failed entrepreneurs". We will solve
the optimization problems for men by backward induction: we rst solve the optimization
savings decisions for successful entrepreneurs, male workers and failed entrepreneurs, re-
spectivley, take the number of entrepreneurs in the economy as given. Then by comparing
the ex post utilities, we derive the number of entrepreneurs in equilibrium.
Given the sex ratio  and the fraction of men who choose to be entrepreneurs nmt , if a
man choose to be an entrepreneur and he succeeds, his optimization problem is



























where set and 
H





are the savings rate and rst period income of his wife, respectively. w is the emotional
utility obtained from his wife, which is drawn from a distribution Fw(). If the man fails,
his optimization problem is


























where se;Lt and 
L
t are the savings rate and the prot of the man, respectively.
The optimization problem for a representative male worker is




















where sm;Lt is the savings rate of the representative male worker.
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For a representative female worker, the optimization problem is
max u(c1w;t) + E [u(c2w;t+1) + 
m]
with budget constaint












where smt and I
m
t denotes the savings rate and rst period income of her future husband,
respectively.
For simplicity, we assume log utility function throughout the paper.
4.1.2 Marriage market
We assume that w and m are drawn from the same uniform distribution with a lower
bound min and an upper bound max. In the benchmark model, we assume that everybody
enters the marriage market.
In the marriage market, every woman (or man) ranks all members of the opposite sex
by a combination of two criteria: (1) the level of wealth (which is determined solely by
the rst-period savings), and (2) the size of "love" he/she can obtain from his/her spouse.
The weights on the two criteria are implied by the utility functions specied earlier. More
precisely, woman i prefers a higher ranked man to a lower ranked one, where the rank on
man j is given by u(c2w;i;j) + mj . Symmetrically, man j assigns a rank to woman i based
on the utility he can obtain from her u(c2m;j;i)+wi . (To ensure that the preference is strict
for men and women, when there is a tie in terms of the above criteria, we break the tie by
assuming that a woman prefers j if j < j0 and a man does the same. Note that "love" is
not in the eyes of the beholder in the sense that every woman (man) has the same ranking
over men (women).
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The marriage market is assumed to follow the Gale-Shapley algorithm, which produces
a unique and stable equilibrium of matching (Gale and Shapley, 1962; and Roth and So-
tomayor, 1990). The algorithm species the following: (1) Each man proposes in the rst
round to his most preferred choice of woman. Each woman holds the proposal from her most
preferred suitor and rejects the rest. (2) Any man who is rejected in round k-1 makes a new
proposal in round k to his most preferred woman among those who have not yet rejected
him. Each available women in round k "holds" the proposal from her most preferred man
and rejects the rest. (3) The procedure repeats itself until no further proposals are made.2
4.1.3 Equilibrium
To derive the general equilibrium, we will rst solve the optimization problems for successful
entrepreneurs, failed entrepreneurs, male workers and female workers. Since there are three
types of men that receive di¤erent rst period incomes in the economy, men will not make
the same savings decisions. Hopkins (2010) analyzes a more general two-sided matching
game. One implication by his paper is that mens choice decision (savings in this paper) is
an increasing function of their initial wealth. In other words, successful entrepreneur will
have the highest wealth in the marriage market while failed entrepreneurs have the lowest
wealth.
For simplicity, we assume that the dispersion of the emotional utility distribution is
very small, min is very close to max, such that the equilibrium matching between men and
women is: (i) successful entrepreneurs get matched with the best typed women; (ii) male
workers get matched with mid typed women; and (iii) failed entrepreneurs get matched
with the worst typed women.
Let ( 1) denote the sex ratio in the economy. We assume  is exogenous throughout
the paper. If  is small (close to one), then in equilibrium, only failed entrepreneurs cannot
get married. In this case, the equilibrium matching between successful entrepeneurs and
2 If only women can propose and men respond with deferred acceptance, the same matching outcomes
will emerge. What we have to rule out is that both men and women can propose, in which case, one cannot
prove that the matching is unique.
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female workers is





1  F  M1 (w)
) M1 (w) = F 1
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The equilibrium matching between male workers and female workers is
M2 (w) = F 1

1  1 + 








and the equilibrium matching between failed entrepeneurs and female workers is
M3 (w) = F 1
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1CA
is the probability that successful entrepreneur i gets married. Due to the symmetry, we






























































+ min   ln (swt )

377775 = 0 (4.8)
For a representative failed entrepreneur, if the sex ratio is small (close to one), with a











































If the sex ratio becomes large such that no failed entrepreneurs can get matched with some
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M3 (w) dF (w)























































37775 = 0 (4.11)
If the sex ratio becomes su¢ ciently large such that no failed entrepreneur can get married,


































3775 = 0 (4.12)
Since men can freely choose to be entrepreneurs and workers ex ante, in equilibrium,
men will feel indi¤erent between being an entrepreneur and a worker, which means nmt will
solve the equation in the following
V m;et + (1  )V m;eLt = V m;Lt (4.13)
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Labor market and capital market must clear in equilibrium, therefore, the two equations
in the following hold, respectively.






























































swt 1RtWt 1 represents the aggregate consumption of the old cohort in period t.
We consider how a structual shock, an unexpected rise in the young cohorts sex ratio in
period t, may a¤ect the entrepreneurial activities in this paper. We will assume that min
is large enough such that marriage is appealing for everyone in the economy. Now we can
show the following proposition.
Proposition 13. If  is small enough,
(i) When the sex ratio is small (close to one), as the sex ratio rises, a smaller number
of men choose to be entrepreneurs.
(ii) When the sex ratio becomes su¢ ciently unbalanced such that no failed entrepreneurs
can get married, as the sex ratio rises, a larger fraction of men choose to be entrepreneurs.
Proof. See Appendix A4.1.
Three remarks are in order. First, there always exist a positive fraction of men who
choose to be entrepreneurs. Here is the reason, for a representative man, if he observes that
all his rivals are workers, he will optimally choose to be entrepreneurs since, no matter what
level of productivity he gets, he will earn innity prot by (4.5). Therefore, nmt = 0 cannot
be the equilibrium in this economy.
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Second, the number of entrepreneurs in the economy depends on the expected welfare of
being an entrepreneur and the welfare of being a male worker. When the sex ratio is close
to one, every male worker will get married, if the possibility of getting a low productivity
draw is high, a rise in the sex ratio harms the failed entrepreneurs most. Men will switch
their choices to workers since being a worker can always get married with some woman.
Third, if the sex ratio is very unbalanced such that some male workers cannot get
married, as the sex ratio rises, more men choose to be entrepreneurs. Here is the intuition.
Suppose there is an increase in the number of men in one period, for a representative "new"
man in the economy, he can choose either to be an entrepreneur or a worker. If he choose
to be a worker, the competition for a wife among workers become even more severe, male
workers will experience a welfare loss. However, if he choose to be an entrepreneur, there
are two outcomes: (i) he gets a high productivity draw zH , and he can marry a woman in
the second period; and (ii) he gets a low productivity draw zL, he can never get married so
he optimally choose his savings as a life-time bachelor. Notice that, if the lower bound of
emotional utility is su¢ ciently high, even a rise in the number of successful entrepreneurs
may leads to a welfare loss, but it is smaller than the welfare loss of male workers who
are facing a bigger possibility of being single. On the other hand, failed entrepreneurs can
never get married, a rise in the number of failed entrepreneurs will not lead to a big welfare
loss to them. Therefore, a representative "new" man will optimally choose to become an
entrepeneur.
4.1.4 A mixed-strategy equilibrium
In this section, we extend our benchmark model by considering the choice of entering/exiting
the marriage market. In a mixed-strategy game, both women and men can choose the
probability of entering the marriage market as well as their saving decisions.
A representative woman will have the same optimization problem as in the previous
section if she enters the marriage market. She can also choose to be single and if she does
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so, her life-time utility is
V wn = maxswn
u(c1w;n) + u(c2w;n)
where V wn denotes the value function of a representative woman who is single throughout
her life.
In a mixed-strategy game, the representative woman will choose the probability of en-
tering the marriage market w, a savings rate if she decides to enter, and a separate savings
rate if decides to abstain from the marriage market. The optimization problem is
max
w;sw;swn
wV w + (1  w)V wn
where V w is the value function when she chooses to enter the marriage market. Obviously,
she will choose w = 1 if and only if V w > V wn . All men will have the similar optimization
problem given their rst period income.
We assume E is su¢ ciently large in this paper such that entering the marriage mar-
ket is a dominant strategy for people who face an ex post probability one to get married.
Then, when the sex ratio is small (close to one), everyone enters the marriage market with
probability one. As the sex ratio keeps rising and exceeds some threshold, some failed
entrepreneurs will quit the marriage market. Here is the reason. As in Proposition 13,
there always exists a sex ratio at which failed entrepreneurs get married with probability
zero ex post. For instance, let 0 denote such a sex ratio. If all failed entrepreneurs still
enter the marriage market with probability one at 0, the value function of a representa-
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by selecting snt . The rst order condition for this failed





















its maximum, any deviation in the savings rate from snt will yield a welfare loss. Therefore,
being single will lead to a higher ex post utility than entering the marriage market in this
case. Entering the marriage market with probability one cannot be the optimal strategy in
equilibrium at 0 and some failed entrepreneurs will optimally choose to be single. Due to
the continuity of all the variables, there exists a threshold 0 at which all failed entrepreneurs
still enter the marriage market but they obtain the same ex post utility as being single.
V e;Lt = V
e;L
n;t (4.16)
As the sex ratio keeps rising, failed entrepreneurs will choose a positive probability of being
single.
We total di¤erentiate the equations (4.6), (4.7), (4.9), (4.11), (4.13), (4.14), (4.15) and
(4.16) at 0 to see how a further rise in the sex ratio may inuence the number of entre-
preneurs in the economy. Similar to the proof of Proposition 13, we nd that the e¤ect is
ambiguous. Here is the intuition. As the sex ratio keeps rising, we consider those "new"
men in the economy. They will have a tradeo¤ in choosing to be entrepreneurs or workers.
If all of them choose to be workers, this will raise the competition for better wives among
male workers which potentially leads to a welfare loss. However, if some of them choose to
become entrepreneurs, once they fail, they will face a more severe competition for getting
married which again yield an expected welfare loss to entrepreneurs. When the sex ratio is
small and the mean of the emotional utility is large, the second e¤ect dominates the rst
one and the number of total entrepreneurs in the economy will decrease. This is because,
once an entrepreneur fails, it may face a positive possibility of being single, the marginal
loss is proportional to the mean of the emotional utility which can be potentially very large.
Then, to be safe, men are more likely to be workers since male workers can always get mar-
ried if the sex ratio is very low. However, when the sex ratio becomes large ( 0), failed
entrepreneurs are indi¤erent between entering the marriage market and being single, the
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net e¤ect of a rise in the sex ratio on the relative welfare of being an entrepeneur compared
to being a worker is ambiguous. The reason is that, the marginal welfare loss to the failed
entrepreneurs in this case may not be large since failed entrepreneurs can choose to be
single if they foresee the bad situations in the marriage market. In other words, there exists
a quasi lower bound for the welfare of failed entrepreneurs at which failed entrepreneurs
welfare does not vary much no matter how sex ratio changes. In this case, it is possible
that the rst e¤ect dominates the second one and the total number of entrepreneurs may
increase as the sex ratio rises.
As the sex ratio continues rising, when no failed entrepreneurs can get married, similar to
the analysis above, there exists another threshold 1 above which male workers will consider
a positive possibility of being single. As in Du andWei (2010, 2011), such a threshold may be
very large if the mean of the emotional utility is very large. Some numerical examples show
that in the real world, no single country has a sex ratio beyond the threshold. Therefore,
for simplicity, we do not consider the case that male workers choose a positive probability
of being single in this paper.
4.1.5 An open economy model with two sectors
In this extension, we assume there are two production sectors, 1 and 2, in the economy.






where  and 1   are the shares on the good 1 and the good 2, respectively. Y1 and Y2 are
the aggregate index of di¤erentiated goods in sector 1 and sector 2, respectively. Young men
can choose to be entrepreneurs in both sectors and factor can freely ow between sectors.
We assume that sector 1 is a risky sector and sector 2 is a risk free sector. The production
197










where zj takes value zH with probability  and zL with probability 1   in sector 1. And
z2 is a constant in sector 2.
Let nm1t and n
m
2t denote the fractions of young men who choose to be entrepreneurs
in sector 1 and sector 2, respectively. Similar to the benchmark analysis, the prot for








































 (zH) 1 + (1  ) (zL) 1
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and the prot for entrepreneur k in sector 2 is
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In equilibrium, given the composition of the nal consumption good, the ratio of the share


















































Again, if we denote the aggregate labor supply in the economy by Lt, where Lt = L1t+L2t,




























































































Since sector 2 is risk free, in equilibrium, we have
2et =Wt
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In equilibrium, both labor market and capital market will clear,





















































If there are more entrepreneurs owing into sector 1, i.e., n
m
1t
1+ increases, the number of
entrepreneurs in sector 2 will decrease. Substitute (4.22) into the prot function of rms in














Now we can show the following proposition.
Proposition 14. If  is small enough,
(i) When the sex ratio is small (close to one), as the sex ratio rises, a smaller number
of men will choose to become entrepreneurs in sector 1 while a larger number of men choose
to become entrepreneurs in sector 2;
(ii) When the sex ratio becomes su¢ ciently unbalanced such that no failed entrepreneurs
can get married, as the sex ratio rises, a larger fraction of men choose to be entrepreneurs
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in sector 1 while a smaller number of men choose to become entrepreneurs in sector 2.
Proof. See Appendix A4.2.
The intuition behind Proposition 14 is similar to that behind Proposition 13. A rise
in the sex ratio is an adverse shock on men in the marriage market, which will stimulate
men to choose more risky but potentially higher return choices. Therefore, the risky sector
(sector 1) will expand relative to the risk free sector (sector 2).
Now we consider an open economy case. Consider a small open economy. We evaluate
the comparative advantage of the country by comparing its relative sectoral export positions
among di¤erent sectors. If there are two sectors in the country, let xi and xj denote
the shares of sector is export and sector js export in the home countrys total export,
respectively. If
xi > xj , i 6= j
the country has a comparative advantage in sector i. We call the small open economy "the
home country", then we can show the following proposition.
Proposition 15. Under the same assumption in Proposition 14, (i) when the home coun-
trys sex ratio is small (close to one), as the sex ratio rises, the home country is more likely
to have a comparative advantage in sector 2; (ii) when the home countrys sex ratio becomes
su¢ ciently unbalanced such that no failed entrepreneurs in sector 1 can get married, as the
sex ratio rises, the home country is more likely to have a comparative advantage in sector
1.
Proof. See Appendix A4.3.
Proposition 15 points out that some structual factors may inuence the trade pattern
signicantly. For instance, countries such as China have very unbalanced sex ratios, men
in those countries are more likely to take the risky choices. If the turning points of the sex
ratios as we discussed in Propositions 13, 14 and 15 are small (close to the balanced level),
then countries with unbalanced sex ratios are very likely to have a larger risky sectors than
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countries with moderate sex ratios. This leads to a comparative advantage towards the
risky sectors in countries with skewed sex ratios.
4.2 Empirics
We discuss two types of empirical approaches that allow us to check for plausibility and
empirical importance of the theory. First, we review the evidence from China on the
association between sex ratios and entrepreneurial activities. Second, we provide some
cross-country evidence on the relationship between a countrys sex ratio and its structure.
4.2.1 Cross-section evidence in China
The sex ratio at birth in China increased from being slightly unbalanced in 1990 to about
120 boys per 100 girls in 2007. While China is not the only economy with a high sex ratio
(and a high savings rate), it is the one with the most extreme sex ratio imbalance at the
moment. For this reason, it is useful to highlight two empirical patterns documented in Wei
and Zhang (2010) that are most relevant for the current paper.
First, using data from two censuses of industrial rms in 1995 and 2004, Wei and Zhang
(2010) nd that the local sex ratio is a signicant predictor of which regions are more likely
to have new domestic private rms (beyond other determinants of the birth of new rms).
They also compute economic impact. Using the most conservative estimate in Wei and
Zhang (2010), an increase in the sex ratio by 3 basis points (e.g., from 1.08 to 1.11), which
is equal to the increase in the average sex ratio from 1995 to 2004, generates an increase in
the natural log number of private rms by 0.39. The actual increase in log number of rms
in this period is 0.83, the rise in the sex ratio can potentially explain 47% (=0.39/0.83) of
the actual increase in the number of private rms in China during this period. In other
words, the economic impact of the rise in sex ratio in promoting entrepreneurial activities
in rural China is potentially very big.
Second, Wei and Zhang (2010) look at the China Population 1% Survey in 2005 to
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nd the information on rm owners, and then run a Probit test to see how the sex ratio
imbalance may inuence the likelihood for parents to be entrepreneurs. Across households,
they nd that a combination of having a son and living in a region with a skewed sex ratio
signicantly raises the likelihood for parents to be business owners or self-employed.
In summary, Wei and Zhang (2010) provide strong empirical evidence in China that a
larger sex ratio may induce more entrepreneurial activities, which is very relevant for our
current paper.
4.2.2 Cross-country evidence
We run two types of regressions in this section. First, we directly test how sex ratios and
sectoral volatilities will inuence the sectoral export. Second, we construct a country export
volatility index by using export data and sectoral volatility data. Then we examine how
the changes in countriessex ratios will a¤ect the country export volatilities.
Data
Koren and Tenreyro (2005) have shown that increasing levels of economic development
across countries are associated with a pattern of comparative advantage towards less volatile
sectorswhere this volatility is measured as the aggregate sector volatility of output per
worker. Assuming that the rankings on industrial volatilities do not vary much across coun-
tries, we compute a similar measure of aggregate productivity volatility from the NBER-CES
Manufacturing Productivity database. The NBER-CES Manufacturing Productivity data-
base covers annual sectoral data from 1958 to 2005. We compute the volatility of sector-level
output per worker (VOL 1) by taking the standard deviation of its annual growth rate.
As a robustness check, we replicate the sectoral volatility measure as in Cunat and
Melitz (2009). We use a reference country, the US, to measure the industrial volatility
index. We measure di¤erences in rm-level volatility across sectors using COMPUSTAT
data from Standard & Poors. This data covers all publicly traded rms in the US, and
contains yearly sales and employment data since 1980 (the past 26 years). We use the
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standard deviation of the annual growth rate of rm sales (measured as year-di¤erenced
log sales) as the second industrial volatility index. Similar to Cunat and Melitz (2009),
we include in our analysis all rms with at least 5 years of data (using all the data going
back to 1980) and all sectors with at least 10 rms. We do not exclude the observations
where the absolute value of the growth rate is above 300%. We compute the sector-level
volatility as the average of the rm-level volatility measures, weighted by the rms average
employment over time.
Other sectoral characteristics such as factor intensity data in manufacturing are available
over time from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database at the 4-digit US SIC
level. For each sector, we measure capital intensity as capital per worker and skill intensity
as the ratio of non-production wages to total wages. Again, we use the most recent data
available, but also average out the data across the latest ve years, in order to smooth
out any small yearly uctuations (especially for very small sectors). All measures are also
aggregated to the 3-digit SIC level.
The cross-country sex ratio data can be obtained from World Fact dataset. We use the
sex ratio in the group from age 0 to age 15 in the regression. We obtain the labor exibility
data from Cunat and Melitz (2009). All other country-level data can be obtained from Penn
World Table 6.3. We measure capital abundance as the physical capital stock per capita.
Capital stock is taken from Caselli (2005) and is constructed from the investment data
reported in PWT 6.3 (based on the perpetual inventory method). Human skill abundance
is calculated as the average years of schooling in the total population from Barro and Lee
(2000). We use the ratio of private credit to GDP as the nancial development index. In
order to control the e¤ect that major commodity exporters may have di¤erent volatilities
in their exports, we construct an dummy variablecommodity exportersin the regression.3
Cashin et al. (2003) list a group of non-oil commodity exporters. We will include those
countries and major oil exporters in this paper.
3We consider a country as a commodity exporter if the share of commodity exports in the country is
greater than 30% of the total exports.
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The country-sector exports data can be obtained from WITS database. We compute
the average export between year 2004-2008 for each sector in all countries.
Estimation
We run two estimations in this section: (i) we test how sex ratios and volatilities together
can inuence the sectoral export, and (ii) we estimate the correlation between countries
export weighted volatilities and their sex ratios.
In the rst type of estimation, we run the estimation to see how countriessex ratios and
sectoral volatilities a¤ect the sectoral exports. We propose a nonlinear regression equation
as in the following:
ln (expki) =
8><>: 1  sex:ratioi  V OLk +   Zki + fi + fk + errorki if sex:ratioi < 

2  sex:ratioi  V OLk +   Zki + fi + fk + errorki otherwise
where the dependent variable is the sector ks log export in country i. Zki is a set of control
variables used in Cunat and Melitz (2009) (see Table 3). fi and fk are the country- and
sector-xed e¤ects, respectively.
In practice, the estimation is done in sequence. The value of  is determined by a
grid search. Estimation of this model can be done via maximum likelihood or sequential
conditional least squares. Procedurally, we perform a grid search over possible values of .
Starting with an initial value of  at 1:0, the search adds 0.001 in each successive round
until  = 1:15 (which is an upper bound of the sex ratios in our sample). Given  in each
round, we then estimate a linear equation
ln (expki) = 1  sex:ratioi  V OLk  I [sex:ratioi < ]
+2  sex:ratioi  V OLk  (1  I [sex:ratioi < ])
+  Zki + fi  I [sex:ratioi < ] + fk  I [sex:ratioi < ]
+f 0i  (1  I [sex:ratioi < ]) + f 0k  (1  I [sex:ratioi < ]) + errorki
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and collect the residuals. We then compare the sum of squared residuals for all s and
pick the  at which we obtain the smallest sum of squared residuals.
Table 3 shows the regression results. We nd that, when a countrys sex ratio is small
(below the threshold ), a rise in the sex ratio does not lead to an increase in the export
in more volatile sectors (1s are positive or insignicant in all regressions). However, if
countrys sex ratio is large (above the threshold ), a rise in the sex ratio can generate
higher export in more volatile sectors (2s are signicant in most regressions), which is
consistent with our theoretical predictions. Interestingly, results in Table 3 also support the
predictions from standard trade theories: the coe¢ cient on the interaction term between log
capital abundance and log sectoral capital-intensity is positive and signicant, which means
that capital abundant countries will export more capital-intensive goods. The coe¢ cient
on the interaction term between log skill abundance and log sectoral skill-intensity is also
positive and signicant, which means that skill abundant countries will export more skill-
intensive goods.
Next, we construct a country export volatility index and examine how changes in the
sex ratio may inuence a countrys export volatility. By Proposition 15, as the sex ratio in
a country rises, the country may have a larger export towards the more volatile sectors or
less volatile sectors, which depends on the level of the sex ratio. In other words, a countrys
sex ratio may nonlinearly inuence the countrys average export volatility. We propose a
nonlinear estimation to test our theory.
V OLi =
8><>: 1 + 1  sex:ratioi +   Zi + errori if sex:ratioi < 

2 + 2  sex:ratioi +   Zi + errori otherwise







where Xki and Xi denote the sector ks export and total export in country i, respectively.
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V OLk is the sectoral volatility index. We include the sex ratio (sex:ratio), and all con-
trol variables used in Cunat and Melitz (2009) such as labor market exibility, log(capital
abundance), skill abundance, log(real GDP per capita) and etc. (which is denoted by set
Z) as the regressors.  is the threshold of the sex ratio in Proposition 15. We will estimate
parameters , ,  and  by using a nonlinear least squares method.
Figures 1 and 2 show the scatter plot and the LOWESS smoother of countriesexport
weighted volatilities and their sex ratios, using two di¤erent measures of industrial volatil-
ities. The patterns showed in those gures are consistent with our theoretical predictions:
starting at the balanced sex ratio, as the sex ratio rises, a countrys export volatility will
rst decrease. Once the sex ratio passes some threshold, export volatility will increase.
Table 4 shows the estimation results. In the rst experiment of each regression, we
include the sex ratio, log countrys income and commodity exporters dummy variable as
the regressors. The reason for adding commodity exporters dummy is that by looking at
the sectoral volatilities, the commodity production sectors seem to have relatively higher
volatility levels on average. In the second experiment, we include all other control variables
in Cunat and Melitz (2009) as the regressors. Finally, we exclude the commodity exporters
from our sample in the last experiment. We nd that 2s, the marginal e¤ect on the export
volatility of a rise in the sex ratio when the sex ratio is large, are all positive and half of them
are signicant. This means that countries like China with very unbalanced sex ratios will
export goods in more volatile sectors than a country with a sex ratio around . This e¤ect
is also economically signicant. Consider a country with both export volatility and its sex
ratio around the mean level in the world, i.e., the country has an export volatility around
0.11 and a sex ratio around 1.05. If the sex ratio in the country rises to 1.13 (Chinas sex
ratio in 2005), the export volatility of the country will increase by 0:3 (1:13 1:05) ' 0:025,
where 0.3 comes from the empirical results in Table 3 that 2 is about 0.3 on average. This
means that as the sex ratio in the country rises to an very unbalanced level, 1.13 in this case,
the export volatility will increase by almost 0:025=0:11 100% ' 24%, which is economically
signicant.
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We also nd in Table 4 that most 1s are negative and some of them are signicant,
which means that a small rise in the sex ratio from the balanced level may possibly induce
countries to export more in less volatile sectors, but the e¤ect can be very small. All these
results are consistent with our theoretical predictions.
There are many caveats with the empirical patterns. First, in spite of our best e¤orts,
there may still be potential control variables that are missing from our list. Second, the
sex ratio (and some other variables) can be endogenous and/or measured with errors. This
would normally call for an instrumental variable approach. At this point, we are not able to
come up with convincing instrumental variables in a cross-country context. We leave this
to the future research.
4.3 Conclusion
We construct a theoretical model in this paper to analyze how a major social structure
changes in countries like China, namely a rise in the surplus of men relative to women,
will a¤ect the entrepreneurial activities. We nd that, when the sex ratio is close to one,
as the sex ratio rises, fewer men choose to become entrepreneurs which in turn leads to a
reduction in the aggregate entrepreneurial activities. However, when the sex ratio becomes
very unbalanced, a rise in the sex ratio will induce more men to take the risk and pursue
the returns, which leads to an increase in the entrepreneurial activities in the economy. In
an open economy model with two sectors, a risky sector and a risk free sector, we show
that, when the home countrys sex ratio is su¢ ciently large, it is more likely to have a
comparative advantage in the risky sector.
There exists some empirical evidence that supports our theory. Wei and Zhang (2010)
nd that a rise in the sex ratio in China leads to more entrepreneurship. In addition to
their work, we also test the relationship between exports and sex ratios. We nd that (i) if
the sex ratio becomes very skewed, the exports in more volatile sectors tend to rise, and (ii)
a country with a very unbalanced sex ratio tends to have a large aggregate export volatility.
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Both of the results are consistent with our theoretical ndings.
The paper can be extended in a number of directions. First, since entrepreneurship is
an important source of economic growth, we can analyze how sex ratio can inuence the
growth in countries like China. Second, we can investigate the welfare implications of the
rise in the sex ratio. This could be very interesting because, a rise in the sex ratio is an
adverse shock on men which may result in a worse situation to men. Social welfare may
fall as the sex ratio rises (Du and Wei (2010)). But at the same time, a rise in the sex ratio
may stimulate the economic growth by inducing more men to be entrepreneurs. This means
that high welfare may not be equivalent to fast economic growth, which is very useful to
discuss the real optimal policies. We leave these topics for future research.
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Figure 4.1: Volatility 1 (output per worker growth) vs Sex ratio, scatter plot and Lowess
smoother
Notes: a. The fth graph shows the Lowess smoother conditional on variables ln(countrys
income), labor market exibility and commodity exporter dummy. We rst regress both
Vol 1 and sex ratios on those three variables and collect the residuals. Then we trace out
the lowess smoother between the residuals. b. The sixth graph shows the Lowess smoother
conditional on variables ln(countrys income) and labor market exibility after excluding
commodity exporters. We rst regress both Vol 1 and sex ratios on the two variables and
collect the residuals. Then we trace out the lowess smoother between the residuals
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Figure 4.2: Volatility 2 (annual sales growth) vs Sex ratio, scatter plot and Lowess
smoother
Notes: a. The fth graph shows the Lowess smoother conditional on variables ln(countrys
income), labor market exibility and commodity exporter dummy. We rst regress both
Vol 2 and sex ratios on those three variables and collect the residuals. Then we trace out
the lowess smoother between the residuals. b. The sixth graph shows the Lowess smoother
conditional on variables ln(countrys income) and labor market exibility after excluding
commodity exporters. We rst regress both Vol 2 and sex ratios on the two variables and
collect the residuals. Then we trace out the lowess smoother between the residuals
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Figure 4.3: Scatter plot of two sectoral volatility measures
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Table 4.1: The Ten Least and Most Volatile Sectors at the 3-Digit SIC Level, Vol1
SIC Vol 1 # of rms Description
275 0.033 - Commercial Printing, Lithographic and Gravure
271 0.036 - Newspapers: Publishing, or Publishing and Printing
308 0.046 - Plastics Products
381 0.046 - Detection, Navigation, and Nautical Systems and Instruments
205 0.048 - Bread and Other Bakery Products
279 0.05 - Typesetting, Platemaking and Related Services
359 0.051 - Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Equipment
276 0.051 - Manifold Business Forms
323 0.051 - Glass Products, Made of Purchased Glass
328 0.053 - Cut Stone and Stone Products
SIC Vol 1 # of rms Description
333 0.291 - Primary Smelting and Rening of Copper, Aluminum
261 0.266 - Pulp Mills
214 0.232 - Secondary Smelting and Rening of Nonferrous Metals
334 0.219 - Animal and Marine Fats and Oils, oil mills
207 0.215 - Fertilizers, Pesticides and Agricultural Chemicals
291 0.205 - Leather Gloves and Mittens
287 0.197 - Cigars
315 0.193 - Leather Gloves and Mittens
206 0.164 - Sugar, candy and gum
286 0.163 - Industrial Organic Chemicals
Notes: NBER-CES Manufacturing Productivity database does not report the number of rms in
the industries.
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Table 4.2: The Ten Least and Most Volatile Sectors at the 3-Digit SIC Level,
Vol2
SIC Vol 2 # of rms Description
386 0.028 14 Photographic Equipment and Supplies
284 0.04 38 Perfumes,soap and Other Toilet Preparations
365 0.042 26 Household Audio and Video Equipment
352 0.045 11 Farm Machinery and Equipment
251 0.048 18 Household Furniture
342 0.05 10 Cutlery, Handtools, & Hardware
282 0.051 21 Plastics Materials, Synthetic Resins
372 0.053 33 Aircraft
273 0.053 13 Books: Publishing, or Publishing and Printing
371 0.054 80 Motor Vehicles and Passenger Car Bodies
SIC Vol 2 # of rms Description
131 0.296 207 Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas
299 0.262 15 Lubricating Oils and Greases
281 0.208 30 Alkalies and Chlorine & Industrial Chemicals
122 0.201 25 Bituminous Coal and Lignite Surface Mining
367 0.172 260 Electronic Components & Accessories
283 0.164 447 Medicinal Chemicals and Botanical Products
369 0.158 44 Electrical Machinery, Equipment
399 0.157 22 Linoleum, and Other Hard Surface Floor Coverings
333 0.155 13 Primary Smelting and Rening of Copper, Aluminum
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Appendices
Appendices to Chapter 1
A1.1. Proof of Lemma 1
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is bounded, and notice that 0 <  1 

F  < 1, then as k goes
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which completes the proof.
A1.2. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. (i) We approximate the optimal price in the home produced tradable good sector
around "t = "t = 0, and we obtain



































We can rewrite the equation above as
 


















1  mN   
!235 2
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  (mH +mN )cKt






































  (mH +mN )cKt
Under a exible exchange rate regime,




































































































) 1 (mH +mN )cKt
where
det (








1  mN > 0
Similarly, under a xed exchange rate regime, we have
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(1 + it 1)Bt 1 + (1 + it 1)StBt 1
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The similar condition holds for the foreign capital stocks.











































The capital stock in period t does not depend on the choice of exchange rate regime
from period t  1 to period t. Therefore, cKt takes the same value under two exchange rate
234
regimes and we can obtain
































































is close to zero and dP Htfixed   dP Htflexible !  2 < 0
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   1





which means that as At goes to innity, neigher kH or kN will converge to zero. Then mH
and mN converge to innity as At approaches innity, and
dP Htfixed   dP Htflexible
= 2 det (
) 1
264 2kHkNm2N + 2k2HmNmH + kHmN
 2kHkNmNmH    (kNmN + kHmH)  
375





























+ kHmN    (kNmN + kHmH)   > 0
Then dP Htfixed   dP Htflexible > 0
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Now we show that
dP Htfixed and dP Htflexible is increasing in At.
We can rewrite the di¤erence between
dP Htfixed and dP Htflexible as
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= positive :terms 
264 (1  H) kHkN
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For the second term in (4.26), it is easy to show that MCH
1 
MCN
1  is increasing in At if
H > N . Then by plugging the expression of
kH
kN
into (4.26), we can easily show that, the
second term is also increasing in At. Therefore,
@
dP Htfixed   dP Htflexible
@At
> 0
Since all functions in the model are continuous, there must exist a critical value of the
labor productivity, A0 such that
dP Htfixed   dP Htflexible
At=A0
= 0
For At > A0,














Y Tt = (yHt)
fixed
Since  > 1,
(P HtYHt)
flexible > (P HtYHt)
fixed
the export revenue in the tradable good sector is higher under a exible exchange rate
regime than that under a xed exchange rate regime.
For At < A0,














Y Tt = (yHt)
fixed
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and similarly due to  > 1,
(P HtYHt)
flexible < (P HtYHt)
fixed
the export revenue in the tradable good sector is lower under a exible exchange rate regime
than that under a xed exchange rate regime.
(ii) By (4.26), it is easy to show that
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 > 0. Therefore,
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1  , mH and mN are all close to zero, and then
dPNtfixed   dPNtflexible ! 0





then dPNtflexible < dPNtfixed
for all At > 0.
A1.3. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We rst compare the welfare gain in period t if the home country switches from a
exible exchange rate regime to a xed exchange rate regime.





































where PTt is approximately the price of imported good for very small !,
PTt ' 




Under a exible exchange rate regime, we have







































flexible   ln P = 
2
2







flexible   ln PN
i
Similarly, under a xed exchange rate regime,








































fixed   ln PN
i
Then
















As for the disutility from labor supply, up to the second order of , we approximately
242
have





































































































and t:i:regime means the term independent of the exchange rate regime choices.


































As we have shown in the previous section,
dP Htfixed dP Htflexible and dPNtfixed dPNtflexible are of the same order of 2. Then up to the second order of , the welfare
243
gain of switching to a xed exchange rate regime in period t is
Et 1






















































































If we add up the budget constraint of two countries, then we have















































Nt   P t Ct   P inv;tIt

(1  )Ct  Wt
Pt
Lt + rtKt +
t
Pt






The value function can be written as a function of the only predetermined variable Kt based
244
on this new budget constraint.
For small 2, we can approximately obtain







































































"t    q
dP Htfixed   dPTtfixed
 

"t    q




























The expected welfare di¤erence between a xed and a exible exchange rate regime is
V fixedt   V flexiblet
=  
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375dP Htfixed   dP Htflexible(4.27)
The rst term on the right hand side of (4.27) is independent of the home production and
has an ambiguous sign. The second term is negative. And the last term has an ambiguous
sign according to Proposition 1.
For very large At, for instance At !1, the last term on the right hand side of (4.27) is
negative. According to Proposition 1, as At !1,
dP Htfixed   dP Htflexible converges to
innity, which will dominate the rst term on the right hand side of (4.27) even if the rst
term is positive. Then we have
V flexiblet > V
fixed
t
There is a welfare loss if switching from a exible exchange rate regime to a xed exchange
rate regime.
For very small At, for instance At ! 0, the third term disappears and
























































There is a welfare gain if switching from a exible exchange rate regime to a xed exchange
rate regime.





t   Et 1V flexiblet

@At







1  and K are increasing in At.





















































L. We take the deriv-
ative of 
















1   bH   bN
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1  mN + 1

L is also in-
creasing in At. By Proposition 1,
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There exists a critical value there exists a critical value of the labor productivity, Aw0 , such
that it is indi¤erent in choosing a exible and a xed exchange rate regime. For At > Aw0 ,
there is a welfare loss if switching from a exible exchange rate regime to a xed exchange
rate regime. For At < Aw0 , the result reverses. Welfare improves is switching to a xed
exchange rate regime.
A1.4. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. In period t  1, both countries are at the steady state, then we have



































































  (mH +mN )cKt
Based on the same reasoning as in Proposition 1, the home country will have the same
Kt under two exchange rate regimes. Since we are interested in the di¤erence betweendP Htfixed and dP Htflexible, we can simply drop this term in the following calculations.





















We can approximately write the optimal price in the tradable good sector as following:














































































mH dP Ht +mNkNdPNt
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
3777777775
Under a exible exchange rate regime, up to the second order of  and a, we have
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Similarly, under a xed exchange rate regime, up to the second order of  and a, we
have



















































1  mN   
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Then we calculate the di¤erence between optimal prices under the two regimes. For the
tradable good price, we have









































































As A ! 0, i.e., steady state labor productivity in the home country is extremely low,
then
dP Htfixed   dP Htflexible !  2
264 1 + 2a2

1 P1n=1 sn  n+11  


1 P1n=1 sn  n+11  a + 1
375
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is increasing in n. Due to the fact
P1
n=1 sn = 1 and sn is decreasing









Then, as A! 0, dP Htfixed < dP Htflexible
As A!1, i.e., steady state labor productivity in the home country is extremely high,









converge to innity. Then dP Htfixed > dP Htflexible
and
dP Htfixed   dP Htflexible will also converge to innity.
To calculate the derivative,
@
dP Htfixed   dP Htflexible
@ A
we only need to calculate the derivative of the additional term with respect to A resulted









































Under the assumption in Proposition 1, we can similarly show that this term is increasing
in At. Then
@
dP Htfixed   dP Htflexible
@ A
> 0
Following the same proof of Proposition 1, we can show (ii) and (iii) hold.
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A1.5. Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. We rst compare the welfare gain in period t if the home country switches from a
exible exchange rate regime to a xed exchange rate regime.
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Under a exible exchange rate regime, we have
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The gain in the consumption-led utility of switching to a xed exchange rate regime is

















































As for the disutility from labor supply, up to the second order of , we approximately
have













































































































and t:i:regime means the term independent of the exchange rate regime choices.


































As we have shown before,
dP Htfixed dP Htflexible and dPNtfixed dPNtflexible are
of the same order of 2. Then up to the second order of , the welfare gain in period t of
257
switching to a xed exchange rate regime is
Et 1







































































































































































351A+ bit   bit
=

"t   a"at    q
dP Htfixed   dPTtfixed
 

"t   a"at    q
dP Htflexible   dPTtflexible
Then the expected welfare di¤erence between a xed and a exible exchange rate regime
is
V fixedt   V flexiblet
=  





























































































375dP Htfixed   dP Htflexible
The rst three terms on the right hand side of (4.27) are independent of the home production
and have ambiguous signs. The fourth term is negative and the last term has an ambiguous
sign according to Proposition 3.
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For very large A, for instance A!1, the last term on the right hand side of (4.27) is
negative. According to Proposition ??, as A!1,
dP Htfixed dP Htflexible converges to
innity, which will dominate the rst three terms on the right hand side of (4.27). Then we
have
V flexiblet > V
fixed
t
It is optimal for the policy maker to choose a exible exchange rate regime.
For very small A, for instance A! 0, the fourth term disappears and

























































































1 P1n=1 sn  n+11  a   
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Kq + lH L

then we have
V flexiblet < V
fixed
t
which means, for countries with very low labor productivities, it is optimal for the policy
maker to choose a xed exchange rate regime.
Notice that, allowing for labor productivity shocks, the additional term compared to
260
the benchmark case does not depend on A, therefore, we have
@
h




and the same results hold as in Proposition 2.
Appendices to Chapter 2
A2.1. Proof of Proposition 5







 (1  F (w)) + mf(w)
i
+(1  w)u02w;n + f (w)u02w (u2w   u2w;n)
375 = 0
 u01m +
264 u02m (m + [ (1  F (m)) + wf(m)])
+ (1  m)u02m;n + f (m)u02m (u2m   u2m;n)
375 = 0
We show by contradiction that w = u2m;n   u2m and m = M(w) hold for   1.
Suppose not, then
m > M(w)  w
where the second inequality holds because   1. Then we have
m = u (Rswy)  u ((Rswy +Rsmy)) > w  u (Rsmy)  u ((Rswy +Rsmy))









(1  F (w)) +M(w)f(w)









(1  F (w)) +M(w)f(w)






 (1  F (m)) +M 1(m)f(m)




Contradiction. Therefore, we have m =M(w) and sm  sw5 for   1.
Since 12    1, at  = 1
(Rsmy +Rswy)  max (Rswy, Rsmy)
Then, in the neighbourhood of  = 1, we have u02m < u02m;n.6
We proceed in two steps. In the rst step, we assume that inequality u02m < u02m;n
holds for all values of , and prove that a higher sex ratio leads to a higher savings rate. In
the second step, we prove by contradiction that the inequality indeed holds for all values of
.
Substitute the expression of w and m into (4.40) and (4.41), totally di¤erentiating the
4The second inequality holds because (i)
1

(1  F (w)) +M(w)f(w) =  (1  F (m)) +M 1(m)f(m)
by using the uniform distribution assumption; and (ii),
u2m   u2m;n > u2w   u2w;n
5We can sm  sw for   1 by contradiction. Suppose not, then sw > sm, following the same steps as
showing m =M(w), we nd a contradiction.
6The conditions for the equation u02m = u
0
2m;n are (Rs
my + Rswy)  max (Rswy, Rsmy) and  = 1,
which cannot hold at the same time.
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system and re-arrange the matrix, we obtain











1CA , ds =
0B@ dsw
dsm
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[1  F (w)]  u02m   u02m;n < 0
It is easy to show that
det (




























u022m;n   u02m;nu02   (u02)2


























(max   min)2  0
and hence det (
) > 0.















The sign of ds
w
d is ambiguous. As we showed, for  > 1, s
w  sm, which means that even
if ds
w





The response of the aggregate savings rate in the young cohort to the rise in the sex












































Obviously, the second term on the right hand side are positive. When  = 1, both women
and men have the same savings rates. As the sex ratio rises, we have shown that men raise
264
their savings while women reduce their savings. Then sm > sw, which implies that the rst
and the third terms on the right hand side are positive. Therefore, the aggregate savings
rate of the young cohort increases as the sex ratio rises. Since the (dis-)savings rate of the
old cohort is xed, an increase in the savings rate by the young cohort translates into an
increase in the economy-wide savings rate.
We now show by contradiction that u02m < u02m;n must hold for all s. Suppose not,
then u02m > u02m;n may fail sometime. Due to continuity of E, there exists a level of sex








































































= 0, we calculate the second order deriva-




















































By iterating this process forward, we obtain that





= 0 for any k > 0
This means that A equals zero for all s, which contradicts with the result at the beginning
of the proof that A 6= 0 when  = 1. In other words, there exists no 0 such that A = 0
holds. Therefore, inequality u02m < u02m;n must hold for all s.
Remarks: In this proof, we have assumed a uniform distribution for emotional utility i
(i = w;m). We note that many other distributions can give us the same results as long as
















and f(w) is small enough.


























7We use normal distributions in the calibration section, which gives the same qualitative result.
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A2.2. Proof of Proposition 6






where we use the fact that men and women are symmetric when  = 1 and hence they
choose the same savings rate. Notice that (4.29) is the same rst order condition for a
life-time bachelor, then even if there are some men or women choosing to be single, they
choose the same savings rate s. For a representative woman, at the balanced sex ratio, if
she chooses to enter the marriage market, with probability F () she can get married and
receive welfare
V w = ln ((1  s)y) + F () ln (R (2s) y)
+ (1  F ()) ln (Rsy) + E [j w  ]
 ln ((1  s)y) +  ln (Rsy) = V wn
where the inequality holds because  > 1=2 and E [j w  ]  0. Therefore, entering the
marriage market is a dominant strategy for all women. Since men and women are symmetric
when  = 1, all men and all women will enter the marriage market with probability one at
the balanced sex ratio.






























where the rst equality in (4.30) holds because
@m
@





























[1  F ()] d   

















and the rst inequality in (4.30) holds because






Men lose as the sex ratio rises while the e¤ect on womens welfare is ambiguous.
Now consider womens welfare. Given the equilibrium sm and sw under a sex ratio of ,
if a woman deviates from the equilibrium choice sw, for instance, by choosing a savings rate
sw0 = sm, then she would receive a lower life-time utility V w0 ( V w). Since sw0 = sm  sw,
this woman will have a better situation than all other women in the marriage market, i.e.,
she is more likely to get married and also more likely to marry a better man. Then




1  0u2w0;n + Z
w
M (w + u2w0   u2w) dF (w)

 u1w0 + 

(1  F (w))u2w0 + F (w)u2w0;n +
Z
w
M (w) dF (w)

= u1m + 

(1  F (w))u2m + F (w)u2m;n +
Z
w
M (w) dF (w)

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 u1m + 




 1 (m) dF (m)
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= V m
where u1w0 , u2w0 and u2w0;n denote the rst period consumption-led utility, the second period
consumption-led utilty when she gets married, and the second period utility when she fails
to get matched with any man, respectively. u2w is the second period consumption-led utility
for all other women who get married. The rst inequality holds because the woman faces a
greater possibility of getting married and also she will receive a higher expected emotional
utility from her husband. The second inequality holds because, women are more likely than
men to get married and also women are expecting to receive higher emotional utilities from
their spouses than men.
Therefore, for   1, we can show that V w  V m, women always achieve higher welfare
than men.
For a representative man in the marriage market, given his rivalschoices, if he choose
to stay in the marriage market, he will follow the rst order condition (4.41) and achieves
an approximate life time utility u1m + u2m;n. If he chooses to be single, he maximizes the
life time utility u1 + u2. The rst order condition in this case is
 u01m + u02m = 0
The two savings decisions, in the marriage market and being single, will be di¤erent since
the representative man would follow di¤erent rst order conditions. Then
V mn = maxu1 + u2 > u1m + u2m;n ! V m
when  ! 1. The representative man will then choose to be single which violates the
assumption that, for all s, entering the marriage market is the dominant strategy for all
men. Therefore, there much be a threshold 1 such that for   1, V mn = V m.
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For   1, with probability 1 , a representative man will choose to enter the marriage
market, and with probability 1  1 , he remains single. For a representative woman, since
she earns the same rst period income as a representative man, we can show that
V wn = V
m
n = V
m < V w
Therefore, the representative woman would choose to enter the marriage market with prob-
ability one.
As for the aggregate savings rate in the young cohort, we have showed in Proposition
5 that for  < 1, as the sex ratio rises, the aggregate savings rate in the young cohort
will rise. For   1, as the sex ratio rises, some men begin quitting the marriage market
and choose a di¤erent savings rate according to (4.43). Compare (4.41) with (4.43), it
is ambiguous whether sm > smn or not, then the e¤ect on the aggregate savings rate is
ambiguous.
A2.3. Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. We rewrite the the economy-wide savings rate as following


















t strictly increases in  since men will
save at a higher rate than women. sP then is an increasing function of . By the expression
of the current account to GDP ratio, this is also the condition that the current account is
an increasing function of the sex ratio. Therefore, the economy-wide savings rate and the
current account rise as the sex ratio becomes more unbalanced.
A2.4. Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. Since capital can ow freely internationally, the interest rates are equal in both
countries. By (4.2) and (4.3), the wage rates are also equal in the two countries.
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Given the same wage rates, the households in the two countries have the same rst
period income. By Proposition 5, Country 2 will have a higher savings rate than Country
1. On the other hand, in equilibrium, given a constant R, the investments in both countries
are the same, and the world capital market always clears. Therefore, Country 2 runs a
current account surplus and Country 1 runs a current account decit.
A2.5. Parental savings and endogenous sex ratios
In this appendix we make the sex ratio for any cohort to be an endogenous choice of their
parents. We introdue parental savings for children, which is a part of the economy-wide
household savings. To incorporate these features, we consider an OLG model in which every
cohort lives two periods (young and old). Everyone works and earns labor income in the
rst period. If one gets married, the marriage takes place at the beginning of the second
period, and the couple produces a single child right away. They derive direct emotional
utility from having a child, and the value of this emotional utility could depend on the
gender of the child. Parents are altrustic toward their child and can save for their child
(and transfer the savings to the child to augument his/her income).
As noted in Wei and Zhang (2011), widespread sex selective abortions are a relatively
recent phenomenon because the inexpensive technology (especially Ultrasound B machines)
used to detect the gender of a fetus became available only within the last three decades. For
example, 1985 was the rst year in which half of the county-level hospitables in acquired
at least one ultrasound B machine (Li and Zheng, 2009). Therefore, the rst cohort born
with a severe sex ratio imbalance was entering the marriage market around 2003. In the
model, we assume sex-selective abortions are not technologically feasible in periods before
t0 so that the sex ratio is always balanced. Starting from period t0 that parents can directly
choose a sex ratio t for the next cohort cohort. As a result, parents in period t have a son




Parents can save for their child, and that savings potentially depends on the gender of
271
their child. Let T it+1
8 be the amount of the parental savings for their child, where i = w
(a daughter) or m (a son). A young persons rst-period income is the sum of the labor
income y and the transfer from her/his parents:
yit+1 = y + T
i
t+1
With this setup, the optimization problem for a representative young woman who enters
the marriage market is





















where V mt+1 (V
w
t+1) is the life-time utility of the womans son (daughter). 
s and d are the
emotional utility each parent obtains from having a son and a daughter, respectively. 
is the parameter representing the degree of parental altruism toward their child which is
assumed to be independent of the childs gender. We assume   1=2.9
Let cw1t and S
w














t   T it+1

where Smt is the rst period savings by a representative man and i (=w or m) stands for
8T i can be negative, which means young people make a transfer to their parents.
9This assumption is made to ensure the existence of a steady state in the long run equilibrium.
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the childs gender.
As in the benchmark model, we assume a uniform distribution for i. The optimization












































where u02;m;t+1 and u02;w;t+1 stand for her marginal utilities when she has a son and a daughter
in the second period, respectively. uw;m2;t+1 and u
w;w
2;t+1 stand for the utilities obtained from
consumption when the representative woman has a son and a daughter, respectively.







































Parents optimally choose how much to save for (and transfer to) their children. For






10 In this extension,
w = max
 
M 1 (m) ; u2m;n  
 
















M (w) ; u2w;n  
 














The rst order condition with respect to Twt is
  u02;w;t + u01w;t = 0 (4.33)
Similarly, the rst order condition for parents with a son is
  u02;m;t + u01m;t = 0 (4.34)
Parents also optimally choose the sex ratio (although they dont directly choose the













Since this paper focuses on countries with a preference for son, we assume s  d.
We also make the Darwinian assumption that Em and Ew are su¢ ciently large so that
marriage is strongly attractive. Totally di¤erentiating (4.31), (4.32), (4.33) and (4.34), we
have the following proposition:
Proposition 16. Assume emotional utilities are drawn from an independent and identical
uniform distribution (min; max), with the mean of emotional utility su¢ ciently large such
that f()1 F () is close to zero, assume also u(c) = ln c, and assume further that the sex ratio
becomes a choice variable from period t0 onwards, then there is a unique old steady state
before period t0, and
(i) t  1 (t  t0);
(ii) In the long run new steady state, equilibrium sex ratio is greater than one. Compared
to the old steady state, both young men and parents with a son in the new steady state have
a higher savings rate, while the relative savings rates for young women and parents with a
daughter in the two steady states are ambiguous. However, both the total savings rate for the
young cohort and the parental savings rate for children in the new steady state are higher
than in the old stead state.
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(iii) In period t0, both young men and parents with a son have a higher savings rates
relative to their counterparts in the earlier periods, but the changes in the savings rates by
young women and parents with a daughter are ambiguous. However, the aggregate savings
rate is higher and the country runs a current account surplus in period t0.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 5, we rst show that mt = M(
w
t ) if parents
choose a sex ratio t  1. Suppose not, then at least in one period, k,
mk > M(
w
k )  wk































































































































which is a contradiction! Therefore, we must have mt =M(
w
t ), (and S
m
t  Swt also holds)
if t  1. By (4.33) and (4.34), we can also show by contradiction that Tmt  Twt . Suppose












Since Smt  Swt , Tmt > Twt must hold if the above inequality holds. Contradiction again
with the assumption. Thus we much have Tmt  Twt .




k   u2;m;k   V mk = s   d  0
Similar to the previous analysis, we have
wk =M














Similar to the proof of Proposition 5, if E is large enough such that
E M (w) + u2w   u2w;n
we can show that
V wk = u(c
w













































This would have to imply that
u2;w;k + V
w
k   u2;m;k   V mk < 0
which is a contradiction with the initial assumption! Therefore, t  1 much hold in each
period (t  t0). We can check that if s = d, due to the symmetry in men and womens
optimization problems, we have t = 1.
By the assumption that sex ratio only becomes a choice variable from t = t0 onwards,
parents in all previous periods take as given sex ratio is balanced. That is, t = 1 for
t <= t0. They make optimal decisions on savings for themselves and savings for children by
solving the rst order conditions, (4.31), (4.32), (4.33) and (4.34). In the initial equilibrium
277







  (u2;m;t + V mt + s) = t0 1
where t0 1 is obtained by solving (4.31), (4.32), (4.33) and (4.34), which represents the
di¤erence in the parental welfare between having a daughter and having a son. In the initial
equilibrium, young men and young women, parents with a son and parents with a daughter







by assumption s  d, we have t0 1  0. To see the savings responses to the shock in
period t0 that permits an endogenous choice of the sex ratio, it is equivalent to the savings
responses to an permanent increase in  (from a negative value to zero).
For any level of , by combining the equations (4.31), (4.32), (4.33), (4.34), (4.35) and
women and mens value functions, and totally di¤erentiating them, we can obtain





































































































































































































































































































































































































































P13;t =  u001w;t, 
P14;t = 0, 
P15;t = 0, 
























































((1 + t) (1  F (M (wt ))))


























































P31;t =  u001w;t, 








P34;t = 0, 

P
35;t = 0, 

P






P41;t = 0, 

P











45;t = 0, 

P





P51;t = 0, 

P










55 = 0, 

P




































E [wj w > wt ]
2t

P66;t =  1, 
P67;t = 0

P71;t = (1  F (M(wt )))u02;m;n;t+1
































75;t =  E [mj m > M(wt )]


















































































0B@1  F (wt )
t
+ f(w)

































































































































































In the rest of the proof, we assume E is su¤ciently large such that f (w) is very
small compared to 1   F (w). In the long run equilibrium where Swt 1 = Swt , Smt 1 = Smt ,




  dx = dz
We can show that the determinant of matrix 













P13 + P13  
P24 + P24
   

























































































P13 + P13  
P24 + P24
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P + P )
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The sign of dT
w
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where we dene Gt as the identity matrix, and it is easy to show that
G11;t+1 > 0, G12;t+1 > 0, G13;t+1 > 0, G21;t+1 > 0, G22;t+1 > 0 and G23;t+1 > 0











in each period. Suppose not, there exists a k < 1 that, in period k + 1, both inequalities
hold but in period k, at least one of the inequalities fails.






















































It is easy to show
Fk > 0




















d > 0. Then
dTmk










































































































































































but the sign of dT
w
t
d is ambiguous. In period t0 when the shock occurs, the aggregate
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In a small open economy similar to the benchmark model, the aggregate savings rate and
293
current account to GDP ratio are
sPt0 =
Qt + (R  1) NFAt 1   cyoungt0   coldt0
Qt






















where NFAt 1 is a predetermined variable and W is constant in a small open economy. In
period t0, as we showed above, both the young and the old will reduce their consumptions in
response to the new technology that allows for endogenous determination of the sex ratio.
The aggregate savings rate rises. If E is large enough such that f(
w)





decreases after the shock and therefore, current account also rises.
A few remarks are in order. First, in the new steady state11, sex ratio is greater than one.
To see the intuition, we demonstrate that choosing a balanced sex ratio cannot be optimal
when a son brings greater intrinsic utility to parents. Suppose parents did choose to have
a balanced sex ratio, then both young men and young women would face a symmetric
optimization problem. Then parents would make the same transfer to child regardless
of childs gender, and young men and young women would also make the same savings
decisions. Since s > d, at the balanced sex ratio, having a son will yield a greater utility
to parents. Parents will optimally deviate by choosing a higher sex ratio.
Second, it is intuitive that parents with a son will make greater savings in period t0 in
response to the technology shock since they expect their son to face more severe competitiion
in the marriage market, but why dont parents with a daughter necessarily reduce their
11 In the longer working paper version, we show that there exists a steady state both before and after the
shock.
294
savings in period t0? On the one hand, as they expect their daughter to face a more
favorable marriage market, they have an incentive to reduce their transfer to her. On the
other hand, a higher sex ratio also implies that their daughter has a greater probability to
have a son, and she and the son-in-law will likely to have to make a greater sacrice in their
consumption and make a greater transfer to their son. Since parents with a daughter care
about the utility of their daughter, they would want to share the burden of their daughter
and make a greater transfer to her. Given the two conicting incentives, the net e¤ect of
a higher sex ratio on parental transfer is ambiguous. [Notice that, for parents with a son,
a higher sex ratio also raises the probability that their son may have a grandson in the
future.]
Third, in the longer working paper version, we show that the sex ratio is higher in
the new steady state, and the sex ratio during the transition rises monotonically from the
initial to the new steady state. To see this, we note that parents with a son in period t0
would make a greater transfer to their son based on the logic of the previous remark. The
aggregate transfer made by all parents to their children also rises. This raises the initial
wealth of the young cohort in period t0 + 1. As this cohort now are more capable of their
own son, if they have one, with his marriage, they are more likely to choose to have a higher
sex ratio. This process continues until the economy reaches the new long run equilibrium
when the utility loss associated with an additional transfer to their child just exceeds the
utility gain associated with a further increase in the sex ratio.
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Appendices to Chapter 3
A3.1. Proof of Proposition 9
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NNt L NNt
NN (1  N )1 N
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(1  T )ATtKTTt (1  LNt) T 1

41 = 0, 









(1  T )ATtKTTt (1  LNt) N 1
and
z1 =  Ru02, z2 = z3 = z4 = 0
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Since the consumption on the nontradable goods by the young cohort must be less than the



















































































































In period t + 1, the shock has been observed, (2.2) and (2.4) hold in equilibrium. By
solving (2.2), (2.3), (2.4) and (2.5), we have
PNt = R
N T
1 T and Pt+1 = R
(N T )
1 T
which means that after one period the shock occurs, the price of the nontradable good and
the consumer price index will go back to their initial levels. As for the current account,
CAt = PNtQNt +QTt + (R  1) NFAt 1   PtCt  Kt+1
where NFAt 1 is the net foreign asset holdings in period t   1 and Kt+1 is the sum of
capital input in both the nontradable sector and the tradable sector in period t+ 1. Since
st 1wt 1 = NFAt 1 +Kt
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Then
CAt = stwt   st 1wt 1  Kt+1
where Kt+1 = Kt+1  Kt. The demand for the nontradable good is now
QN;t+1 =
w ((R  1) st + 1)
PN
where we drop the time subindex because wage rate and the relative price of the nontradable
good will go back to their initial levels. It is easy to see that since st > st 1, QN;t+1 >
QN;t 1.
As N < T , the nontradable sector has a lower capital-intensity than the tradable
sector. Then, in period t+ 1, Kt+1 < Kt 1.






w ((R  1) st + 1)
PN;t+1
In the equilibrium, all markets clear and we can obtain
Kt+1 =
T   (T   N ) [(R  1)st + 1]
(1  T )R w
and then
CAt = stwt   st 1w + (T   N )(R  1) (st   st 1)
(1  T )R w
To show dCAtd > 0, we only need to show
d(stwt st 1wt 1)
d > 0. One su¢ cient condition
for the inequality is
stPNt > st 1PNt
















Plugging the expressions of dPNtd and
dst

























st  positive :terms
+positive :term
=









st  positive :terms + positive :term
As shown above, PNtCNt   (1   st)wt > 0, then dCAtd > 0, in period t, the country will
experience a current account surplus.
A3.2 Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. At  = 1, all women and men are symmetric and they make the same savings
decisions. Since 12    1,
(Rsmt wt +Rs
w
t wt)  max (Rswt wt, Rsmt wt) (4.39)
Then, in the neighbourhood of  = 1, we have u02m < u02m;n.12
We proceed in two steps. In the rst step, we assume that inequality u02m < u02m;n
holds for all values of , and prove that a higher sex ratio leads to a higher savings rate. In
the second step, we prove by contradiction that the inequality indeed holds for all values of
.
Assume that inequality u02m < u02m;n holds for all values of   1, the rst order
12The condition for the equality u02m = u
0
2m;n is (Rs
my+Rswy)  max (Rswy, Rsmy) and  = 1, which
is not possible in the model.
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 (1  F (w)) +M(w)f(w)
i
+(1  w)u02w;n + f (w)u02w (u2w   u2w;n)




264 u02m  m +  (1  F (m)) +M 1(m)f(m)
+(1  m)u02m;n + f (m)u02m (u2m   u2m;n)
375 = 0 (4.41)
We show by contradiction that w = u2m;n   u2m and m = M(w) hold for   1.
Suppose not, then
m > M(w)  w




































(1  F (w)) +M(w)f(w)








(1  F (w)) +M(w)f(w)






 (1  F (m)) +M 1(m)f(m)







Contradiction! Therefore, we have m =M(w) and sm  sw fo /r   1.



























































+f (w)2u002w (u2w +M(w)  u2w;n)











13The second inequality holds because (i)
1

(1  F (w)) +M(w)f(w) =  (1  F (m)) +M 1(m)f(m)
by using the uniform distribution assumption; and (ii),
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N )ANtKNNt LNt N 1
and
z1 = 0, z2 =
1
2
[1  F (w)]  u02m   u02m;n
z3 =  wt (s
m
t   swt )
1 + 
, z4 = z5 = 0




































































Notice that the consumption of the nontradable good by the young cohort must be less














































The sign of ds
w
t















































































31 < 0, and since z2 < 0, dPNtd < 0, which results
in a fall in the consumption price index and therefore a real exchange rate depreciation in
period t.
As for the current account,
CAt = PNtQNt +QTt + (R  1) NFAt 1   PtCt  Kt+1
where NFAt 1 is the net foreign asset holdings in period t   1 and Kt+1 is the sum of
capital input in both the nontradable sector and the tradable sector in period t+ 1.
Notice that
st 1wt 1 = NFAt 1 +Kt
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Then
CAt = stwt   st 1wt 1  Kt+1
where Kt+1 = Kt+1 Kt. By Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995), if the sex ratio remains constant
 after period t, the price of the nontradable good will go back to its initial level, which
means that real exchange rate will appreciate in period t+1. In this perfect foresight setup,
when rms make their optimal decisions, equations (2.2) and (2.4) hold. If we assume log
utility function, the aggregate savings rate by the young cohort will remain the same after
period t.
The demand for the nontradable good is now
QN;t+1 =
w ((R  1) st + 1)
PN;t+1
where we drop the time subscript because both the wage rate and the relative price of the
nontradable good would go back to their initial levels. It is easy to see that since st > st 1,
QN;t+1 > QN;t 1.
As in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995), we assume that N < T , the nontradable sector has
a lower capital-intensity than the tradable sector. Then, in period t+ 1, Kt+1 < Kt 1.






w ((R  1) st + 1)
PN;t+1























(R  1) (st   st 1) w
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(R  1) (st   st 1) w
R
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To show dCAtd > 0, we only need to show
d(stwt st 1wt 1)
d > 0. By (3.9), one su¢ cient
condition is for the inequality is
stPNt > st 1PNt















Plugging the expressions of dPNtd and
dst

























st  positive :terms
+positive :term
=









st  positive :terms + positive :term
As shown above, PNtCNt   (1   st)wt > 0, then dCAtd > 0, in period t, the country will
experience a current account surplus.
We now show by contradiction that u02m < u02m;n must hold for all s. Suppose not,
then u02m > u02m;n may fail sometime. Due to continuity of E, there exists a level of sex









































































= 0, we calculate the second order deriva-



















































By iterating this process forward, we obtain that





= 0 for any k > 0
This means that z2 equals zero for all s, which contradicts with the result at the beginning
of the proof that z2 6= 0 when  = 1. In other words, there exists no 0 such that z2 = 0
holds. Therefore, inequality u02m < u02m;n must hold for all s.
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A3.3. Proof of Proposition 11
Proof. If u (c) = ln c, solving the rst order condition under a balanced sex ratio for both
men and women in the marriage market, we can obtain
  1






which is the same optimal condition when a man or a woman chooses to be single. For
a representative woman, at the balanced sex ratio, if she chooses to enter the marriage
market, with probability F () she can get married and receive welfare



























where the inequality holds because  > 1=2 and E [j w  ]  0. Therefore, entering the
marriage market is a dominant strategy for all women. Since men and women are symmetric
when  = 1, all men and all women will enter the marriage market with probability one at
the balanced sex ratio.











































where the rst equality in (4.42) holds because
@m
@





























[1  F ()] d   

















and the rst inequality in (4.42) holds because








Men lose as the sex ratio rises while the e¤ect on womens welfare is ambiguous.
Now consider womens welfare. Given the equilibrium smt and s
w
t under a sex ratio ,
if one woman deviates from the equilibrium choice swt , for instance, by choosing a savings
rate sw0t = smt , she would receive a lower life-time utility V w0t ( V wt ). Since sw0t = smt  swt ,
this woman will have a better situation than all other women in the marriage market, i.e.,
she is more likely to get married and also more likely to marry a better man. Then




1  0u2w0;n + Z
w
M (w + u2w0   u2w) dF (w)

 u1w0 + 

(1  F (w))u2w0 + F (w)u2w0;n +
Z
w
M (w) dF (w)

= u1m + 

(1  F (w))u2m + F (w)u2m;n +
Z
w
M (w) dF (w)

 u1m + 
"
(1  F (M (w)))u2m + F (M (w))u2m;n +
Z
M(w)




where u1w0 , u2w0 and u2w0;n denote the rst period consumption-led utility, the second period
consumption-led utilty when she gets married, and the second period utility when she fails
to get matched with any man, respectively. u2w is the second period consumption-led utility
for all other women who get married. The rst inequality holds because the woman faces a
greater possibility of getting married and also she will receive a higher expected emotional
utility from her husband. The second inequality holds because, women are more likely than
men to get married and also women are expecting to receive higher emotional utilities from
their spouses than men.
Therefore, for   1, we can show that V wt  V w0t  V mt , women always achieve higher
welfare than men.
For a representative man in the marriage market, given his rivalschoices, if he choose
to stay in the marriage market, he will follow the rst order condition (4.41) and achieves
an approximate life time utility u1m + u2m;n. If he chooses to be single, he maximizes the
life time utility u1 + u2. The rst order condition in this case is
  u01m + u02m = 0 (4.43)
The two savings decisions, in the marriage market and being single, will be di¤erent since
the man will follow di¤erent rst order conditions. Then
V mn = maxu1 + u2 > u1m + u2m;n ! V m
when  ! 1. The representative man will then choose to be single which violates the
assumption that, for all s, entering the marriage market is the dominant strategy for all
men. Therefore, a threshold as 1 exists and at   1, V mn = V m.
For   1, with probability 1 , a representative man will choose to enter the marriage
market, and with probability 1  1 , he remains single. For a representative woman, since
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she earns the same rst period income as a representative man, we can show that
V wn = V
m
n = V
m < V w
the representative woman will enter the marriage market with probability one.
As for the aggregate savings rate in the young cohort, we have showed in Proposition
1 that for  < 1, as the sex ratio rises, the aggregate savings rate in the young cohort
will rise. For   1, as the sex ratio rises, some men begin quitting the marriage market
and choose a di¤erent savings rate according to (4.43). Compare (4.41) with (4.43), it
is ambiguous whether sm > smn or not, then the e¤ect on the aggregate savings rate is
ambiguous.
A3.4. Proof of Proposition 4










v0i   v00i Lit
(4.44)
where i = w;m.
Similar to the proof of Proposition 2, we can show that m =M(w) and smLm  swLw
for   1. Since at  = 1, women and men are symmetric, and hence sm = sw and Lm = Lw.
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Notice that the consumption on the nontradable goods by the young cohort must be less than





















































The sign of ds
w
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Under the assumption v
00L






, then we have
dLt
d > 0, which means the aggregate labor supply is increasing in the sex ratio.
















































54 < 0, then dPNtd < 0, which results in a fall in the
consumption price index and therefore a real exchange rate depreciation in period t.
As for the current account,
CAt = PNtQNt +QTt + (R  1) NFAt 1   PtCt  Kt+1
where NFAt 1 is the net foreign asset holdings in period t   1 and Kt+1 is the sum of
capital input in both the nontradable sector and the tradable sector in period t+ 1.
Notice that














wt   st 1wt 1Lt 1  Kt+1
where Kt+1 = Kt+1  Kt. Following Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995), if the sex ratio remains
constant at  after period t, the price of the nontradable good will go back to its initial
level, which means that the real exchange rate will appreciate in period t+1. In this perfect
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foresight setup, when rms make their optimal decisions, equations (2.2) and (2.4) hold. If
we take the log utility function, the aggregate savings rate by the young cohort will remain
the same after period t.














where we drop the time subindex because wage rate and the relative price of the nontradable
good will go back to their initial levels. It is easy to see that since st > st 1, QN;t+1 >
QN;t 1.






















In equilibrium, all markets clear and we can obtain
Kt+1 =
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d > 0. By (3.9),




























































Plug the expressions of dPNtd and
dst
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st  positive :terms + positive :term
As shown above, PNtCNt   (1   st)wt > 0, then dCAtd > 0, in period t, the country will
experience a current account surplus.
A3.5. Welfare analysis and discussions of policy interventions
We conduct a simple welfare analysis and use it as a basis for evaluating policy interventions
aimed at reducing current account imbalances. Consider a benevolent central planner who
cares about the overall welfare of men and women when utility is transferable. The central
planner can do anything, including cutting down the sex ratio. We rst compute the welfare
loss of a rise in the sex ratio. Then we compare the welfare consequences of two di¤erent
ways to reduce the current account surplus: (i) taxing the tradable good and (ii), reducing
the sex ratio.
There are two sources of market failures that the central planner would avoid: (a)
men save competitively to improve their relative standing in the marriage market; and (b)
both men and women may under-save as they do not take into account the benets of
their own savings for the well-being of their future spouses. The central planner assigns
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the marriage market matching outcome and optimally chooses womens and mens savings








The rst order conditions are











2(1  F (M (w)))u02m + F (M (w))u02m;n

= 0 (4.46)
Comparing (4.45), (4.46) to (3.14) and (3.16), in general, it is not obvious whether women
or men will save at a higher rate in a decentralized equilibrium than that under central
planning. However, when  = 1, we can show that the two sets of rst order conditions are
identical, and therefore, women and men will save the same rates under a central planning
economy as in a decentralized economy.
There are two opposing e¤ects. On one hand, a part of the savings in the competitive
equilibrium is motivated by a desire to out-save ones competitors in the marriage market.
The increment in the savings, while individually rational, is not useful in the aggregate,
since when everyone raises the savings rate by the same amount, the ultimate marriage
market outcome is not a¤ected by the increase in the savings. In this sense, the competitive
equilibrium produces too much savings. On the other hand, because the savings contribute
to a pubic good in a marriage (an individuals savings raises the utility of his/her partner),
but an individual in the rst period does not take this into account, he/she may under-
save relative to the social optimum. These two e¤ects o¤set each other. Therefore, when
 = 1, the nal savings rate in the decentralized equilibrium could be the same as the social
optimum.
In calibrations with a log utility function, we show that mens welfare under a de-
centralized equilibrium relative to the central planners economy declines as the sex ratio
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increases. In comparison, womens relative welfare increases as the sex ratio goes up. The
social welfare (a weighted average of mens and womens welfare) goes down as the sex ratio
rises.
As a thought experiment, one may also consider what the central planner would do if
she can choose the sex ratio (in addition to the savings rates) to maximize the social welfare.




The only sex ratio that satises (4.47) is  = 1. In other words, the central planner would
have chosen a balanced sex ratio. Deviations from a balanced sex ratio represent welfare
losses.
We now consider the welfare e¤ect of two policy interventions aimed at reducing the
current account imbalance: i) taxing the tradable good and ii), reducing the sex ratio.
We rst consider the case of taxing the tradable good. Suppose the home country
will impose a tax  on the tradable good in period t and fully rebate this tax revenue to
consumers, then the price taken by the tradable good producers will be 1    . In period
t+1, when the current account goes back to zero, home will reduce the tax to zero. During
the period in which the shock occurs, (3.18) becomes
wt =
(1  ) (1  T )ATt












where variable Z denotes the variable when there is a tax on the tradable good.
As we have shown in the proof of Proposition 10,







(R  1) (st   st 1) w
R
(4.48)
where yt is the rst period income of the young cohort. We assume that a fraction a
(0  a  1) of the tax revenue will distributed to the young cohort in period t while the
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rest will refund to the old cohort. Then the nontradable good market clearing condition






NN (1  N )1 N
=  (Rst 1wt 1 + (1  a)QTt + (1  st) (wt + aQTt)) (4.49)
and the wage parity is
wt =
(1  ) (1  T )ATt













Given KTt and KNt are predetermined, we can show the following proposition:










+ (1  st) (wt   PNt) (T + LNt   1)  0









+ (1  st) (wt   PNt) (T + LNt   1) < 0
taxing the tradable good can reduce the current account surplus. However, everyone in Home
will experience a welfare loss (on top of the welfare loss associated with an unbalanced sex
ratio).
Proof. As we have shown in Proposition 10, if the utility function is of log form, then savings
rates will not depend on the rst period income. We then can take the savings rates as
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11 = CNt, 
12 =  (1  st)

13 =  (1  a+ a (1  st)) (1  T )QTt
1  LNt

21 = 0, 
22 = 1, 












z1 =  (1  a+ a (1  st))QTt
z2 =   wt
1  
z3 = 0































(PNCN   (1  a+ a(1  st))w)
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. In the standard literature, both N
and T take value greater than 0.25, then
N
LN
+ T1 LN > 1.
Notice that (1  a+ a(1  st))w is only part of the demand for the nontradable good,
which must be smaller than PNCN , therefore, det (
) > 0.
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+(1  st) (wt   PNt) (T + LNt   1)
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T = PNt. In period t, when shock occurs, as we
have shown in Proposition 10, wtPNt increases. However, it is unclear whether it exceeds one.












By (4.48), taxing the tradable good cannot reduce the current account surplus caused by












< 0. Taxing the tradable good can achieve the goal of cutting down the current
account surplus. However, this also reduces the rst period income by the young cohort.
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
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1  T + (1  st) (wt   PNt)
T + LNt   1
1  T < 0
taxing the tradable good will cut down the current account surplus, however, at the same
time, it will reduce the economy-wide welfare.
When Home taxes the tradable good sector, the wage rate in that sector decreases
immediately, which induces a migration of labor from the tradable sector to the nontradable
good sector. The tradable good sector shrinks. Since the young people also get all the tax
refund, whether this tax refund can o¤set the decrease in wage rate is ambiguous. Since
the total tax refund equals the tax on per unit tradable good multiplied by the quantity
of tradable output, a shrinkage of the tradable good sector implies less tax revenue from
the tradable sector and a smaller transfer to consumers. However, consumers only bear a
part of the tax burden through a lower wage. Firms bear the other part of tax burden by
receiving a lower return to capital. Since the entire tax revenue is transferred to consumers,
there is an indirect transfer from rms in the tradable sector to consumers. The net e¤ect
on the rst period income of the young cohort is ambiguous.
If the central planner can reduce the sex ratio, then as shown Proposition 10, a reduction
in the sex ratio will yield a fall in the current account. Correspondingly, there will be a
welfare gain for young men but a welfare loss for young women. The aggregate social welfare
will improve.
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Appendices to Chapter 4
A1.1. Proof of Proposition 13
Proof. If the sex ratio is close to one, all male workers get married. Let Nmt =
nmt
1+ denote
the number of entrepreneurs in the economy. We total di¤erentiate the equations (4.6),
(4.7), (4.9), (4.11), (4.13), (4.14) and (4.15), we can obtain

0  dx = dz
where 
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24F(M2) 1(min)1+ 1+(1 )nmt  se;Lt LtWt
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[1  F (m)] dm
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+(1  )
0B@ swt Wt=Ltset+swt Wt=Lt 1(Nmt )2 + (1  ) RM3(min) [1  F (m)] dm














































































































































































0B@ RM3(min) [1  F (m)] dm































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  0 holds.
331






























































































































































































As the sex ratio rises, a smaller fraction of men will choose to be entrepreneurs.








> 1. Otherwise, some entrepreneurs will switch
to become workers. By (4.5), we have


















1+ will hold, which means some male work-
ers cannot get married. In this case, failed entrepreneurs will never get matched with
any woman. They optimally choose their savings rate equal to 1+ by (4.10). We total
di¤erentiate the equations (4.6), (4.8), (4.12), (4.13), (4.14) and (4.15), we can obtain

  dx = dz
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where 
 is a 6 6 matrix with elements
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12 = 0, 
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21 = 0











































































































































































































































53 = 0, 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As the sex ratio rises, a larger fraction of men choose to be entrepreneurs.












the number of entrepreneurs in sector 2 negatively depends on the number of entrepreneurs
in sector 1.











We total di¤erentiate the equations (4.6), (4.7), (4.9), (4.11), (4.13), (4.51) and (4.21),
or the equations (4.6), (4.8), (4.12), (4.13), (4.51) and (4.21) to analyze the e¤ect of a rise
in the sex ratio on the choices of being an entrepreneur in sector 1 or a worker. Notice that,
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(4.5) and (4.23), (4.14) and (4.51), only di¤er in constant terms which do not a¤ect any
derivative properties. Then, the two systems (when sex ratio is small and when sex ratio is
large) are the same as in Proposition 13. Therefore, all the results in Proposition 13 hold if
we only take entrepreneurs in sector 1 as the entrepreneurs in Proposition 113.
In sum, If  is small enough, (i) When the sex ratio is small (close to one), as the sex
ratio rises, a smaller fraction of men will choose to become entrepreneurs in both sector 1
and sector 2; (ii) When the sex ratio becomes su¢ ciently unbalanced such that no failed
entrepreneurs can get married, as the sex ratio rises, a larger fraction of men choose to be
entrepreneurs in sector 1 while a smaller fraction of men will choose to be entrepreneurs in
sector 2.
A4.3. Proof of Proposition 15
Proof. Let nmjt and Njt denote the fraction of men who choose to be entrepreneurs in sector
j in the home country and the total number of sector js entrepreneurs in the world, re-
spectively. Since we assume the home country is small, it will take the interest rate which
is determined by the world capital market as given. This in turn can pin down the wage
rate in the home country by (4.2) and (4.3).
For a representative entrepreneur with productivity zit in the home country, the sales
revenue is










where Pw1t and P
w





is the world GDP, which is exogenous to the home country. Then











































Assume that the aggregate demand for the nal good in the home country is Y Dt . Then
























respectively. Then, exports in sector 1 and sector 2 are










Y wt   Y Dt

and










Y wt   Y Dt

respectively.













may hold, where x1t and x2t are the shares of sector 1s export and sector 2s export,
respectively. Then the home country is more likely to have a comparative advantage in
sector 2. When the sex ratio becomes su¢ ciently large, as in Proposition 14, if the sex ratio


















may hold. Then the home country is more likely to have a comparative advantage in sector
1.
